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PREFACE 
The title of this study suggests its dual purpose. F;i.rstly~ 
it outlines a theory pf,1diJ::'ect foreign investment; in less 
developed countries. Secondly, it examines the Eracti'c;::e 
of fqreign investwent, using the c;::pvpe~-nickel project 
in Botswana as the case stu4y. 
The dissertation is qivided ~pto three major sections. 
Section I brie~ly descr~bes the political and ecbno~i~ 
history of Botswqna and di$cusses some of the major 
features of the post-inde~endence polit~cal. ~con9my. 
Section II is a survey 0£ the theory bf direct foreign 
investment in underdeveloped ~<;mmtries. Chapters 3 and 
~ putliqe a theoreti9~l mod~l and the remainder of the 
section attempts to a~ses$ the impact of foreign invest-
ment on a host economy. Altho~gh the analysis applies 
~pecifically tq mineral extraotiop it is often applicaple 
' 
to ~anµfacturing and plantation investment as well. I . 
It has to be emphasised that the discussion contained 
in Section.II is conducted at the most general levei~ 
The underdeveloped "country" is an "ideal" type or 
paradigm - an economy where t;he great m~~ority of the 
population is pependent upon the traditional agricultural 
sector, where there is wide~pread unemployment apd u~der­
employment, ~n<;l wh~re the distribution o:t; wealth and 
in~om~ is ext+emely in~quitable. The industrial sector 
is small and i~ dominated by the foreign investor. Such 
an account cannot poi;-tray the stat-e of af:ea·irs·:, prevailing 
in a particular co~ntry - it is prob.;ibly q. ~q.:re· accurate 
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description of the paradigmatic African country than of 
a Latin Americap or Asian country. Nevertheless, the 
reader must bear in mind that Section II is concerned 
essentially with describing a general pattern and, 
given its underiying assumptions, must be assessed in 
tenns of its internal consistency. Peculiar features 
of an existing country, legislation passed by the govern-
ment, or particular provisions cont~in~d in the agreements 
between the company and the host governm~nt may modify 
conclusions reached in Section II without denying the 
validity·of the analytical framework. Section II can 
be read in isolation from pec~ions I and III. However, 
because of certain peculiar features of the case study, 
the general theoretical analysis is particularly useful. 
For reasons listed below, the contents of Section III 
frequently rely on estimation and prediction and the 
general theoretical frctmework outlined in Section II 
enables us to predict more easily the outcome of events 
currently occurring in Botswana. 
Section III describes the development of the copper-nickel 
industry in Botswana. Although negotiation and exploration 
commenced in 1959, the first shipment of matte was delivered 
to the United States refinery in early 1974. Thus many 
significant effects of direct foreign investment are 
not yet apparent and, as noted above, one is compelled 
to rel¥ on a measure of conjecture. Furthermore, because 
~otswana is only in its ninth year of independence many 
impo+tant statistics are, as yet, inadequate. or unavail-
able, despite the considerable achievements of the 
planners and statisticians. 
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S E C T I 0 N I 
TEE REPUBLif OF BO'l'SWANA - an introductor¥ survey_ 
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CHAPTER 1 
The Political Framework 
1.1 Introduction 
------------
·Although the dissertation focuses upon the growth of a 
single enterprise - namely the copper-nickel industry at 
Selebi-Pikwe - it is crucially important to appreciate 
the broader context within which the industry is situated. 
This is particularly significant in the case of a large 
scalemineral extractive industry in a less developed 
economy, where the industry in question occupies such a 
prominent and pervasive position in the economy as a 
whole. 'l'he growth of the mining sector cannot be analysed 
in isolation from the rest of the economy and the prevail-
ing political ideology. 
'I'his chapter commences with a description of the geo-
graphical and ethno-demographic features of Botswana. 
This is followed by an attempt to outline the development 
of the internal political structure. The following 
chapter attempts to provide a brief description and 
analysis of the major features of Botswana's economy. 
1.2 §~2S~~Eh!9-~~g-~~h~2:Q~~2S~~Eh!£_~~~!~E~§ 
Botswana is a vast country covering some 570 000 square 
kilometres. It is part of the Southern African sub-
continent and is considerably larger than Lesotho and 
Swaziland, and somewhat smaller than the Republic of 
South Africa. The country is landlocked sharing boundaries 
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with South Africa, Namibia (South West Africa), Rhodesia 
and Zambia (see Maps A l and A 2). 
Botswana's outstanding characteristic is the chronic 
lack of water, a factor which acts as a major constraint 
on economic development - agricultural, manufacturing 
and mining. 
Most of Botswana's development potential is concentrated 
in the Eastern sector where the relatively good rainfall 
combined with the presence of underground water provides 
good pastorage making the east excellent cattle breeding 
territory. 1 Moreover the country's only railway line -
the Bulawayo-Mafeking line - runs through the eastern 
sector. Segments of this rich cattle breeding area are 
privately owned by foreign controlled companies and white 
absentee owners - the Tuli, Gaborone and Lobatsi Blocks 
(owned by the Anglo American Corporation/Charter 
Consolidated) and the Tati Concession Area (owned by 
the Tati Company) . 
The north-western area of Botswana is dominated by the 
large (6 500 square metres) swampy delta formed by the 
Okavango River. This represents an important, as yet 
untapped, source of much needed water which could be 
used not only for irrigation schemes in the immediate 
vicinity but also for providing water for the mining and 
industrial sectors in theremainder of the country. 
Feasability studies are being undertaken to assess the 
possibili~y of using the swampwaters for agricultural 
and industrial purposes. 
The Southern and Central areas of the country are dominated 
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by the sparsely peopled Kalahari Desert which is a great 
sandveld closely covered by thornbush and grass. Surface 
water is non-existent and where borehole water is 
available in sufficient quant~ties cattle ranches have 
been established. 
The northern area enjoys a relatively high rainfall with 
large tracts of indigenous forest and dense bushveld. 
'l'he potentially rich Makarikari salt pans lie in the 
Southern portion of this area. 
The population of Botswana, including absentees, is 
estimated at 671 379, of which 660 118 are Botswana 
citizens. The resident population is estimated at 
574 094, of which some 57 per cent is below twenty years 
of ages. 2 
The largest, relatively modern, business centres are ~he 
• capital, Gaborone (population 18 436), Francistown 
(19 903) and Lobatsi (12 920). The most densely populated 
centres·are however the areas of the traditional 
villages, foremost amongst them: ,being Serowe, Molepolole, 
Kanye and Mmadinare. Because of frequent absence at 
cattle posts and migration to South Africa it is extremely 
difficult to estimate the population of these rural 
centres. Approximately 80 per cent of the country's 
population live in the eastern sector. 
Botswana is peopled primarily by the Tswana who are one 
of the three main ethnic and linguistic divisions of the 
Sotho group of Bantu-speaking peoples of central south 
Africa. Many Tswana reside outside of Botswana, particu-
larly in South Africa. The Europeans excepted, there are 
\ 
' I 
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also considerable nurr~ers of members of other ethnic 
groupings residing in Botswana although the great majority 
of these are also Bantu-speaking peoples and are generally 
subject to the rule of Tswana chiefs, 3 the Bushmen being 
a notable exception. 
The Tswana, although, in Schapera's opinion, sufficiently 
homogenous to be classed as a single group, are subdivided 
into several subgroups, clusters (which comprise several 
different tribes), and into a large number of individual 
tribes. The eight major tribes (or, in Schapera~s termino-
logy, they would probably be referred to as "clusters") 
have all been granted portions of land, as distinct from 
the areas of "state land" and the, primarily white owned, 
freehold territory. Thus Botswana is divided up into two 
large tracts of state land, the tribal territories of 
the Bamangwato, Bangwaketse, Batlokwa, Bamalete, Bakgatla, 
Barolong, Batawana and Bakwena tribes, and the freehold 
territories of the Tuli, Gaborone and Lobatsi Blocks, 
the Tati Concession Area, and the Ghanzi farms (Map B). 
1,3 E21!~!£~1_Q~Y~12EID~n~4 
Botswana's political status is that of fully independent 
nation state. She is a member of the United Nations and 
the Organisation of African Unity. The country is . 
governed along Western parliamentary lines similar to 
the system prevailing in the United States. The ruling 
political party is the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) 
headed by the President, Sir Seretse Khama. 
Botswana's road to independence has been an extremely 
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interesting and thorny one. I will not attempt to describe 
the political development of the Botswana Republic in any 
detail, and the following constitutes little more than 
a chronological outline of the major events influencing 
the political history of Botswana. 
Possibly the most outstanding characteristic of Botswana''s. 
political development is the degree to·. which it was in-
fluenced or, indeed, determined, by events and conflicts 
of a far wider nature, events and conflicts which, in 
essence, were unrelated to the internal affairs of the 
territory. The most important factor influencing the 
territory of the Tswanas was the conflict between Boer 
and Briton. This conflict eventually, at various times, 
involved the British, German, Transvaal and Cape Govern-
ments, Rhodes and his British South Africa Company and 
the London Missionary Society in the Tswana territory. 
The importance of the missionaries cannot be over-
emphasised - the London Missionary Society sent some 
of its most dynamic members to the Tswana territory, 
foremost amongst them being Robert Moffat, David 
Livingstone and John Mackenzie, and their powe.r and 
influence over the tribal chiefs, the British Governments 
and the British people cannot be ignored. 
Modern political development appears to date from 1852 1 
when the Sandriver Convention was signed. This accorded 
a limited degree of political independence to the 
Transvaal and effectively meant that the Tswana w~~e 
faced for the first time by an organised political 
K. entity. The Convention specifically forbade the Transvalers 
from encroaching upon Tswana territory. It was, however, 
the Transvaal's claim to the Western portion of the 
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Tswana territory, territory which included the "missionaries' 
road" to the north that brought the Transvaal into conflict 
with. the men of the.London Missionary Society, and also 
conflicted with Rhodes' dream of an empire to the north. 
The Transvaalers' interest was strengthened by the dis-
covery of gold in the Tati Area in 1860. In the same year 
the Transvalers annexed the Tati Gold Area but because 
of the simultaneous discovery of the Kimberley diamond 
fields the expected gold rush did not occur and the 
annexation was never made effective. 
After a series of severe conflicts between the British 
and the Transvalers the Pretoria Convention was signed 
in 1881. The convention attempted to stipulate the 
boundaries of the Transvaal but this did not prevent 
Transvaal burgers from encroaching on Tswana territory. 
The presence of these Transvalers in Tswana territory 
led to the establishment of the Republics of Stellaland 
and Goshen, 5 both of which were in Tswana territory and 
crossed the re.ad to the north. 
In 1884 the British and Transvaal governments signed 
the London Convention. Small parts of Stellaland and 
Goshen were incorporated into the Transvaal although 
the British ensured that the road to the north remained 
open. The Transvaal burgers ignored the London Convention 
and began attacking Tswana territory. In late 1884~ 
after the Boers had raised the Transvaal flag at M~feking, 
a powerful British force under Colonel (later Gener~! 
Sir Charles) Warren was despatched to the Tswana territory. 
\ 
British action at this time was prompted by German \ 
acquisition of South West Africa and the possibility 
of a German-Transvaal link-up. 
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By Order-in-Council of June 1885 the British Government 
finally established a protectorate over British Bechuana-
land. On the 30th September 1885 the area South of the 
Molopo River was proclaimed British territory. This area 
fell under the jurisdiction of the Governor of the Cape 
Colony and was known as British Bechuanaland. The area 
north of the Molopo River to 22 ° S latitude fell under 
the jurisdiction of the High Commissioner and was known 
as the Bechuanaland Protectorate. 
Matters were not allowed to rest there. For one thing 
the tribal boundaries had not been determined but, of 
more imminent importance, was the granting of the Charter 
to Rhodes' British South Africa Company in 1889. The terms 
of the Charter gave the Company the right to acquire 
the powers necessary for government ih an area which 
incorporated the whole of the Bechuanaland Protectorate. 
Moreover it certainly appeared to be the intention of 
both the British Government and the British South Africa 
Company that the territory would eventually be administered 
in a similar fashion to Matabeleland and Mashonaland. 
Several of the important Tswana Chiefs, ably supported 
by the London Missionary Society, objected to the 
prospect of being administered.by the British South 
Africa Company and in 1895 Chiefs Kgama, Sebele and 
Bathoen went to London to plead their case. It was, 
however, the Jameson Raid, launched from the Bechuana-
land Protectorate, that put an end to Rhodes' designs. 
Furthermore in 1895 the separation between British 
Bechuanaland and the:'Bechuanaland Protectorate was 
finalised ~ the former was incorporated into the Cape 
Colony, and the latter was administered by a Resipent 
Commissioner directly responsible to the High Commissioner. 
-~--~, -~=-
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to give maximum authority to the traditional leaders, 
the British authorities soon found themselves embroiled 
in tribal disputes ·Of every nature. 
By 1920 it had become necessary to create a Native 
Advisory Council to advise the Resident Commissioner 
on all matters affecting African interests. Within a 
few months a European Advisory Council was formed. In 
1951 a Joint Advisory Council was formed. These councils 
had no legislative rights and it was this right that 
Tshekedi Khama sought most avidly. 
In.1958 Tshekedi was able finally to initiate a motion 
in the Joint Advisory Council calling for the establish-
ment of a legislative council. An Executive and Legis-
lative Council was formed although the latter was 
decidedly racist in its constitution, the Whites 
receiving a degree of representation out of all propor-
tion to their numbers. It was nevertheless a significant 
step towards responsible government. 
In December 1960 Botswanas first political party, the 
Botswana Peoples Party (BPP), was formed, followed in 
early 1962 by the formation of Seretse Khamas BDP. 
It was decided that talks would be held at Lobatsi in 
July 1963 to discuss the granting of internal self rule 
to the Protectorate. Pressure was however mounting for 
a grant of independence. The proposals of the Lobatsi 
Constitutional Conference were accepted by the British 
Government and elections·":were held in March 1965. The 
BDP gained a landslide victory and Seretse Khama was 
elected Prime Minister of the Protectorate's first 
African government. 
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The Government tabled its independence proposals in 
December 1965. The system of government prevailing in 
Botswana is broadly similar to that prevailing in the 
United States, with Khama as Executive President of the 
Botswana Republic. The most recent elections were held 
in 1970 and although certain opposition parties did gain 
a handful of additional seats the position of the BDP 
appears to be secure. The pan-Africanist BPP appears 
to be gaining considerable ground in the urban areas -
they hold both Francistown seats - whilst the newly 
formed Botswana National Front (BNF) appears to derive 
most of its support from the membership of ex-chief 
Bathoen II, formerly chief of the powerful Bangwaketse 
tribe. 
After 1910 it appears that the area south of Botswana, 
namely South Africa, did not exercise as direct an 
influence on events within the territory's boundaries 
as it had done in the nineteenth century. This is correct 
in a certain sense but the importance of the triangular 
relationship between South Africa, Botswana (then 
Bechuanaland) and Britain cannot be overemphasised. 
In terms of a schedule to the South Africa Act it is 
evident that Britain envisaged that the High Commission 
'rerri tories would eventually be incorporated into the 
Union of South Africa. At the time the British government 
preferred the somewhat vague assurance that they would 
not hand over the territories to South Africa before the 
wishes of the inhabitants had been ascertained. Neverthe-
less, it is evident that both Britain and South Africa 
were certain that incorporation of the territories into 
the Union would take place in the not too distant future. 
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This particular aspect of Botswanas history has been 
extensively documented. 7 Suffice it to say that none 
of the High Commission Territories were ceded to South 
Africa, although the expectation that this would 
eventually happen was to exercise an important influence 
on the nature of British rule in the Protectorate. 
When assessing the part played by Britain in the 
territory's economic and constitutional development 
one must bear in mind Britain~ extreme reluctance to 
extend her influence over the territory. In 1885 it 
was explicitly stated that Britains major motive in 
according protectorate status to the territory was to 
safeguard the road to the north and to counter German 
expansion and the possibility of a German-Transvaal 
territorial alliance. Moreover, it appears that Britain 
did not envisage bearing responsibility for the terri-
tory ~s administration for a protracted period. It 
appears that, shortly after the declaration of a protec-
torate, it was accepted that the British South Africa 
~oliipany would assume responsibility for the government 
of the territory. Furthermore from 1909, if not earlier, 
the British Government appears to have assumed that the 
protectorate would eventually pass into the hands of 
the Union Government. These factors undoubtedly contribut-
8 
ed to Britain's neglect of the Protectorate. Stevens 
asserts that, 
11 there can be little doubt that the British 
objective o.f establishing firm control over the 
road to the north was thus achieved. At the same 
time the acknowledged primacy of this goal was 
destined to have the unfortunate effect of 
retarding the social and economic advancement 
of the indigenous population and of delaying the 
Territory's political and constitutional 
evolution. 11 (p. 113) 
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A glance at the financial reco~ds of the Protectorate 
will illustrate one example of the attitude which 
Britain adopted towards Bechuanaland's development. 
The earliest available financial records are for the year 
1899/1900. From this year to i911/12 it appears that 
Britain provided some R 1 044 000 in the form of 
grants-in-aid after which these grants ceased. From 
1930/31 the Bechuanaland Protectorate received small 
annual allotments from the Colonial Development Fund. 9 
The report of the Pim Commission (1933) severely 
indicted B~itish policy in the Bechuanaland Protectorate 
and, in its concluding remarks, the Commission noted 
that, 
"Speedy results cannot be looked for and many 
.suspicions have to be removed. Nothing would 
do more to remove them than clear evidence that 
Native prosperity and Native advance in all 
directions, both economic and cultural, is the 
genuine concern both of His Majestiy's Govern-
ment in the United Kingdom and of the local 
administration." (par. 229) 
From the mid-1930 1 s it appears that the British Govern-
ment, prompted by the criticism of the Pim Report, 
showed an added interest in the development of the 
Protectorate. Allotments to the Protectorate under 
the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts showed a 
small, but steady, increase, the allocation under the 
1945 Act (which covered a period of five years) 
totalling R 2 033 750. ~evertheless between 1932/33 and 
1954/55 it appears that revenue collected by the local 
administration constituted some 83 per cent of total 
expenditure. Under the 1955 Colonial Development' and 
Welfare Act Bechuanaland's allotment was raised to 
R 2 668 000. By 1964/65 the annual expenditure from the 
Colonial Development and Welfare Fund had risen to 
R 1 756 000. 
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Grants-in-aid from the British treasury recommenced in 
l95b/57 when the surplus balance accrued during the war 
'years had been completely exhausted. The delay in 
reviving budgetary assistance was subjected to severe 
criticism. '!'he Morse Commission noted that, 
"In the ten1 years succeeding the war the policy 
of husbanding the Territory's surpluses and 
so postponing the day when a grant-in-aid would 
be imperative meant that the territory made very 
slight progress; the standards of the public 
service which were never lavish, became relatively 
depressed to a level from which recovery might 
well have been far slower than the decline. 11 
(p. 42) 
Over the period 1956/57 to 1965/66 grants-in-aid 
totalled approximately R 22 000 000. During that period 
the British Government's total contribution to the 
Protectorate was approximately R 40 000 000. In 1965/66, 
the year preceding independence, the grant-in-aid totalled 
R 3 740 000 and there was little prospect of this dependency 
being reduced in:tr.he foreseeable future. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 
1 The average rainfall for the whole country is about 
450 mm per annum. In the extreme south west the 
average is less .than 250 mm and in the extreme north 
east it is more than 650 mm. For more detailed in-
formation on rainfall see National Development Plan 
1973 - 78, chapter 8. · 
2 For a detailed breakdown of the population figures 
see Statistical Abstract 1972; Manpower and Employ-
ment in Botswana, 1973. Most of the information is 
derived from the 1970 Census. 
3 :For a detailed analysis of the Tswana group see 
Schapera (1953, 1970). 
4 For historical background see, inter alia, Sillery; 
Halpern; Stevens (1967). Also selected essays in 
Potholm and Dale {ed) . 
5 Despite the Pretoria Convention Transvaal burghers 
continued to acquire land in Tswana territory. This 
land was acquired either by outright freebooting, 
or from unscrupulous speculators and agents, ·Or 
in return for assisting in inter-tribal disputes. 
Stellaland and Goshen were acquired in the latter 
manner - see Sillery, chapter 6. Also Davenport and 
Hunt (eds). 
6 Blue Book C 4588. 
7 See particularly Hailey; Khama, Tshekedi; Stevens 
(1972). 
8 Henry, and Spence attempt to rationalise Britain's 
attitude towards the Protectorates. 
9 For an outline of Botswana's early financial history 
see Financial and Economic Position of the Bechuana-
land Protectorate (1933) Cmd. 4368, chapter III. 
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CHAP'l'ER 2 
The Major Characteristics of Botswana's Political Economy 
2.1 !~~!9gy2~~2E 
Before the implications of the growth of the mining 
sector can be assessed the framework within which the 
sector is situated must be outlined. I have attempted 
thus far to outli'ne Botswana's political history, 
and the remainder of this section attempts to highlight 
particular features· of the politico-economic framework. 
I have chosen to concentrate upon three broad features 
of Botswana's political economy. Firstly, Botswana as a 
member of the Southern African region; secondly, the\ 
characteristics of the labour force and the distribu\ion 
of income; and thirdly, a brief description of the \ 
economic base - the livestock and agricultural sector}\ 
the mining sector, and the manufacturing sector. 
2.2 !e~~~9~!e~E~-~£E!S~E-~~S!9E 1 
We have seen how so many aspects of Botswana's political 
and economic development have been determined by her 
geographical proximity to South Africa, or, in general, 
by her locational 11 membership 1~ of the Southern African 
sub-continent. Indeed, some of the most important· events 
.in Botswana's history constituted little more than a 
response to a situation prevailing elsewhere in the sub-
continent, and over which the people of Botswana exercis-
ed little or no control. 
Botswana's membership of the Southern African region 
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has remained an important determinant of her politico-
economic development. The question of the development 
potential of Botswana as part of the Southern African 
periphery is an important aspect of the discussion in 
Section III. In the present section, I will attempt to 
outline, as briefly as possible, the institutional features 
of the Southern African region. 
Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland (BLS) and South Africa have 
been members of the Southern African Customs Union since 
1910. 2 The 1910 Agreement was extremely brief. It provid-
ed for free interchange of goods between the member 
territories; it provided for a common external tariff 
at South African rates; the shares of the coro~on customs 
pool were specified by the agreement. Botswana received 
0,276 per cent of the revenue pool, Lesotho 0,886 per 
cent, and Swaziland 0,149 per cent, the remainder 
(98,689~ per cent) accruing to South Africa. Calculation 
of these shares was based upon an estimate of the customs 
and excise duty content of imports into the High Commission 
territories over the period 1906 ~ 08. In 1965 the shares 
accruing to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS) were 
adjusted, although the ELS share as a whole (that is, 
in relation to South Africa) was not altered. The 1910 
Agreement did not permit BLS to protect their industries 
against competition from South Africa. Furthermore, no 
provision was made for consultation between the partners. 
BLS received several clear cut benefits as a result of 
the existence of the Customs Union. Firstly,BLS did not 
' have to bear the financial' burden of administering a 
customs and excise department. Secondly,BLS enjoyed 
privileged access to the relatively large South African 
market. 
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The disadvantages of belonging to the Customs Union were 
equally clear cut. Firstly, the BLS countries were not 
permitted to protect. their industries from South African 
competitors. South Africa, on the other hand, utilised 
protective tariffs in order to· nurture her infant industrial 
sector. The common external tariff was set with South 
African priorities in mind and BLS consumers were compelled, 
on occasion, to pay a price above the world price to 
facilitate the growth of a South African industry. The 
bulk of BLS imports were from South Africa but they were 
not permitted to protect domestic industries which might 
wish to compete with one of the South African suppliers. 
Secondly, the BLS Governments were not able to exercise 
effective control over customs and excise rates which are 
a major source of government revenue and an important 
policy variable. Under the 1910 Agreement the growth in 
BLS revenue from Customs and excise duties did not 
reflect the growth of the BLS economies as a whole, but 
rather depended upon the state of trade in South Africa 
and the level of its duties. Robson points out that in 
196~/66 the proportion of ordinary revenue contributed 
by customs and excise duties amounted to 21 per cent, 
35 per cent and 32 per cent for Botswana, Lesotho and 
Swaziland respectively whereas in other African countries 
at similar stages of development the contribution made 
by this revenue source amounted to approximately 50 per 
cent to 60 per cent. 
In general, the BLS Governments were forced to relinquish 
control over important aspects of fiscal policy. The 
implications of this situation were clearly outlined 
in 1969 when the South African Government imposed a sales 
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tax on a wide variety of commodities, many of them 
consumer necessities, affecting the cost of living of 
the lowest income gr~ups. The BLS Governments were not 
consulted before the imposition of this measure but were 
forced to accept it. The actiori of the South African 
Government was subjected to severe criticism and probably 
served to emphasise many of the unsatisfactory implications 
of the Customs Union agreement. 
In December 1969 a new agreement was concluded. The new 
agreement is considerably more comprehensive than the 
1910 agreement and many of the provisions of .the new 
agreement attempt, it appears, to overcome some of the 
problems outlined above. At this stage no .attempt is 
made to assess the provisions of the existing agreement, 
and the following paragraphs merely attempt to describe 
the most important provisions of the agreement. 
The agreement provides for the free interchange of goods 
between the contracting parties (Articles 2 and 3) with 
certain exceptions (Articles 11, 12, 17). The customs 
duties and tariffs in force in South Africa will be 
applied to all goods entering the common customs area 
(Article 4). This is similar to the 1910 agreement. There 
are however certain provisions which differ radically 
from the provisions of the 1910 agreement and it is upon these 
that attention will be focused. 
Article 6 provides that the governments of BLS may impose 
additional duties ori goods imported" •.. to enable new 
industries in its area to meet competition from other 
producers or manufacturers in the common customs· area". 
The duration of the protection is limited to a period 
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of eight years. Article 7 provides that BLS may specify 
certain industries which are or are likely to be of 
major importance to ~heir economies, and request the 
South African Government to maintain or increase an 
existing tariff on a competing' import for a specified 
period. Thus the new agreement does afford some form of 
infant industry protection to BLS. 
Significant alterations have been made regarding the 
distribution of revenue (Article 14). The new revenue 
formula relates the actual revenue transfer from the 
customs pool to the value of each country's imports, and 
it attempts to divide the common pool in proportion to 
each country's consumption of goods. A multiplier of 1,42 
is then appended to the total arrived at in terms of the 
formula. Landell-Mills (1971) suggests that the multiplier 
is intended to compensate BLS for the price raising 
effects of protective tariffs and import quotas, for the 
loss of fiscal discretion suffered by BLS, and for the 
polarisation of development which inevitably occurs when 
underdeveloped regions are linked to a relatively advanced 
region in a customs union. The agreement itself does not 
attempt to rationalise the use or magnitude of the 
multiplier. 
Finally1the current agreement provides for the creation 
of a consultative body, the Customs Union Commission, 
which will meet at least once a year (Article 20). 
Various other articles provide for consultation in respect 
of particular problems (inter alia Articles 5, 7, 12, 14, 
17, 18). 
The implications of the new agreement will be examined 
in detail in Section III. 
- 21 -
The other important institutional feature of the Southern 
African region is the de facto Currency Union 3 existing 
between BLS and South Africa with the Rand serving as 
legal tender in BLS. 
Certain advantages accrue to BLS from the existence of 
the Currency Union. Firstly, the cost of manufacturing 
and administering a currency is avoided. 
Secondly, and more important, the use of a powerful, well 
established currency increases the confidence of domestic 
savers and foreign investors. Furthermore the use of a 
single currency facilitates trade between the member 
countries. 
There are, however, many serious disadvantages arising 
from membership of the Currency Union. Firstly, use of 
the Rand effectively means that BLS are providing South 
Africa with an interest free loan, insofar as they (that 
is BLS) do not earn anything from the backing of the 
currency in circulation. 4 
Secondly, BLS do not have access to the fiduciary issue.· 
This is an inexpensive source of finance which is not 
available to the BLS planners. 
Thirdly,membership of the Currency Union severely 
restricts the BLS governments in their use of monetary 
policy. 'The money supply adjusts automatically to 
fluctuations in the balance of payments, a surplus in 
the external accounts effectively means that currency 
is imported. As Muzorewa points out, this means that 
BLS cannot suf~er from an external payments problem, 
but it also implies that BLS cannot«:x:mtJ:bl, 1the~:,supply 1 ()f·noney.and 
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it is possible that the BLS planners do not consider the 
maintenance of external equilibrium to be a major priority. 
They may prefer to maximise employment opportunities 
which depends on the unfettered ability to finance 
development projects which, in turn, is strongly influenced 
by the ability to control :.,the11,money supply. 
Problems of a similar nature arise from the existence 
of a common foreign exchange pool. It might be argued 
that the foreign exchange pool effectively means that 
Botswana faces no foreign exchange constraint and may 
import in unlimited quantities. However, as pointed 
out above, the fact that the money supply is dependent 
upon the balance of payments acts as the relevant 
constraint for if the country wishes to expand the 
money supply it will have to forgo imported goods and 
services. Furthermore,BLS have to obtain the approval 
of the South African authorities to remit funds to the 
non-sterling area. 
In general membership of the monetary union does force 
BLS to relinquish control of monetary policy. They may 
not use exchange rate fluctuations as a policy instrument. 
Their ability to control the money supply is severely 
limited and credit conditions in BLS will be strongly 
determined by the situation prevailing in South Africa. 
In essence then both the Customs,and_Currency Uniori force 
BLS to relinquish a significant degree of control over 
fiscal and monetary policy to the more developed partner, 
South Africa. The above is not intended as a rigorous 
appraisal of the Customs and Currency Unions, but rather 
as a description of the institutional features of the Southern 
African region. The implications for Botswana of belonging 
to the Customs and Currency Unions will be examined in 
greater detail in the case study. 
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2.3 Labour and the Distribution of Income 
-------------------------------------
The need to ensure ~ rapid growth of employment oppor-
tunities and an equitable spread of income is, as shall 
be discussed at a later stage, a major priority of the 
Botswana planners. Thus discussion of the labour 
market and the distribution of income is an important 
aspect of the analysis that follows and it is necessary 
to describe the existing situation in some detail. 
a) Employment and Unemployment 
Table 2.1 reveals some important movements in the 
labour force between 1964 and 1971. The economically 
active population increased by 1,62 per cent per 
annum over the period. Employment for cash wages 
. 
increased by 6,75 per cent per annum and employment 
for cash wages in the modern sector increased by 
8,28 per cent per annum. The portion of the popula-
tion solely dependent upon family agriculture in-
creased by only 0,75 per cent between 1964 and 1971. 
Thus by 1971 8,9 per cent of the population were 
earning cash wages, which compares very favourably 
with Kenya (6 per cent), Uganda (3,5 per cent) and 
Tanzania (2,5 per cent). The proportion of those 
actually in receipt of cash 'income increases con-
siderably when the remittances of the migrants working 
in South Africa are taken into account. 
The statistics do however require closer examina~ion. 
In 1964 12,6 per cent of the economically 
active population were receiving cash wages and 
by 1971 this had increased to 18,l per cent (an 
TABLE 2. 1: The Growth in Population, Employment, Labour Force and Migrancy - 1964 - 71 
Total Resident Migrants Non-Cash Family Cash Cash Employment Resident Population Total Excluding 
Population Aged 10 + Aged 10 + . Agriculture Employment . Agriculture 
Economically Active Population Aged 10 + 
1964 Males 236 025 153 423 35 728 125 4 77 100 450 25 030 16 598 
. ' 
" 
Females 266 703 182 476 6 394 125 201 118 580 6 630 5 470 
TOTAL 502 728 :B5 899 ' " 42 122 250' 678 219 030 31 660 1 22 068 
1971 Males 262 121 168 621 48 000 131 080 92 024 39 056 28 671 
Females 311 973 216 264 12 000 151 410 139 058 12 352 11 173 
TOTAL 574 094 384 .885 60 000 282 490 231 082 51 408 1 39 844 
Average Rates ' 
of Growth 2 1,80 I, 85 4,87 1,62 0,75 6,75 8,28 (Total) 
NOTES: Includes people working on tribal lands, many of whom may be employed only for a brief period. 
2 The inter-censal period was taken as being from 31st March 1964 to 31st August 1971, i.e. 
7,42 years. 
Source: Manpower and Employment in Botswana, Table A.I 
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increase, in absolute terms, of 19 748). When 
this is coupled with an absolute increase of 
31 812 in the economically active population the 
end result is that those relying on family agriculture 
alone still increased by approximately 12 000 (1 700 
per annum). 
There are no reliable estimates of unemployment and 
underemployment in Botswana. The 1973 Manpower Survey 
estimates that approximately 5 000 urban dwellers 
between the ages of 15 and 54 (that is, 13 per cent 
of the age group) were unemployed in 1971. Rural un-
employment and underemployment is even more difficult 
. to estimate. From Table 2.1 it appears that, although 
the numbers employed in traditional agriculture 
increased by approximately 5,6 per cent over the 
seven year period, the numbers of males employed in 
that sector actually decreased. However, as the 
Manpower Survey points out, this is as much a result of 
the rapid increase in emigration of males of working 
age as of the growth of domestic cash employment. 
Furthermore Table 2.1 does not reveal the important 
fact that approximately 57 per cent of Botswana's 
resident population is under 20 years of age which 
means that the planners will be faced in the near 
future with the task of providing employment fo.r the 
lar9e school-going population. 
The question of absenteeism is discussed below but 
suffice it to say that assumption 3 is considered 
unrealistic. As employment opportunities in Botswana 
expand the rate of emigration is likely to decrease 
somewhat and, although undesirable· in many respects, 
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Projected Growth in the Economically Active Labour 
Force to 1978 andl988 under.Alternative Assumptions 
of Rates of Emigration and Absenteeism 
Alternative 1971 - 1978 1978 - 1988 
Assumptions Increase Average Increase Average 
in Active Annual in Active Annual No 
Labour No of Jobs Labour of Jobs 
Force Required .. Force ... Required. 
l • Continued Emigration 35 734 5 100 79 067 7 900 and Absenteeism 
2. No Emigration, 5~ Q2a 8 100 l I 7 138 I I 700 Continued Absenteeism ' .1} ' ·.I '. ·l 
.. -
. ·vv 
3. No Emigration, Con-
tinued Absenteeism 67 948 9 700 126 602 12 700 
1972 level .,. ... .. ' ' ' . at 
. 
t~OTES: a) "Emigration 11 refers to those permanently absent 
from Botswana whilst "absenteeism" refers to 
those temporarily absent, usually i.n employ-
ment in South Africa. 
b) Declining mortality and fertility rates assumed 
in each case. 
SOURCE: Manpower and Employment in Bot~wana, Table 1.4. 
there is little reason to expect a decline in the 
rate of absenteeism (that is, those who seek work 
in the economies of other countries on a temporary 
basis). The emigration component is important - it 
is estimated that between 1964 and 1971 approximately 
36 000 people left Botswana permanently. The Manpower 
Report suggests that the situatio~ envisaged somewhere 
between assumptions 1 and 2 represents a realistic 
viewpoint. This implies that between 1971 and 1978 
some 6 000 or 7 000 additional employment opportuni• 
ties will have to be created each year. In the 
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following ten year period approximately 10 00~ new 
jobs will have to be created each year. The 1973 -
78 National Development Plan estimates that during 
the plan period 5 300 new jobs will be created each 
year 1 an average rate of growth of employment' .6f 
8,8 per cent per annum which effectively means that 
between 1973 and 1978 the planners expect to absorb 
some 80 per cent of the increase in the resident 
active labour force in formal sector cash employment. 
They acknowledge that the employment growth rate ·will 
not be as high as 8,8 per cent per annum in the 
following ten year period (1978 to 1988) although 
over the fifteen year period they expect total em-
ployment in the formal sector to grow by approximately 
6. per cent per annum. Thus by 1988 the planners expect 
140 000 people to be employed in the formal sector, 
more than 30 per cent of the resident active labour 
force. 
b) Labour Migration 
As is the case in most underdeveloped countries, the 
Botswana labour force is characterised by widespread 
migration between the rural and urban areas. Moreover, 
as with all the underdeveloped regions of Southern 
Africa, there is considerable movement of labour 
between Botswana and South Africa. 
The following table indicates that between 1964 and 
1971 urban population increased by 32 986 (approxi-
mately 4 123 per annum) whereas urban cash employment 
increased by 8 100, approximately l 013 per annum. 
Thus the proportion of the urban population in cash 
employment has declined from 41,5 per cent in 1964 
.I 
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'l'ABLE 2. 3: Urban Employment and Population Growth, 
1964 to 1971 
De Facto Urban Urban Cash Employment 
Population (estimate) 
1964 21 430 8 900 
1971 54 416 17 000 
iA.verage Annual 13,4 per cent 9, 1 per· cent Growth 
Estimated Labour 13,8 per cent I.Force Growth ( l) 
NOTE: l) Labour force is defined as that part of the 
population between 15 and 54 years of age. 
· 2) In order to calculate the labour force growth 
rate the.estimates have had to be weighted to 
allow for the higher concentration of males 
of working age in Selebi-Pikwe and Orapa, new· .. 
towns since 1964. 
SOURCE: Manpower and Employment in Botswana, Table 1.2. 
to. 31,2 per cent in 1971, implying an increase in 
both the number of unemployed and the rate of unem-
ployment in the towns.The Manpower Report states 
·emphatically that" ••• our estimate of 17 oo"o is an 
absolute maximum for urban employment in 1971, giving 
a maximum estimate for intra--censal growth in the 
urban areas" (p. 5). 
The table below indicates that by 1971 only 54,5 per 
cent of the urban population of working age were · 
employed in the formal sector. 
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TABLE 2.4: 
Total 
in 
Age-
Group 
15-54 
Males 14 877 
Females 14 751 
ro•11AL 29 628 
Population Aged 15 to 54 in Urban Areas 
in 1971, by Type of Economic Activity 
and Sex 
Not per Had per Had per 
Econo- cent been cent been cent 
mi cal- active active 
ly in in 
Act.ive Family cash 
.P-.gric. employ.-
only ment 
1 190 -8,0_ 782 5,3 12 905 86,7 
I 
6 195 42,0 5 320 36,1 3 236 21,9 
7 385 24,9 6 102 20,1 16 141 54,S 
SOURCE~ Manpower and Employment in Botswana, Table 1.1. 
It is, moreover, reasonable to expect a substantial 
increase in urban unemployment, as there is little 
reason to expect a decline in· the rate of rural-urban 
migration. Migration of this nature is encouraged not 
only by the rural-urban wage differential or by the 
attraction of the city's "bright lights" but is 
determined largely by the migrants' expectation of 
obtaining employment. Thus as cash employment oppor-
tunities in the urban areas increase so too will the 
rate of migration. Pikwe, the site of the copper-
nickel development, provides ample verification of 
this phenomenon as is evidenced by the rapid growth 
of a squatter village at the mine gates. The 
population of this village is estimated conservatively 
at 12 000. 
The extent of inter-country labour migration is also 
highly significant. 5 In 1972 the total number of 
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foreign black migrants working in Rhodesia and 
South Africa was estimated to total 840 000, 
approximately 7 per cent (58 800) of whom were 
citizens of Botswana. Thus there are at least as 
many Botswana in paid employment outside as insid~ 
the country. The migrants are expected to remit 
approximately R 1 000 000 per annum to their families 
and dependents in Botswana. The continuing importance 
of the South African labour market is succinctly 
expressed in a government white paper which noted 
that, 
11Although the numbers in modern sector cash 
employment represent almost 40 per cent of the 
male labour force - which is high by the 
standards of the developing world - this is 
largely due to the large numbers of people who 
find work in the mines, factories, and firms of 
South Africa ••• It is unfortunate that so · 
many people should be forced to seek work out-
side the borders of this country, it must be 
recognised that employment opportunities in 
Botswana will only build up slowly, and it 
is inevitable that large numbers will continue 
to seek work outside Botswana for some years 
to come." (Government Paper No. 2 of 1972, 
Para 7). 
c) The Level of Skills 
The Report on Manpower and Employment identifies the 
shortage of skilled workers as the major constraint 
inhibiting the development of the Botswana economy 
and the 1973 - 1978 National Development Plan acknow-
ledges that "in both the private and public sectors 
of the economy, the present shortage of local supplies 
of skilled and educated manpower has become an acute 
constraint upon development" (para 7.21). Skilled 
\ 
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employment is defined as including all people who 
possess, or who are in a job which requires, some 
post primary education or training. 
The shortage of skilled ·Workers is the most important 
factor accounting for thedependence upon expatriate 
labour. 'rhe Manpower Report estimates that skilled 
employment comprises approximately 26 per cent of 
total employment in the formal sector, 19 per cent 
of these positions being held by expatriates. The 
shortage of skills is particularly acute at the 
higher level of employment, the proportion of 
expatriates in skilled employment increasing from 
approximately 7 per cent at the primary schooling 
level to over 80 per cent of those employees .requir-
ing university degrees, although the Manpower Report 
does reveal that only 67 per cent of the expatriate 
employees were, in the opinion of their employers, 
in jobs requiring post primary education. 
The shortage of skilled workers, particularly at 
higher levels of education, also serves to explain 
the large earnings differential between those jobs 
requiring a high level of skills and those requiring 
relatively little post-primary education, training 
or experience. The Manpower Report notes that one 
of the two most important characteristics of the 
structure of wages and salaries in Botswana is the 
enormous wage differential between the higher and 
least well paid jobs. This assertion is borne out 
by Table 4.1 of the Manpower Report which reveals 
that Motswana graduates employed in the private and 
parastatal sectors earn on average R 228 per month, 
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whilst their fellow citizens who possess only a 
Form I education (one year post primary) and some 
training earn only R 47 per month (the differential 
between non-Batswana graduates and non-Batswana with 
Form I and training is only R 303 per month as against 
R 186 per month). The earnings differential ih the public 
sector is not as pronounced. 
Thus the Botswana planners are confronted with the 
. situation of unemployment and a simultaneous dependence 
on expatriate workers. A major priority of the 
planners is thus localisation of employment and 
a reduction of the earnings differential between 
highly skilled and less skilled workers, between 
skilled and unskilled workers, and between those 
employed in the cash sector of the economy and those 
reliant on traditional agriculture. This presupposes 
the development of a localisation programme, a wages 
and incomes policy, and increasing concentration on 
the provision of education and training. With these 
priorities in mind the planners have attempted to 
project the overall demand and supply position of 
skilled workers in :the· Botswana economy. 
Thus, assuming that, 
a) public sector demand for skilled and educated 
manpower will increase at the same rate as 
departmental recurrent expenditure in real terms 
b) private sector requirements for skilled and 
educated manpower will increase at the same rate 
as output per sector, and 
c) wages, relative to o'ther production costs, remain 
constant, 
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.. 
the planners expect the, overall.supply and demand 
position for skilled·employment to .be as follows: 
1l 1ABLE 2 • 5 : . Expected Supply·. and Demand · Position for · 
Skilled Employment in 1978-and 1988 by 
Level of :Required Education · 
Std. ·7 Form I Form III Formv. Deg.ree 
1972 Batswana in 2 020 680 6 390 1 150 ·.18-0 Post 
_Expatriates 210 70 820 710 580 in Post 
1.978 Demand 3 700 1 310 13'590 4 390 1 420. 
Batswana Remaining 1 830 610 5 790 i 040 170 
·from 1972 
. : 
". 
:Addition from ed. a) 1 340 5 330 2 270 310 
and tr. 1972 - 77 
Expatriates 
- -
2 470 l oso 950 Required " 
1988.Demand 6 130 l 930 19 090 10 490 2 190 
Batswana Remaining l 560 520 4 920 880 140 from 1972 
!Additions fr. a) 2. 060 16 240 10 740 l 900 ed./tr. · 1972 
-
87 ., 
Expatriates 
-
' . 
- - -
·1so Required .. . . . .. 
. -
NOTES: a)·Estimates unreliable but supply of primary 
school leavers will exceed demand. 
b) Errors may appear owing to rounding~ 
SOQRCE:.Manpower ·and Employment in Botswana, Table 5.3. 
Thus it appears that by 1988 Botswana will be faced 
with a small excess supply of sRillecl and trained 
workers in all job categories except those:requiring 
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The statistics on income distribution contained in 
the 1973 - 78 National Development Plan are consider-
ably more detailed. 
TABLE 2.6: Number of 11 Families 11 by Income Group, 
Based upon Income Tax Returns 1970/71 
Income per annum (R) Numbers Percentage 
0 - 750 95 146 97,2 
751 - l 000 316 0,3 
1 001 - 1 500 372 0,4 
1 501 - 2 000 313 0,3 
2 001 - 3 000 479 0,5 
3 001 - 5 000 740 0,8 
5 001 - 8 000 437 0,4 
8 001 + 134 0,1 
TOTAL 97 937 100,0 
NOTES: It has been assumed that each tax payer represents 
a family. 
SOURCE: National Development Plan, 1973 - 78, Table 1.10. 
Thus it appears that only 2 800 families, many of 
. 
which were expatriates, earned an income in excess 
of R 750 per annum. Of those Batswana in salaried 
employment, 77 per cent earn a mean annual income of 
R 300, and only 1,5 per cent of c~tizen families 
employed in the formal sector earn an income in 
excess of R 750 per annum. 
In the rural areas there are, as is to be expected, 
many more satswana families earning fairly substantial 
\ 
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incomes, in fact approximately 2;.;tOOO Batswana families 
earn more than R 750. But there is a marked disparity 
in incomes within the rural sector. Iri 1971/72 
approximately 40 000 families earned between R O and 
R 250 per annum, and approximately 7 000 rural families 
earned a cash income of less than R 50 per annum·and 
grew no crops. These figures do not include remittances 
from migrants. 
When the impact of the mining sector is discussed 
the existing distribution or, rather, maldistribu-
tion, of the national income must be borne in mind. 
As I shall point out at a later stage, narrowing 
of the earnings differential referred to above is 
an important government priority and the implica-
tions of mining development will have to be assessed 
in terms of this goal. 
2.4 The Economic Base 
----~----------~-
This introductory chapter concludes with ·.a brief des..; 
cription of the major sectors of the Botswana economy -
the agricultural sector, the manufacturing sector, and 
finally, the mining sector. 
a) Agriculture 
As early as 1805 Henry Lichtenstein, the famous 
traveller, noted that, 
11 The principal wealth of the country consists in 
the breeding of cattle. Their herds are much 
more numerous than those of the Koossas (sic) 
and they have as great ·a veneration for them. 
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One man alone will sometimes be the owner of 
eight or ten consi4erable herds ••. ". 
The economy's dependence upon cattle has continued 
to the present day. In 1968/69 livestock was responsible 
for 74 per cent of the value added to the non-freehold 
rural domestic product and in 1971/72 it appears that 
this figure had increased slightly to 76 per cent. 7 
In 1968/69 livestock exports accounted for approxi-
mately 67 per cent of total exports. The marketing 
of livestock is controlled by the Botswana Meat 
Commission, a co-operative type organisation, which 
also controls the large abattoir at Lobatsi. The 
major export markets are South Africa, Zambia, and 
the United Kingdom. The long term prospects for 
these markets and the possibility of expanding into 
as yet unexploited markets are sound. 
There are, however, important problems associated 
with the dependence upon livestock. Firstly the di-
stribution of this important source of wealth is 
decidedly skewed. In 1971/72 32 per cent of the 
rural population owned no cattle at all and 40 per 
cent owned less than 10 head. The 1973 - 78 National 
Development Plan estimates that at least 50 head of 
cattle are required to ensure a satisfactory liveli-
hood. Furthermore weather conditions cause consider-
able fluctuations in the cattle population and 
·although recovery from drought is fairly rapid it 
·appears that in each post-drought period the owner-
ship of cattle has become more concentrated than in. 
the preceding period. Smallstock - goats, sheep, pigs -
are distributed more equitably but are not nearly as 
important a source of wealth as cattle. 
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Secondly, livestock production is not labour intensive 
and, as such, does not satisfy one of Botswana's most 
pressing needs. 
The majority of the rural population is unabl~ to 
earn a satisfactory livelihood solely from cattle 
and, therefore, it is important that the Botswana 
authorities encourage crop production as an alter-
native source of income and employment. There are, 
needless to say, enormous obstacles to be overcome -
lack of water and irrigation facilities, lack of 
draught power,. technological inefficiency, soil 
erosion, poor credit facilities, to name but a few. 
No attempt will be made to review Botswana's problems 
in the sphere of crop production. Suffice it to say 
that the agricultural sector will remain the base 
of the economy for the forseeable future - it is 
the only source of livelihood for the great majority 
of the population, and, in 1971/72, the value of 
agricultural output accounted for 31 per cent of 
the gross domestic product. However, livestock 
production, though highly lucrative for the few, 
is too narrow a base to provide income and employ-
rnen t for the bulk of the rural population, and 
attention will have to be focused on arable 
agriculture~ 
b) Industry 
The inclusion of secondary industry in a description 
of the major sectors of the Botswana economy is open 
to criticism - its contribution to employment is 
small; in 1971/72 the value of manufacturing output 
comprised approximately 8 per cent of the gross 
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domestic product, 80 per cent of manufacturing's 
contribution being derived from the activities of 
the Botswana Meat Commission. 
Nevertheless the planners are paying consider-
able attention to the expansion of secondary industry 
and assert that.the government's goals will only be 
.achieved with a much greater development effort in 
the industrial and commercial sector. Furthermore 
the government expects the industrial and commercial 
sector to grow rapidly - the 1973 - 78 National 
Development Plan estimates that 10 000 new jobs will 
be created in the industrial, commercial and related 
sectors during the plan period, and it is estimated 
that almost 3 000 of these new job opportunities 
will be made available by the growth of the manufac-
turing sector. 
The government will attempt to encourage the growth 
of the industrial sector in a number of ways. Firstly 
it will provide.most of the basic infrastructural 
requirements - industrial estates have been established 
in Gaborone and Francistown; transport and communica-
tion facilities, both rail and road, will be improved. 
Certain fiscal incentives are offered - the company 
tax rate is only 30 per cent, depreciation allowances 
are generous, and foreign investors will be able to 
repatriate their earnings without government inter-
ference. Furthermore the government have indicated 
that they will use, where necessary, Clause 6 of the 
Customs Union Agreement which permits the erection 
of a protective barrier against South African manufac-
turers. The government will use a tariff barrier to 
protect the brewery.which is to be established in 
Botswana. 
. - 40 -
Several para-statal bodies have been established to 
facilitate the growth of the industrial sector. The 
Botswana Development Corporatio·n is a limited 
liability company the share capital of which is 
wholly owned by the government. The major activity 
of the BDC has been in the field of township and 
property development and in the management of various 
government investments. The BDC also enters joint 
business ventunes with private capital and assists 
private enterprise by providing a variety of financial 
services and by leasing equipment and machinery. The 
National Development Plan estimates that the BOC.will 
invest in excess of R 10 million during the plan 
period. It must be borne in mind that the BDC is a 
corporation with the normal responsibility towards 
its shareholders - in other words, it is a profit 
maximising body and will not invest in any enterprise 
which does not ensure a stipulated commercial rate 
of return. 
The other important institution is the Botswana 
~nterprises Development Unit (BEDU) which will work 
in conjunction with the Botswana Enterprises Develop-
ment Company Ltd (BEOCOL), another limited liability 
company wholly owned by the Government. The task of 
these institutions will be to encourage the develop-
ment of enterprises owned and managed by Botswana 
citizens. Industrial estates are being established 
in Gaborone, Francistown, and Mochudi which will be 
made available to local entrepreneurs, and other 
financial and technical services will be provided. 
\ BEDU and BEDCOL are required to promote the growth 
of small scale, labour i.ntensive enterprises. 
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The output of the industrial sector will be aimed at 
the export market and, it is hoped, will also be 
import substituting. However it is important that 
the local manufacturers cater for the domestic 
market and it is hoped th~t the growth of the m_ining 
sector will generate, both directly and indirectly, 
the growth of a domestic market. This possibility 
will be examined in depth at a later stage. 
c~ MininSJ8 
Botswana has a long history of mineral.extraction and 
exploration, in fact the first gold discovery in 
Southern Africa was made in north eastern Botswana 
in 1866. 
'l'his arou·sed interest in the mineral potential of the 
territory and widespread exploration was undertaken 
but with limited success. Small scale gold mining 
was undertaken in the Tati Area but the last gold 
working closed in 1964; manganese and asbestos were 
mined at various localities, although all mining of 
these minerals had ceased by the mid-sixties; copper 
attracted the attention of the early prospectors 
leading to the development in the early decades of 
the century of the Bushman Mine, 73 miles northwest 
of Francistown; diamonds were found near ~rancistown 
in 1959 and an assortment of semi-precious stones 
were found in various parts of Botswana. 
Mining output in the pre-independence era was never . 
very significant and by 1965 all mining activity had 
ceased. However, although the tempo of mineral 
extraction was relatively slow, the mid-19SO's saw 
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a revival of prospecting activity by the Geological 
Survey Department and by several internq.tional com-
panies. The intensified prospecting activity led to 
several important discoveries - copper and nickel 
occurrences at Selebi-Pikwe, Matsitamma and Selkirk-
Phoenix; diamonds at Orapa; coal at Morupule and 
Mmamabula. The details of these discoveries are out-
lined i.n the introductory chapters of Section III. 
Whereas at independence there was little hope of 
reducing the budgetary dependence upon Britain,· a 
few years after independence the mineral discoveries 
provided the means for rapid economic development. 
In order to exploit these mineral resources Botswana 
will have to rely upon the capital and expertise of 
large international mining corporations, and the 
remainder of this dissertation is concerned with 
the question of direct foreign investment in a less 
developed country - Section II is a general survey 
of the current literature and Section III is an 
attempt to apply the ideas outlined in the survey to 
the copper-nickel industry in Botswana. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 2 
l Southern Africa is defined to include Botswana, 
Lesotho, Swaziland, South Africa and South West 
Africa (Namibia) . 
2 See inter alia, Customs Union Agreement 1910 and 
1969; International Monetary Fund, African Depart-
ment, 1971; Turner; Lombard, Stadler and Van der 
Merwe; Robson; Landell-Mills (1971); Cowen. 
3 See Muzorewa (1972, 1974). 
4 Muzorewa (1974) estimates that, in the early 
'seventies, Botswana would have earned approximately 
R 542 000 per annwu from their currency backing. 
5 See Wilsqn. 
6 See National Development Plan 1970 - 75; 1973 - 78; 
also Jackson. 
7 11 Non-freehold 11 effectively refers to the traditional 
agricultural sector. It does not include activity in 
the Tuli, Gaborone and Lobatsi Blocks, the Tati Area 
or the Ghanzi Farms. 
8 For early mining history see Boocock; Pim Commission; 
Rey; Gordon. 
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S E C T I 0 N II 
The· -The·ory of· Direct For~"i"<;ln "Inve·s'tine·nt ·tn 
L·ess· DeVe'lc:>"pe"d co·untri:es 
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CHAP1£ER 3 
A Theory of Direct Foreign Investment 
3.1 ±g~!QQY£~!Qg 
There are basically three channels of international 
resource transfer. Firstly;portfolio invest~ent,.whic;;h 
includes the raising of capital by .international bond 
issues and investment in foreign stock markets;.secondly, 
official aid programmes; and finally, by means of direct 
foreign investment (OF!). 
I do not intend analysing the rise (and~fall) of these 
various channels· in any detail1 because obviously the 
major reason for focusing on·direct foreign investment 
arises from the nature of the case study which is most· 
definitely an example of private DFI. Suffice it tp say 
howeve~ that in the half century prior to the First World 
War international bond issues predominated with England 
being far and away the major international cr~ditor. It 
is interesting to note that even at this early stage the 
majority of United States (US) owned foreign assets were 
in the form of direct investments rather than foreign 
bond holdings. 2 
Official aid began to assume importance after World War I 
although in the post Second World War era the magnitude 
·Of official ai~ transfers increased rapidly 
Moreover this period is characterised by the rise of 
multilateral .aid bodies, the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) dominating 
the field. 
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What are the outstanding characteristics of DFI? Or, put 
another way, is there any satisfactory definition of DFI? 
Possibly two of the most outstanding characteristics of 
DFI are that firstly, it implies that the transferor 
retains some element of control over the resources 
transferred. Secondly,DFI involves the transfer of a 
package of resources; that is, it does not merely consist 
of the transfer of financial capital but also technology, 
skilled manpower, material inputs and other varied re-
sources. But it is extremely difficult to apply either 
of these crucial characteristics in constructing a rigid 
definition of DFI. To assert that because the investor 
owns, let us say, 49 per cent of the share capital of a 
particular venture nominal control is absent, and so too 
therefore is the phenomenon of DFI, is clearly arbitrary. 
Similarly to assert that because some element of a pre-
defined package of resources is not in fact part of the 
resource transfer and, .therefore, does not constitute DFI, 
is similarly unsatisfactory. 
Whilst acknowledging the importance of these characteristics 
it is probably preferable to define DFI i.n terms of the 
unit responsible for the transfer of the resources, namely 
the multinational corporation. This of course begs the 
question, "what is a MNC"? K~ndleberger (1969) 
distinguishes between the national firm with foreign 
operations, the multinational firm, and the international 
firm - the dividing lines drawn by Kindleberger are highly 
arbitrary (even metaphysical) and appear to depend on the 
behavioural characteristics and awareness (or lack thereof} 
of a national identity. Vernon's (1971) definition is 
considerably more functional relying, as it does, on the 
number of countries in which the firm operates, six 
subsidiary operations being considered sufficient for 
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the attainment of multinational status. Dunning's (1971 b) 
broad definition embracing, as it does, all firms which 
operate and control income creating activities in more 
than one country, is possibly preferable, although it does 
raise the problem of defining·"control" and "income 
creating activities". 
These various definitions, though important, frequently 
involve the participants, in hairsplitting debates 3 and, 
once againf it is possible to fall back on the nature of 
our particular case study for, whatever criteria one 
~ chooses, the companies operating in Botswana, the Anglo-
./ I 
~ American Corporation and American Metal Climax, may be 
designated multinational corporations. Thus given that 
private DFI inevitably requires~ the active presence of 
a multinational corporation it is, in light of the 
attempt made below to assess the host-country implica-
tions of DFI, necessary to outline the characteristics 
of the MNC. 
Two assertions frequently made when the MNCs are 
discussed concern their large size and the oligopolistic 
nature of the market in which they operate. Raymond 
Vernon's (1971) massive research project into US MNCs 
provides some illuminating empirical evidence regarding 
both assertions. Using "Fortunes'" list of 500 top US 
companies Vernon classifies 187 as "multinational". 
In terms of sheer size the 187 dominated the remaining 
313 giants inlthe top 500. In·l964 the sales per enter-
prise of the 187 averaged $ 972,3 million as against 
$ 283,2 million for the 313 national firms; in the same 
year the MNCs employed, on average, 35 800 people, whilst 
the national corporations employed only 11.500 people; 
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in 1965 the 187 averaged 76 US plants per enterprise, 
whilst the 313 nationals operated on average 34 US 
plants. The profitability figures reflect a similar 
domination, with after tax earnings as a percentage of 
sales for the 187 averaging 7,2 per cent,and for the 
313 nationals 5,9 per cent; after tax earnings as a 
percentage of capital investment averaged 13,3 per cent 
for the multinationals,and 11,l per cent for the 
nationals. 
_lL Furthermore the rapid growth in importance of the firms' 
--Y-::-foreign operations is evident. Vaitsos (1972) cites a 
study undertaken by Furtado which indicates that between 
1955 and 1964 the sales of US owned manufacturing 
subsidiaries abroad grew by 170 per cent whilst in the 
same period their sales in the US market grew by.only. 
50 per cent. At the turn of the century Vernon's 187 
MNCs controlled only 7 manufacturing subsidiaries. By 
1950 this had grown to 988 and py 1967 had mushroomed 
to 3 646. The nine US owned petroleum extractive MNCs 
controlled 24' extractive subsidiaries in 1930 and 96 in 
1967; the nine non-petroleum mineral extractors controlled 
17 subsidiaries in 1930 and 45 in 1970. 4 
'l'he size of the average MNC is formidable in relation 
to the giant US economy and particularly formidable in 
relation to the industry of which it is part. It is thus 
viewed with considerable trepidation in the economies 
which play host to DFI. The Canadians (Hymer, 1967), 
Australians (Penrose, 1956} and New Zealanders (Kindle-
berger, 1969) entertain a deeprooted fear and suspicion 
of the giant MNC - obviously the size of US investment 
in, for example, Canada, constitutes a small portion of 
total capital formation in that country but it appears 
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that the strategic heavy industrial sector is firmly 
controlled by foreign interests. The small less 
developed countries (LDCs) find themselves in a more 
unenviable position where their export sector or, for 
that matter, the great portion of their industrial assets 
are controlled by one or, possibly, two or three foreign 
companies who may easily co-operate in a manner which 
increases their already great bargaining strength vis-a-vis 
' ' 5 
the host government. 
It is more difficult to validate the assertions regarding 
the structure of the market within which the MNCs operate. 
Vaitsos (1971) cites studies which indicate that in 1957 
15 out of l 547 US firms controlled 35 per cent of total 
manufacturing investment abroad. In the mid·-'sixties 46 
British firms controlled 71 per cent of all British owned 
foreign assets and three firms controlled practically all 
British owned foreign assets in the petroleum industry. 
Vernon (1971} admits to considerable difficulty in 
measuring the oligopolistic position of the markets of 
the 187 MNCs, measurement being thwarted by the diverse 
lines of production in which many of the corporations 
engage. Nevertheless a concentration index was established 
by calculating the ratio of the sales of the four largest 
firms in each industry to total sales of the industry. 
The results were 43,2 per cent for the 187 MNCs, 40,9 per 
cent for the 313 nationals, and 37,9 per cent for US 
industry as.a whole. R&D and advertising expenditure, 
generally sound indicators o~ an oligopolistic market, 
assist in verifying the assertion. Corporate funded R&D 
as a percentage of sales for the 187 amounted to 2,48 per 
cent, and 1,85 per cent for the remainder of Fortunes' 
500; advertising expenditure as a percentage of sales was 
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2,52 per cent for the multinationals and 2,39 per cent 
for the remaining 313. But without calculating concen-
tration ratios or a&vertising expenditures the assertions 
regarding the oligopolistic nature of the MNC's market, 
may be verified on a purely impressionistic. basis -
six US companies in the petroleum industry controlled 
foreign assets worth $ 20 billion in 1969 and although 
non-American compe.tition :. in the petroleum industry is 
significanyno more than a handful of firms control this 
industry. The same may safely be said of the copper, 
aluminium, and, certainly, the n~ckel industries. 
Thus whilst it is not necessary to agree with Servan-
Schreiber' s assertion that the European economy is "in 
a state of collapse" in the face of a "foreign challenger 
(who is) breaking down. the political and psychological 
framework of our societies" (p. 12). Nor indeed is it 
necessary to accord full support to his oft cited prophecy 
that "fifteen years from now the worlds third greatest 
industrial power, just after the United States and 
Russia, might not be Europe, but American industry in 
Europe" (p. 17). Nevertheless, when attempting to assess 
.the implications for>the host country of DFI, account 
must be taken of the size of the average unit responsible 
for DFI and the structure of the market within which it 
operates. 
3 .• 2 !_~h!2EY_Qf_Q!f!Q~_[QE~!SD-~nY!!~m!n~ 
Attempts to explain the phenomenon of PFI incorporate 
many different approaches. 6 Many attempts have been made 
to adapt the framework of capital theory, which purports 
to rationalise factor flows by reference to the international 
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interest rate structure (Mundell, 1960), but it is recogn-
ised that whilst capital theory may be useful in explaining 
portfolio investment it does not significantly advance 
our understanding of the MNC or, indeed, of DFI in general. 
Capital theory cannot, in essence, account for the~fact 
that DFI does not involve a change in ownership of the 
resources transferred. Nor, of course, can it incorporate 
elements of the DFI package ct.her than financial capital -
the transfer of technology, skilled manpower, etc. cannot 
be rationalised by differential interest rates. 
Attempts have also been made to use the framework of 
international trade theory (Mundell, 1967). Kindleberger 
(1969) succinctly points out that under conditions of 
perfect competition DFI would simply not exist for, 
" in these conditions, domestic firms would 
have an advantage over foreign firms in the 
proximity of their operations to the decision 
making centres, so that no firm could survive 
in foreign operation. For direct investment to 
thrive there must be some imperfection in the 
market for goods and factors, including amongst 
the latter technology, or some interference in 
competition by government or by firms which 
separates markets" (p. 13). 
Johnson (1970) has attempted to incorporate the question 
of technology transfer into the international trade 
theory approach. Ultimately however the trade theory 
approach places the nation state and its attempt to 
optimise its welfare function at the centre of its 
analysis at the expense of a rigorous analysis of the 
I~~C itself (Murray, 1971, 1972). 
Two other approaches to the problem of DFI have achieved 
widespread recognition in the recent past. The first may 
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loosely be termed the oligopoly approach which is basi-
cally an attempt to extend the theory of the growth of 
the firm to the international economy (Hymer, 1960, 1970; 
Kindleberger, 1969; Girvan). The second is an ingenious 
adaptation of location theory (Murray, 1972). The 
theoretical framework employed in this. dissertation comprises 
an attempt to combine the oligopoly approach with loca-
tion theory. 
Any attempt to explain the growth of DFI and to a~sess 
its implications for the host country must recognise: 
a) the size of the unit which is primarily 
responsible for the international transfer 
of resources and the economic power which 
it is thus able to exercise vis-a-vis the 
less developed economy within which it is 
located; 
b) the oligopolistic structure of the market 
within which the large MNCs, particularly 
those engaged in mineral extraction, 
operate; 
c) the relationship of the subsidiary to the 
corporate structure of which it is part. 
This latter point is of crucial signifi-
cance. In Girvan's excellent analysis of 
MNCs in mineral export economies his 
fundamental proposition is that, 
" •.. the functioning of these industries in 
the national economies in which they are 
phsyically located can be better understood 
by an analysis of their functioning in the 
corporate economies of which they are an 
organic part. Such problems as their 
dependence on foreign demand, prices and 
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decision making; the large amount of 
profit repatriation and its reflection, 
the low share of the industry's value 
which is 'returned' to the national· 
economy; and the lack of integration of 
the industry with the national economy 
are the surface manifestations of the 
institutionalised relationships between 
- subsidiaries and their parent firms .• •• 
The pursuit of this idea led to the need 
for the development of the notion of a 
corporate economic system as conceptually 
quite distinct from a national economic 
system, although obviously the two do 
overlap in the real world" (p. 491) ; 
d) that DFI does not only, or even most importantly, 
consist of a flow of capital funds but also a 
flow of knowledge, technology, skilled manpower, 
etc., and that these parts of the resource 
transfer cannot be accepted or rejected by the 
host country as mutually exclusive entities. 
In other words the resources mobilised by 
the MNC are transferred as part of a "package 
deal" and it serves no purpose to construct 
a model which implies acceptance of, for example, 
the capital fund element of the package and 
rejection of· t.he technology element; 
e) that the MNC is part of a, predominantly capi-
talist, international economic system and that 
its decision can only be made within the 
limitations of that framework. This point 
will be elaborated in the analysis that follows. 
It has considerable bearing on the question of 
the location of productive activity in the 
international economy. 
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'l'he oligopoly model of DFI accords specific recognition 
to the size of the productive unit responsible for the 
greater part of DFI1 and to the structure of the markets 
within which they operate. In fact, the model is based 
on the observation that the prime mover of capital and 
other resources between nations in a firm of great size 
situated within a highly concentrated market. 
The fundamental hypothesis is that firms expand in the 
international sphere for the same reasons and in materially 
the same manner as they expand in the national economy. 
The movement of the firm into the international arena 
is seen as a further step along a historical continuum. 
The Industrial Revolution might be seen as the starting 
point and ever since then the representative firm has 
shown a tendency to increase in size from the small {pin) 
workshop of the Wealth of Nations, to the Marshallian 
firm, the national corporation, and finally to the multi-
national corporation. 
The Industrial Revolution and the small factories and 
"workshops which characterised that period of economi_c 
history were thus the precursors of the contemporary 
MNC. Prior to the Industrial Revolution there were, of 
course, large companies operating on a global scale 
but they are to be distinguished from the contemporary 
MNC insofar as they were, 
11 like dinosaurs, large in bulk, but small 
in brain, feeding on the lush vegetation of 
the new worlds. 
The activities of these international merchants, 
planters and miners laid the groundwork for the 
Industrial Revolution by concentrating capital 
- 56 -
in the metropolitan centre, but the driving 
force came from the small scale capitalist 
enterprises in manufacturing, operating at first 
in the interstices of the feudalist economic 
structure, but gradually emerging into the open 
and finally gaining predominance. It is in the ' 
small workshops, organised by the newly emerging 
capitalist class that the ·forerunner of the 
modern corporation is to be found" (Hymer, 
1972, p. 115/16). 
Thus, in effect, the capital accumulated during the era 
of merchant capitalism was one of the important factors 
giving rise to the era of manufacturing or industrial 
capitalism, whence the prevailing mode of production was 
centred on a free labour market, the members of which sold 
their labour to those who had accumulated capital during 
the era of merchant capitalism. The capitalist's power 
therefore rested in the ownership of the means of pro-
duction and in his ability to reap the profits of co-
operation (division of labour). The capitalist thus brought 
together labour in his workshop, accumulated additional 
capital (largely as a result of the productivity increase 
generated by an increased division of labour), reinvested 
this capital in his small workshop,and so widened the 
scope of his activities giving rise to the Marshallian 
firm. The structure of the enterprise did not change 
materially as a result of the a!.dvance from Smith's work-
shop to Marshall's firm, but the rapid growth of the US 
economy in the last quarter of the previous century, 
accompanied by the great merger movement of that period, 
gave rise to the great national firm. 
The spread of what was 'formally a tightly controlled, 
localised family enterprise over a wide geographical 
area necessitated an alteration in the mode of business 
organisation, characterised largely by the need for a 
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vertical division of the management function. For the first 
tine the executive was placed in a position of authority over other 
executives. The parent company retained control of 
overall strategy, whilst the executives in charge of 
the individual subsidiaries concentrated their energies 
on the activities of their particular subsidiaries. 
'rhis, crudely, is the mode of organisation of the 
giant multinational. 
The obvious omission from the analysis thus far is the 
failure to outline the reasons for the growth of the 
unit from the small family firm to the giant MNC. The 
major factors prompting the growth in the size of the 
firm were the advances made in technology, both produc-
tion and communication, the necessity for minimising 
the added risk ©£ large-scale capital commitment, the 
economies to be derived from large-scale production, 
and the widening market for both consumer and capital 
goods. Norman Girvan notes that, 
11 It appears that the emergence of the integrated 
firm was an inherent and possibly indispensible 
part of the revolution which took place in the 
scale of production and demand, in the level 
of technology, and in the quantity bf capital 
utilised in production. With much more capital 
committed to production on a much larger scale, 
firms had to minimise the risks of investment 
and assure their facilities of full capacity 
operation by acquiring their own raw material 
supplies and marketing outlets. All stages 0£~ 
production and marketing had to be brought as 
far as possible within the frontiers of corporate 
control. Those firms which got a headstart, 
because of strategic control of one stage of 
the industry or the technology of production, 
or because of entrepreneurial foresite and 
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initiative or because of a combination of all 
three, were able to absorb in one way or another 
the weaker and more vulnerable firms. This 
process continued until a small number of 
firms faced each other, each with its own 
supplies of raw materials and its own marketing 
outlets. 11 {p. 494). 
The factors accounting for the spread of the large national 
corporations into the international economy are identical 
in almost all respects, and it is in this manner .. : .:._:~ 
that the greatest part of capital,.technology, knowledge, 
etc. is transferred across international boundaries. 
The 11 oligopoly school" stresses the question of bargaining 
{see particularly Vaitsos, 1970 b, 1972 a; Penrose, 1968, 
Girvan);the bargaining line being drawn between the MNC 
on the one hand, and the host-country government on the 
other. Thus, within thisframework, the distribution of 
bargaining strength is of paramount importance. 
We must however avoid exaggerating the power and the role 
of the MNC. Kindleberger (1969), one of the most 
enthusiastic propagators of the oligopoly approach, 
asserts somewhat hyperbolically that "the nation state 
is just about through as an economic unit 117 because 
11 
••• the multinational corporation is evolving into the 
international one faster than the national governments 
are girding themselves to produce adequate policies to 
meet it" (p. 210). Kindleberger's argument implies that, 
in the face of this alleged tendency on the part of the 
multinational to acquire an international character, 
that is, to loosen its ties with any particular state 
{for example, Lever Brothers, Shell-BP, etc.)., the nation 
state will find it increasingly difficult to protect 
its individual national in~ere•t. Thus, as Penrose (1971) 
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points out, Kindleberger's view would appear to coincide 
with Galbraith's vision of a "new industrial state", a 
. . 8 
world managed by the technocrats of the large corporation. 
Penrose (1971), however, accuges Kindleberger of arguing 
by exaggeration and asserts that as long as the nation 
state retains its political sovereignity it will not 
relinquish significant aspects of its economic autonomy 
to the multi-, or indeed, international corporation. Thus 
Penrose argues that there are, within the bargaining 
framework, certain important options available to the 
nation .state, and that these alternatives will be 
bolstered by f irrn action on the part of existing inter-
national bodies and by the formation of interregional 
associations of the less developed countries. 
Penrose's criticism of Kindleberger's extremist views 
is undoubtedly important. However insofar as it implies 
rigorous discussion of every policy alternative open to 
the LDC it will not be examined in detail. Whether or 
not particular policy alternatives can be detailed in a 
~eneral theoretical statement is questionable. The patterns 
of DFI and development are sufficiently similar to permit 
general analysis but a discussion of policy alternatives 
implies a rigorous analysis of the socio-economic 
situation in each LDC. 
In addition one must ensure that the role of the MNC in 
the international economic system is not overemphasised. 
The .MNC reflects the growth and direction of the·inter-
national economic system, and, largely because of its 
size, it provides us with a transparent view of the 
workings of that system, but it does not determine 
interrelationships or, more particularly, the location 
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of productive activity, within .the international economy. 
In essence, whilst the classical school views the 
international economy as a summation of sovereign inde-
pendent nation states, the oligopoly approach analyses 
the international economy as though it was a 
summation of individual corporate units. Murray, on the 
other hand, argues that 
" ..• it is more helpful to see it as a single, 
predominantly capitalist system, in which the 
geographical distribution of particular struc-
tural features of a capitalist system will be 
governed by market determined laws of location 
and only secondarily by the actions of nation 
states. Competitive firms, particularly inter-
national firms, become the dominant units of 
the system. States, which in part reflect the 
interests of these firms, are subordinate, modi-
fying elements" {1972, p. 167). 
Thus, in terms of Murray's model, the activities of the 
nation state are dominated by the activities of the MNCs. 
Murray however takes. the analysis a step further and by 
ingenious adaptation of Location Theory and the 
Theory of the Firm, shows how the geographical distri-
bution of production in the international economy is 
governed by market determined laws of location. 
In certain important respects Murray's analysis of the 
location of production in the international economy does 
modify and bolster certain of the conclusions reached 
by the oligopoly school. In the final analysis, however, 
it appears that all Murray is saying is that the MNCs 
do not determine the ultimate habitat of their produc-
tive factors in vacuo, but that there are certain under-
lying laws of market determined location with which they 
must comply and which cause the international polarisa~ 
tion of productive resources and activity. 
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The mechanics and implications of Murray's analytical 
framework, so painstakingly outlined in his 1972 article, 
will not be detailed at this stage but will emerge 
in the analysis that· follows. 
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NOTES '1'0 CHAPTER 3 
1 For excellent empirical and theoretical surveys 
of international capital mobility see Cooper, R. N~; 
Cooper, R. N. and Truman; Dunning (1972 b). 
2 It is also sometimes difficult to distinguish 
between assets in the form of bonds and DFI in 
the British case. _Thus railway investments in 
South America and India might be in either form. 
3 See Dunning {1973 b) for a survey of the debate. 
4 This only refers to subsidiaries engaged in mineral 
extraction. The corresponding figures for all sub-
sidiaries in the petroleum industry are 212 and 
1 442, and, in the non-petroleum extractive 
industry, 32 and 417. 
5 For examples of corporate collusion in Zambia see 
Faber and Potter; in the Caribbean Girvan and 
J'effers.on; in Latin America see Mikesell (ed.). 
6 For a survey of the theories of DFI see Dunning 
{1973 b). 
7 He continues: "General de Gaulle is unaware of 
it as yet and so are the Congress of the United 
States and rightwing know-nothings in all · 
countries. Tariff policy is virtually useless, 
despite the last-gasp struggles of the protec-
tionists to keep out Japanese steel, Danish cheese, 
Middle East oil, Brazilian coffee, and of the 
Johnson administration to get the American public 
to stop going abroad. Monetary policy is in the 
process of being internationalised. The world is 
too small. It is too easy to get about. Two-hundred-
thousand-ton tankers and ore carriers and containeri-
sation, airbuses and the like will not permit 
sovereign independence of ~he nation state in 
economic affairs." {p. 207/208). 
8 It would also closely coincide with Karl Kautsky's 
vision of "ultra-imperialism", that is" ••. the 
joint exploitation of the world by internationally 
united finance capital in place of the mutual 
rivalries of national finance. Such a new phase 
of capitalism is at any rate conceivable" (cited 
Lichtheim, p. 105/06). 
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CHAPTER 4 
Direct Foreign Investment and the Transfer of Technology 
4.1 Introduction 
------------
The lack 6f access to sophisticated techniques of produc-
tion (or, what is the same thing, "knowledge") is 
frequently viewed as one of the most severe constraints 
inhibiting economic development. Thus, insofar as 
technology is one of the most ubiquitous elements of 
the package of resources transferred by the process of 
DFI, it appears that DFI will almost inevitably relax 
a serious constraint facing the planners in a less 
developed economy. 
The question of technology transfers cannot however be 
analysed in isolation from the socio-economic conditions 
prevailing in the recipient country, and it is frequently 
argued that the process of DFI, through the agency of 
the MNC, transfers technology the characteristics of 
which are fundamentally unsuited to the conditions 
prevailing in the host country. 
The remainder of this chapter will be devoted, firstly 
to a discussion of the choice of technique and the 
characteristic features of the technology transferred 
by the process. of DFI. Secondly an attempt is made to 
assess the imp~ications for the host country of the 
technology transferred. The view that preferential 
access to technology (or knowledge) constitutes a 
source of monopolistic advantage is discussed. in some : 
detail. 
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When the host country implications of the technology 
transfer are discussed the analysis will be conducted 
at the most general level. The characteristics of the 
technology transferred are important factors determiniI].g 
the effect of DFI on the host .country's labour market, 
government revenue, and linkages (see Chapter 5) and 
therefore on the Balance of Payments (see Chapter 6). 
It is also a significant determinant of the host country's 
distribution of income (see Chapter 7). It will be argued 
that the process of DFI transfers technology of a 
-
characteristic type, an understanding of which provides 
an essential background for a discussion of the subject 
matter of Chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
The question of the choice of techniqaes is generally 
analysed in terms of the observation that the 11 ideal" 
LDC is characterised by an unlimited supply of cheap, 
unskilled labour, and scarce and consequently costly 
supplies of capital. Thus any attempt to arrive at an 
optimum choice of technique will be geared towards 
employing large quantities of labour and spreading the 
scarce capital over as wide a spectrum as possible. 
The, simple nee-classical model assumes that a wide 
spectrum of efficient techniques is available and that 
labour and capital are perfectly substitutable. However, 
as Stewart points out, 
11This view is completely unhistorical. Techniques 
of production are ways of producing goods -
generally machines. Each method of production 
has to be invented, developed and used at a 
particular point in time. The range of technigues 
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available to produce a Earticular good arises 
from the historical develo ment of the industr 
in question. p. 103 • 
It is hypothesised that the choice of technique adopted 
by the foreign investor is exercised primarily by the 
MNC and.!.!£!:. by the LDC itself. It is not suggested that 
the selection criteria employed by the MNC and the LDC 
are always contradictory. Nor, indeed, is it s'uggested 
that the LDC planners are unable to influence the choice 
in any way - an adjustment in depreciation allowances, 
the provision of a subsidy per worker employed, etc., 
will conceivably influence the firm's decision. It is \ however argued that, because of the technological dependence of the underdeveloped world, the range of 
\ ' I )f insofar as it is possible to distinguish between a 
alternatives will be severely limited, and therefore, 
i 
sets of factor proportions and two objective functions. 
corporate and a national economy, there will exist two 
It is of greater practical relevance to deterI11ine the 
factors affecting the corporation's choice of technique 
than those affecting the recipient's choice. ~he analysis 
does, of course, beg one important question, that of the 
choice of industry. That is, if it can be rigorously 
shown that the choice of technique adopted in any 
particular industry will, for whatsoever reason, give 
rise to a sub-optimal allocation of resources, the 
obvious (or perhaps "first-best"} implication is that 
the resources would be better employed in another activity. 
This arc;J.ument ignores the possibility that the resources 
will not be made available for alternative employment and 
is, under these circumstances, a weak argument. However, 
without further argument, it is assumed that the LDC 
wishes to extract its mineral resources and the possibility 
of employing the necessary factors in an alternate mann~r 
is not considered at this point. 
- 66 -
The technology transferred by the MNC to the LDC is 
generally technology that has been developed for use 
in the industrialised metropolitan economies. The 
technology is thus geared tow.ards large scale production 
and is specifically designed to absorb the relatively 
abundant supply of cheap capital saving on the scarce 
factor, labour. Thus when transferred to the LDC it uses 
relatively little of its abundant supply of cheap labour 
and, because of the sophisticated nature of the technology, 
much of the labour that it does use must be imported 
from the metropolis. 2 On the other hand it uses a 
relatively large quantity of the supposedly scarce 
factor, capital. 
This would appear to be an essentially irrational act 
on the part of the investor. This is however not the 
case. Firstly, as has been noted above, the technology 
has already been developed in the economically advanced 
source economy. R&D is an expensive process, relying 
on certain inputs which are more readily available in the 
source than in the host country. Furthermore demand for 
producer goods arises mainly in the advanced economies 
and production will thus3be geared towards satisfying 
that demand. It might be argued that the earlier, 
· relatively labour-intensive products of the R&D process 
should be used in the LDCs, however much of 
this early machinery is obsolete and expensive to 
maintain. The Japanese method of copy.ing the techniques 
of the advanced Western economies might meet with some 
success but even this requires a basic technical and 
scientific infrastructure. Moreover, particularly, in 
the case of low grade mineral extraction, there is 
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usually_ a certain minimum scale of operations, and in 
order to achieve this scale relatively sophisticated 
technology must be employed. Thus as Merhav points out, 
"The technical progress of the entrepreneur 
in the underdeveloped economies is not limited, 
like that of en~repreneurs in an advanced 
economy, to the rate of invention and scienti-
fic advance in his own country or in other 
similarly advanced economies. He has the advantage 
of the latecomer, and can make much greater 
relative advances than the entrepreneur in the 
advanced economy ... 
The underdeveloped country, onenmightsay is a 
case of 'Economic· Growth with UnTimited Supp·11es 
of Technical Pro ress 1 - but it de ends for that 
progress.on the advanced countries. p. O 
One obvious solution is to raise the price of capit~l in 
the LDC. This need not necessarily have any noticabie 
effect, because the MNC is not subject to the same con-
straints that face the LDC. Wherever the MNC chooses to 
invest it will be able to make use of its privileged 
access to international capital markets. Moreover it may 
capitalise its often vast reserves of undistributed 
profits. 3 The MNC·does not rely on the supply.of local 
capital funds. Thus if the MNC does use domestic capital 
funds is is likely to be highly interest elastic with 
respect to its use of local capital but an increase in. 
the domestic rate of interest is no·t likely to affect 
its capital formation because of its ability to draw on 
alternative sources (Dunning, 1973 a). 
The obvious solution of this technological dependence 
lies in the establishment by the LDC of a domestic capital 
goods sector. This possibility is severely constrained 
by several important factors one of which is the limited 
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Under competitive market conditions the price effects 
arising from an added inflow of factors (for example, 
technology) determine inter-country distribution. 4 
However, because of the public good characteristics 
!:> 
of knowledge, the price of technology cannot be determined 
on a competitive market and is determined by bargaining 
between the owner of the information (the MNC) and the 
purchaser of the information (the LDC). 6 The owner of 
the information is able to extract a monopoly rental, 
and, moreover, is able to perpetuate this monopoly rental 
by means of patent and tie-in arrangements. 7 Private 
ownership of knowledge'thus ·constitutes an insuperable 
obstacle to welfare optimisation. 
The above argument applies whenever knowledge is privately 
owned although the conclusions might be of particular 
relevance to the case of a LDC because of the 
inequitable distribution of the bargaining powers 
between the MNC and the LDC. Johnson in fact argues 
that the MNC behaves like a discriminating monopolist 
and, because he assumes that the LDC will have a more 
elastic demand curve for knowledge intensive products 
than other purchasers of technology, asserts that the 
LDC will be charged a lower price. There is however 
sound reason for assuming .that the LDC's demand curve 
will be less elastic than that of the other purchasers -
the technoloy element cannot be extracted from the 
package of resources transferred by DFI and if the 
LDC is to extract minerals on a large scale it will 
require considerable capital, expertise and access to 
sophisticated technology. The demand curve for technology 
is derived from the "demand curve" for "industrialisation" 
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or 11 development 11 and is likely to be highly inelastic. 
The characteristic features of the techniques of produc-
tion used by the MNC are the important determinants of 
the impact of the technology .transfer on the LDC. What 
does this reliance on capital intensive, foreign 
technology imply for the host economy? This is, 
broadly speaking, the subject matter of the remainder 
of this thesis but it will probably be useful to out-
line the answer to this question, albeit in the most 
general terms. 
'\ Reliance on foreign technology provides the MNC with a 
useful avenue of profit remission. This does . 
not only refer to the question of royalty payments or 
licensing fees, but, more importantly, to the firm's 
ability to utilise inter-firm accounting techniques 
which effectively allows the firm to show its returns 
in the geographical area of its choice. If the knowledge 
was available locally and the necessary capital equipment 
was produced domestically the MNC would not be able to 
remit profits to the parent economy with such ease. 
Reliance on imported, expensive capital equipment 
carries the obvious balance of payments implications 
and places considerable strain on foreign exchaqge 
reserves. But still of greater importance is the fact 
that both these points clearly raise the controversial 
question of the continued underdevelopment of the less 
developed world. They, in essence, suggest that the means 
of income generation, the means of production will be 
centralised increasingly in the already developed economies. 
This is, of course, a crucially important question which 
will be raised at ·a later stage. A related problem 
concerns the extent of linkage investment encouraged by 
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the MNC's subsidiary. The structure of the MNC certainly 
inhlbits the creation of link industries in the domestic 
economy. Moreover it is reasonable to assume that a 
technologically sophisticated, capital intensive core 
industry will, in general, require inputs which are 
produced in a like manner. Thus the linkage effects will 
be generated in the source economy and, where they are 
generated domestically, the structure of the link industry 
will be similar to that of the core industry. 
An important policy goal of the typical LDC is that of 
employment creation. In order to attain the goal the 
planners will attempt to encourage the growth of a labour 
intensive industrial sector. Dependence on foreign 
} technology encourages capital intensity which implies 
both a smaller absolute number of workers employed and 
a differently structured work force. The wage and employ-
ment policies of the MNC will be an important determinant 
of domestic income distribution. The importance of this 
latter point cannot be over-emphasized because,although 
DFI usually generates rapid economic growth - using Gross 
Domestic Product, Gross National Product, national income 
per capita and other commonly applied indicators - we 
I: .should not treat society as a monolithic entity, and ther.e is reason to believe that the activities of the MNC promote the welfare of select groups within that society. 
As pointed out above,the remainder of this section will 
consist of an attempt to elaborate upon the points 
mentioned above. The process of DFI cannot be divorced 
from the characteristics of the MNC which, in turn, 
presuppose a certain technological structure. It is 
to an analysis of the implications of the corporate and 
technological structure situated, as they are, within a 
predominantly capitalist international economy that I 
now turn. 
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NOTES TO CHAP'I'ER 4 
l For excellent surveys of the theory see Sen, 
Stewart, Merhav. 
2 In the next chapter it is argued that the structure 
of the LDC's labour force actually encourages the 
use of capital intensive techniques. 
3 Similarly it need not be severely constrained by a 
shortage of skilled and technical manpower in the 
LDC - it may draw on its already established cadre 
of trained manpower. 
4 See Vaitsos (1972 a); Johnson. This can lead to a 
deterioration in the terms of trade and therefore 
"immiserising growth" (Bhagwati). This problem will 
be overcome by an optimum tax on capital or on 
"technical progress" (Johnson; Kemp; Negishi). 
5 By "public good characteristics" I refer to 
indivisibility and incomplete appropriability. 
Knowledge is, by definition, indivisible. Although 
there are devices available wherepy knowledge 
or information may be appropriated (e.g. patents) 
the technical characteristics of knowledge are such 
that its use by one party does not preclude its 
use by any other party. Moreover, as Arrow points 
out, patent laws would have to be unimaginably 
complex to enable full appropriation of a commodity 
as intangible as knowledge. Certain properties of 
the demand for information also prevent welfare 
optimisation. In order to assess the ~conomic value 
of the information the potential buyer will have 
to possess the information but then he will have 
acquired it without cost. If the seller was able 
to appropriate fully the information this problem 
would be avoided and therefore, because of incomplete 
appropriability, the buyer will have to base his 
decision to purchase the information on sub-optimal 
criteria. Essentially the buyer requires "knowledge 
about knowledge" but this is impossible because of 
the principle of incomplete appropriability - see 
Arrow. 
6 For elaboration of this argument see Vaitsos (1970 b). 
The process of price determination is complicated 
further by the fact that the purchaser is a subsidiary 
of the seller and the price will be determined virtual-
ly unilaterally. 
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7 For an analysis of the use of patents in LDCs see 
Penrose (1973); Vaitsos (1970a,.1970 b, 1972 b). 
For a discussion of tie-in agreements see Vaitsos 
(1970 a). The product cycle theorists recognise 
that knowledge constitutes a source of monopolistic 
advantage but argue that the process of competition 
will reduce this advantage (see inter alia Vernon 
(1966); Gruber, Mehta and Vernon)_~ They fail to 
recognise the importance·of patents and tie-in agree-
ments and they do not realise that ;:the transfer of 
technology across international borders is an intra-
f irm transfer and therefore the knowledge is not 
transferred into new hands. 
\ 
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CHAPTER 5 
DFI and the Host Country Implications - Labour, Govern-
ment Revenue and Linkages 
5.1 Introduction 
------------
·!'his lengthy chapter attempts to assess the impact made 
by DFI on the host country's labour market and on the 
revenue accruing to the government. It als0 attempts 
to measure the impact of DFI in terms of the linkages 
generated by the foreign controlled industry. However, 
before attempting to assess the impact of DFI, the 
criteria in terms of which the assessment is made must 
be outlined clearly. 
I will use two distinguishable, but closely interrelated 
sets of criteria and, in so doing, have been strongly 
influenced by the criteria used by the Botswana Govern-
ment.1 The first set of criteria may somewhat loosely be 
termed the "narrowly economic" criteria, whereas the 
second set attempts explicitly to introduce certain of 
the important politico-economic variables. 
Killick, in an attempt to assess the impact of DFI in 
the Sierra Leonean diamond mining industry, attempted 
to calculate the value-added by the MNC. A slightly 
altered version of the tabular lay-out employed by 
Killick is reproduced below. 
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The contents of the table will be analysed in this chapter 
and in chapters 6 and 7. Item (b) is analysed when link-
ages are discussed; item (d) is discussed when the wage 
and employment policy of the MNC is analysed; discussion 
of items (e), (f) and (g) is .incorporated in;the analysis 
of the impact of DFI on government revenue. The contents 
of column (b) are discussed in chapter 6 when the impact 
of DFI on the external accounts is analysed. An analys~s 
of this nature makes use of the normal national accounting 
indicators - domestic value added is, in fact, a measure 
of the industry's contribution to Gross Domestic Product 
whilst the national value added measures the industry's 
contribution to the Gross National Product. The table 
does not take account of the multiplier effects generated 
. by the industry although these are dealt with in part by 
item (b). Despite this omission from the table the analysis 
will attempt to take account of the multiplier affects. 
These measures may be misleading particularly insofar 
as the implied goal is the maximisation of each item 
in column (a) of the table. 2 For this reason it is neces-
sary to qualify these criteria by the use of a somewhat 
broader set of criteria. 
Dudley Seers (1972) asserts that development must be 
viewed in terms of creating conditions conducive to the 
realisation of the potential of human personality. In 
order to attain this goal, continues Seers, the planners 
must concentrate an eliminating poverty, providing employ-
ment, and ensuring an equitable distribution of the 
national product. These criteria are not very functional 
and are very difficult to measure (particularly the 
11 poverty 11 criteria), but they are no less important than 
the quantifiable national accounting measures. 
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TABLE 1: Expenditures of Mining Companies and their 
Disposal 
) 
a~ Gross Output (a) 
b. less Material Inputs 
1. Imported 
2. Locally Produced 
c. Gross Domestic Value Added 
of which: 
d. Wage and Salary Payments 
1. to expatriates 
2. to citizens 
e. Direct Tax Payments 
f. Depreciation 
g. Profits 
h. Gross National Value Added 
(c minus g) 
i. Net National Value Added 
(h minus f) 
j. Item (i) as % of item (a) 
k. Item (i) as % of item (c) 
Expendi-
tures 
(a) 
(a) taken as equivalent to export values 
Mean Expen-
Foreign ditures 
Exchange on 
Require- local· 
ment goods 
and 
services 
(b) (c) 
The employment criterion is included in the value-added 
computation, but the important omission from Killick's 
table is the question of distribution, and by this is 
meant not merely distribution of income but, more impor-
tantly, distribution of power, that is, relative access 
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to the means of productio?. Chapter 7 is devoted to a 
discussion of the question of distribution but this 
does not in any way ~mply that discussion of distribution 
is omitted when the other criteria are evaluated. The 
broader criteria are not added to the "narrowly economic" 
criteria, £hey serve to qualify the latter and are 
discussed concurrently. It has already been suggested 
that DFI raises the question of continuing underdevelop-
ment of the periphery in so far as the distribution of 
gains from the project and the ability to indulge in 
large scale investment is increasingly centralised in the 
industrialised core areas. The process of DFI also raises , 
the question of the development of a secondary core with-
in the underdeveloped periphery and it might be_ argued 
that. the development of this secondary core is achieved_ 
at the expense of the continued underdevelopment of the 
\ internal periphery. 
The remainder of the present chapter attempts to assess 
the impact of DFI on labour1· ,linkages and government 
revenue emphasising the question of value added. The 
following chapter will concentrate on measuring the 
value retained and chapter 7 will focus upon the question· 
of distribution and the broader politico-economic criteria. 
s.3 ~~!22~!: 
It has already been suggested that it would be to the MNC's 
advantage to use techniques of production similar to 
those employed in the industrialised economies. Thus 
the techniques employed would be of a capital intensive 
nature supposedly ignoring the factor proportions pre-
vailing in the host country. Whilst the MNC's choice of 
techniques can be easily rationalised in terms of the cost 
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and location of R&D, the capital resources of the MNC, 
and the limited range of techniques available, it would 
appear that in terms of relative labour availability the 
Ml~C'schoice remains essentially irrational, that is, if 
all other things remained equal it would be to the cor-
poration's benefit to employ labour intensive techniques 
of production in the LDCs. 
\ A factor is, however, only cheap or costly in relation 
' . )to its productivity. Thus, to assert that a LDC is 
. characterised by a plentiful supply of chea~ labour is 
meaningless until we evaluate the quality of the labour 
force. Any large scale industrial activity presupposes 
some degree of training or, at least, familiarity with 
an industrial milieu, from its workforce. Thus, despite 
the apparently low price of the LDC's workforce, it 
is clearly in the MNC s interest to employ as small a 
portion of the local workforce as is feasible. 
Arrighi points out that capital intensive techniques 
do not only require an absolutely smaller number of 
workers (in relation that is to labour intensive tech-
niques) but they also require a differently, structured 
workforce. Labour intensive techniques require a workforce 
in which unskilled and skilled workers predominate, 
whereas capital intensive techniques presuppose a 
workforce largely composed of semi-skilled operatives 
and high level manpower. By dividing complex operations 
into simpler processes1, the producer simultaneously reduces 
his need for both skilled and unskilled workers and 
intensifies the need for semi-skilled operatives and 
high level manpower. Given the conditions facing a LDC 
\ 
it will be easier to overcome a shortage of semi-skilled 
operatives and high level manpower, than a shortage of 
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skilled artisans. If this is in .fact the case the condi-
tions in the LDC's labour market will favour the intro-
duction of capital intensive techniques. 
The high-level manpower requirement of the MNC generally 
. exceeds the short run supply ava~lable in the LDC but 
this need not significantly constrain the activities 
I of the MNC. The MNC has at its disposal a well established 
I cadre of skilled and experienced managerial and technical 
I 
\ 
personell. Moreover the supply of high level manpower 
already existing in the LDC can be easily attracted to 
the MNC by the company's greater ability to ·pay higher 
, wages. 
In order to establish a semi-skilled workforce the MNC 
will have to engage in a limited degree of training most 
of which will be provided "on-the-job". The semi-skilled 
workers already employed in government or other firms 
within the LDC's industrial sector are another potential 
source of labour for the MNC. 
Obviously a particular labour force structure necessitates 
\ 
a particular wage structure. The upper reaches of the 
),K high level manpower force will be predominantly 
. expatriate, although, often for public;;::e1-,at:1._ons. reasqnsrJlocals 
will occupy some of the top management positions (parti-
cularly in personell) and possibly some of the high 
level technical positions. The expatriates will have to 
be drawn from the labour market of the industrialised 
countries and their wage levels will reflect those 
prevailing in the source country market plus an additional 
allowance for working in the unfamiliar, unattractive 
! environment of the ·LDC. The lower reaches of the high-
level manpower hierarchy (e.g. middle management, 
•. 
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accounting clerks, trained secretaries, etc.) will be 
occupied by a combination of expatriates and locals. 
The wage level of the latter group of employees will 
be determined by two· primary factors: first, for public 
relations reasons, the MNC wil.l not pay the local employees 
a lower wage than the expatriates whose wage will be 
determined ,in'· the markets of the metropolis. Secondly, 
the wage rate prevailing in the local civil service 
may be an important factor determining the wage 
structure of the second order high-level manpower. The 
civil service wage structure is usually inherited from 
the days of colonial rule. When the civil service i·s 
localised., not only is the complex structure of employ-
ment often retained, but so too is the wage structure 
which was determined by the wages prevailing in the 
mother country. 
The wage structure of the semi-skilled, predominantly 
local workers, is also of crucial importance. The labour 
force of most LDCs is characterised by widespread 
movement between the rural areas and the towns, that 
is,between bouts of industrial or urban employment 
and traditional rural employment. The worker is unable 
to earn sufficient income in either the towns or rural 
' areas to maintain his family and therefore oscillates 
between the two. Arrighi argues that it is in the 
interests of the MNC that this migration be curtailed. 
In order to stabilise (or, in Arrighi's terminology, 
"proletarianise") this semi-proletariat~ the MNC will 
have to cut the links existing between the town and the 
country by offering the workers a higher wage. The semi-
skilled workers of the MNC are thus offered a wage rate 
above that necessary to attract them to the industry, but 
rather aimed at stabilising their employment in the 
- 81 -
service of the MNC. The MNC's ability to meet these 
added labour costs is beyond dispute. Labour costs 
generally comprise five or ten per cent of the value 
of output (see Church) , and the vast resources of the 
MNC ensure that the added cost.of stabilisation are not 
viewed as a significant constraint. In any event, we 
may assume that'the MNC will concentrate on stabilising 
its workforce only if the productivity increase generated 
thereby justifies the additional expenditure. 
/The above analysis is, however, subject to s?me doubt. 
1 It might be in the corporation's interests to encourage I semi-urbanisation. 3 This ~rgument suggests that the 
corporation benefits from the process of labour migration. 
By encouraging the worker to maintain his rural ties the 
corporation will pay a lower wage insofar as the workers 
income is supplemented and he is assured of a form of 
old-age pension (Meillassoux) . Furthermore by preventing 
permanent urbanisation some of the socio-political 
9 ~ problems associated with the existence of an industrial 
1 proletariat are avoided. 4 Scattered empirical evidence 
does, however, appear to indicate that average earnings 
in the foreign owned mineral extractive industries are 
considerably higher than those prevailing in the rest 
of the economy and that the workforce of ·:.the MNC exhibits 
greater stability (Church). 
The wage and employment policy adopted by the·MNC has 
several important implications for: the host economy. 5 
Firstly, in so far as the MNC does succeed in stabilising 
it own small workforce, it might prevent the dissemination 
of therudimentary skills acquired by its workers through-
out the remainder of the economy. The much vaunted rise 
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in productivity, supposedly generated by the injection 
of skills into the host economy, would thus appear to 
be of a highly localised nature, that is, it would 
appear to benefit the MNC but not the economy as a whole. 
This brings to mind Becker's distinction between general 
and specific training for, in fact, the MNC provides a 
form of general training but, because of its ability to 
stabilise its workforce, is able to appropriate the 
lion's share of the return from the productivity increase. 
There are of course limits to the MNCs ability to appro-
priate this return. Evidence suggests that the numbers 
employed by the MNC tends to decline after the initial 
phase of production (and particularly after the compte-
tion of the construction phase) despite increasing 
output (Church, Mamalakis}. Those workers laid off then 
go out into the wider economy equipped with certain 
skills which allow them to seek other employment or, 
possibly, to establish themselves as small scale entre-
preneurs. In this sense, therefore, the MNC does offer 
benefits to the economy as a whole. It is important not 
to underestimate the magnitude of this benefit - Baldwin, 
in fact, appears to view it as among the most significant 
benefits arising from DFI in Zambia, though with consider-
able reservation. The impact of increased. skills on the 
economy as a whole, ultimately depends upon the opportu-
nities available to use these skills, these opportunities 
being strongly dependent upon the linkages generated by 
the extractive industry. 
Secondly, in Church's words, "the tendency for relatively 
high wages paid in the resource industries to stimulate 
upward pressure on the level of remuneration in other 
industries and in government appears to be well established 
in our case studies", (p. 91). The higher wages paid by 
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the MNC are "justifiable" insofar as the reJ;atively 
large amount of capital available per worker in the 
extractive industry raises the marginal product of each 
worker. But if the wage rate paid by the MNC sets the 
national wage, the corporations wage policy might well 
inhibit the development of secondary industry. Baldwin, 
in fact, identifies the impact on secondary industry 
as being 11 the most unfavourable repercussion of the 
high wage policy" (p. 197) adopted on the Zambian copper-
belt. Wage costs constitute a far greater portion of 
operating costs in government and secondary industry 
than in mining, and therefore a percentage increase 
in wage costs raises total cost to a far greater extent 
in the secondary sector, forcing them to decrease employ-
ment and output or to raise prices to an uncompetitive 
level. 
'l1he mining sector obviously will generate some additional 
activity in secondary industry so that, i~ the short run, 
total employment in secondary industry will probably not 
decline absolutely after the wage rise. In the longer run, 
however, if the wage level in the mining sector sets the 
national wage level, secondary industry will be encouraged 
to reduce the number o:j: workers in its ~mploy by opt:l.ng 
for more capital intensive techniques of producfj,.on. The 
productivity 0£ each worker will be higher than those 
employed under the previous wage structure but the govern-
ment of a LDC cannot be concerned with output alone !;>ecause 
of the existence of widespread unemployment or under-
employment. 
The revenue implications of the MNC 1 s high wage-low em-
' ployment policy are two-fold. The first relates to 
i labour's rights as a third claimant on the returns from 
l-4 
"\ \ 
>! I 
I 
I 
\ 
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the investment, and the second to the question of the 
consumption demonstration effect. 
Theoretically the host government is faced with the 
clear-cut choice of retaining. part of the industry's 
surplus by profit taxation and thus directly chanelling 
the revenue into their coffers or, alternatively, by 
pressing for pigher wages. These wages are then subject 
to personal income taxation and also generate an increase 
in consumption. In the LDCs trade unions are not as 
powerful an influence on wage levels as they are in the 
industrialised countries. Poor organisation, lack of 
experience, and, particularly, the large number of un-
employed weakens the nominally sophisticated bargaining 
rights frequently accorded. to the unions by legislation. 
Thus the government must take upon itself the advocacy 
and protection of the workers' rights. To opt for increased 
wages would probably be an error. 
The arguments against a high wage policy have already been 
outlined in some detail. Government support for this can 
only serve to strengthen the already deleterious effects 
of the high wage/low employment policy followed by the 
MJ.~Cs. Furthermore, if wages are relied upon as a means 
of increasing the host country's share of the return, 
investment is likely to be less than if the government 
retained the surplus because a large portiono.f:the.wage 
increase will be devoted to consumption. This stimulus 
provided to domestic demand is not per se unfavourable 
and should have the effect of raising national income. 
However, the possibility of a demonstration effect on 
expenditure patterns giving rise to a demand for imported 
consumer goods cannot be ignored. A high import, propensity 
is directly related to a high wage policy insofar as it 
)/ 
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stimulates demand for goods of high income elasticity 
like consumer durables, brandname products and expensive 
foodstuffs. The import propensity of the expatriates 
who tend to maintain the expenditure patterns of their 
home countries will be extremely.high, and it is 
possible that there will be a demonstration effect 
from the expatriates to the high wage nationals. Thus 
a high wage policy is not likely to provide a signif i-
cant stimulus to domestic consurner good industries. 
Furthermore a large portion of the food requirements 
of the high wage earners will have to be imported, 
although, if the necessary resources ar~ available 
to improve the quality of the domes-t;ic agricultural 
sector's output, in the long run a larger portion of 
these earnings would be spent locally. 
To su~arise then, the capital intensive techniques 
used by the MNC imply a small workforce with a large 
component of high level manpower. Although capital 
intensive techniques will reduce the need for unskilled 
workers and increase semi-skilled component of the work-
force, mining industry in particular will continue to 
rely upon a large component of unskilled labourers. 
Although this woµld, on the face of it, appear to ignore 
the prevailing set of factor prices, on· closer exam~nation 
it is found to constitute a rational response to the 
conditions prevailing in the LDC's labour market~ 
Furthermore, in the long run, the high wages paid by 
the MNC probably inhibit the growth of a secondary 
industrial sector or, at best, encourage the development 
. of a similarly capital intensive industrial sector. A high 
wage policy will not necessarily stimµlate demand for 
domestically produced const;Uner goods. 
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The skill level of the labour force will be raised by 
the activities of the MNC although ~here is reason to 
believe that these added skills will not be disseminated 
w;i.dely. 6 
5.4 ~4:!!~~9:~~ 
Following Hirschman (1958), a distinction is drawn 
between backward and forward linkages. The former refers 
to the inputs demanded by the MNC's subsidiary and 
supplied through domestic production, whereas the 
latter refers to the ability to utilise the output of 
the industry as inputs in furthe;i:- productive activity 
in the host economy. 
The question to be asked is, "Does the mineral extractive 
industry remain a small developing enclave within the 
underdeveloped host country, or doe.s it link up with the 
national (host) economy so as to stimulate the further 
development of the LDC's industrial and agricultural 
sectors?" 
Kindleberger (1969) asserts that, 
11 The investment linkages Hirschman suggests 
are stimulating to econom;i.c growth ... run 
abroad rather: than to the host economy. With 
little or limited contact with the local 
economy, foreign investment oc;:cupies an 
enclave, tightly bound to tne home country, 
far away, but only loosely connected.except 
geographically to the local scene. 11 (p. 188) 
Mikesell assures us that the 11 ~ackward linkage effects 
of the resource industries are not strong", although the 
asserts, somewhat unconvincingly that "resource industries 
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can have important forward linka~e effects 11 (p. 628). 
Hans Singer asks if, when attempting to analyse the 
multiplier effects of foreign investment "we economists , . 
have become slaves to the geographers?" suggesting that 
"if the proper economic test of investment is the 
multiplier •.• then a good deal of the investmen~ in 
underdeveloped countries which we u$ed to consider as 
1 fo:reign 1 should in fact be considered as domestic in-
vestment on the part of the industrialised countries" 
{p. 4 7 5) • 
These views are supported by numerous c~se studies 
{Baldwin, Girvan and Jefferson, Mikesell r ·Edozien). 
. . 
Why do large scale, foreign owned, mineral extractive 
industries fail to generate these linkages? In attempting 
to answer this question I will draw on two important 
contributions to DFI theory, namely, Girvan's distinc-
tion between the corporate and the national economy and 
Murray's (1972) view that" ..• capitalism, like othe~ 
economic systems, will have its own l~ws governing the 
geographical location of production; that these laws 
will generate sharp disparities in the type and 
quantity of productive activity found in the various 
regions in the system; and that these laws are increasingly 
applicabl.e to the current distribution of economic activity 
in the world market" (p. 164). 
a) Backward Linkages 
Girvan asserts that "it is to the institutional 
integration of these (resource) industries' multi-
national corporate system that we should ascribe 
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their lack of integration within the national econo~ 
mies" (p. 513). Thus, in Girvan's view, it is the 
mode of organisation of the MNC that reduces the 
possibility of backward linkages. 
Firstly, the tendency towards vertical integration 
frequently results in the production of some essen-
tial inputs by the parent company itself. As Caves 
has pointed out, where significant economies of 
scale may be derived at any particular point in 
the productive process it will be to the fipms 
advantage to supply these inputs from one location, 
transplanting only the remaining processes to the 
subsidiary. 
Secondly, even when the inputs are not produced 
within the corporate structure, the observed tendency 
of the MNC to centralise its purchases in the offices 
of the parent company drastically reduces the possi-
bility of backward linkages. It will obviously be 
to the firms advantage to purchase in bulk from a 
.well-established supplier. As Rollins has pointed 
out, the cost of transporting these inputs from the 
metropolis to the satellite need not be seen as a 
significant constraint - the firm will have to . 
arrange for the transport of the subsidiary's output 
to the metropolis and it may use the same transport 
facilities to ship inputs to the subsidiary on its 
inward journey. Furthermore, given that the transfer 
of inputs may take the form of an intra-firm accounting 
entry, the corporation is not constraine·d by a 
possible shortage of foreign exchange in· the host 
country. 
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Girvan's analysis does not, however, fully explain 
why the MNC cannot establish cheap sources of supply 
in the LDC, or why the local government or entre-
preneurs cannot. similarly establish the required 
input producing industries. This point has, to 
some extent, been touched upon already. The inability 
of the LDC to generate a capital goods sector 
supplying the needs of the MNC can be related to 
the capital-intensive techniques employed by the 
corporation - a capital intensive resource industry 
generallypresupposes the use of capital intensive 
inputs. 7 Nevertheless, in order to prov.iae a rigoroµs 
analysis explaining the failure of the MNC to generate 
significant backward linkages, we must look at the 
factors determining industrial location. I do not 
intend discussing this question in great detaii, 
but suffice it to say that Murray (1972) has success-
fully shown that, 
" ... the strongest attraction for 
agglomerative tendencies are agglome-
rations themselves. There is a continual 
reinforcement. The existing centres will 
be terminals for conununication, enjoy 
the benefits of scale economies in 
servicing, distribution networks, public 
utilities, and specialised business 
services. They will have a large market 
with consequent marketing economies. They 
will offer a wide range of suppliers anq 
customers •.• For any business already 
located in the centre there will be 
economies in expanding near existing plant" 
(p. l 71) • 
~ineral extraction is an obvious example of a 
locality bound industry - nevertheless the economies 
of urban agglomeration, improvements in transport 
and communication, the locality of the final market, 
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n ensure that the, proverbial: •.Mohammed will. not have 
to bring his entire entourage to the mountain. lt 
is not suggested that there will be a complete 
absence of backward linkages, and certain inputs, 
particularly in the retail and service sectors, are 
similarly locality bound. However the ancillary 
industries which cluster around the major export 
staple are not likely to make a significant con-
tribution to the development of the host economy. 8 
The crucial fact is that the major industrial link-
ages will be generated in the economie~ of the source 
countries for it is here that scale economies may 
be realised, that skilled labour is available and, 
in general, where the necessary social and physical 
infrastructure is to be found. The markeu created 
by the development of the mining industry might 
stimulate the production of arable crops in the 
neighbouring area~. The quality of the fresh food-
stuff will usually have to be. improved if they are 
to appeal to the high wage ~arners, and a reliable 
marketing network will have to be established. Where 
the mining companies are actually respons1ble for 
providing food to their employees they might be 
encouraged to undert'ake arable crop production. 
Thus Mikesell's assertion that" ••• for the primitive 
economies •.• domestic production of equipment requir-
ed for these (resource) industries must await a higher 
stage of industrialisation 11 (p. 428), would appear 
to be extremely shallow, because the vertically 
integrated structure of the MNC, coupled with the 
market determined laws of location are important 
factors preventing the attainment.of this 11 higner 
stage of industrialisation 11 • 
---1 
I 
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b) Forward Linkages 
The important forward linkages to be derived from 
mineral extraction general1y fefer to the refining 
and processing activities inextricably ·associ-ated 
_with the mining industr~. It appears.that very little 
JJ~- refining ~r processing is. carried out in. the host 
'1\ economy. . 
. . 
. . . 
It is· a well established fact that the mineral 
extractive corporations' almos·t invariably· draw. 
their raw materials from more than one source. 
Establishing an experisive processing and/or refin~ 
ing plant at every raw material source is clearly 
irrational, and faced with the choice between 
est~blishing the procesiing and, particularly, 
refining plant at any -one of the ·raw material. sources 
or in the economy of the parent;. ec·onomy, there is 
good reason to believe that.the MNC will generally 
opt for the latter. 
Firstly, the MNC's initial raw material source .is 
often to be found in the metropolitan country it~elf -
the Os copper, bauxite, and oil riches are merely 
several amongst many examples. The processing acti-
vities had thtis already been established in t~e­
source country, and it is generally cheaper to 
expand an already existing plant.than to establi~h 
a new one. 
Secondly, the uncertain political structure pre* 
vailing in many LDCs sugge_sts that the .co+poration 
· will reduce its risk by· minimising the extent of 
its activiti~~ beyond its national borders. The 
possibility of losing its miner~l- resources through 
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measures undertaken by both the US and Jamaican 
governments in relation to aluminium proouction 
appeared to ensure a low cost bauxite processing 
operation, but·it still proved extremely difficult 
to encourage the aluminium corporation to establish 
a processing plant in Jamaica. In this pa~ticular 
instance, it appeared that the costs of the inputs, 
particularly Caustic Soda, required in the proces-
sing stage, determined the firm's choice of location. 
Caustic soda was far more easily available in the 
US than in Jamaica. Moreover,if the firm was faced 
with a shortage of Caustic Soda in the.US, the 
size of the metropolitan market meant that the 
firm could if necessary establish its own caustic 
soda plant which would be assured of a large market 
over and above the requirement of the firm, thus 
allowing the plant to achieve economies of scale. 
Furthermore, processing frequently gives rise to 
,valuable by-products, which can be more easily 
marketed in the metropolis than in the satellite . 
. 'l'hus agglomeration ecqnomies definitely reduce the 
possibility of establishing a local processing plant. 
There would thus appear to be little a priori.reason 
fo~ expecting significant forward linkagep to be 
generated in the host economy and once again it 
would appear, somewhat predictably, that the extent 
of forward linkages is crucially dependent upon the 
stage of development of the host economy. But once 
again the "vicious circle of poverty" rears it head 
for in the poorer LDCs the link industries generated 
by the major export staple are a crucial determinant 
of the economy's ability to attain a higher stage of 
development. 
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c) Infrastructural Development 
The development of physical infrastructure is not 
conventionally defined as a link industry. Howev~r, 
a large mineral extractive industry necessitates I considerable expenditure.on infrastructure - power 
I plants will have to be constructed, a reliable supply of water will have to be secured, transportation factlities will have to be constructed, and housing 
and other amenities will have to be provided for· 
the MNC's workforce. These infrastructural facilities 
are thought to provide a considerable stimulus to 
the LDC 1 s economy. 
Contemporary practice dictates that the host govern-
ment (as opposed to the corporation) bears the 
financial responsibility for the required infra-
structure. Where the LDC draws on its own financial 
resources a considerable outflow of foreign exchange 
results. However the funds and technology required 
for the provision of infrastructure are generally 
provided for by foreign aid bodies and, although I 
do not wish to debate the controversial question of 
foreign aid, it appears that the overall impact of 
the infrastructure is strongly dependent upon.the· 
character and priorities of the loan body. 
Ultimately therefore any decision on the impact of 
infrastructural development will depend, to a signi-
ficant extent, on the nature of the particular 
~reject in question and will be discussed in detail 
in the following section. In general, however, it 
would appear that the provision of roads and power 
should stimulate the development of the host economy. IO 
Furthermore, infrastructural development, particularly 
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the provision of social amenities (housing, etc.), 
is likely to provide a considerable stimulus to 
the local construction industry. 
5.5 Revenue 
The revenue derived from the presence of a large produc-
tive unit within the LDC's fiscal jurisdiction is one of 
the most important considerations prompting these govern-
ments to encourage DFI. Although certain reservations are 
expressed with regard to the foreign investor's revenue 
contribution no attempt is made to understate its impor-
tance. It is, in fact, recognition of the importance of 
the revenue contribution that compels us to concentrate 
on these measures whereby the MNC might decrease its 
contribution to the LDC government coffers. 
The revenue accruing to the LDC treasury from the activi-
ties of the MNC stems from three major sources, namely, 
corporate profit taxation, import duties and personal 
income taxation. Personal income taxation has already 
been discussed, and this section concentrates on corporate 
profit taxation and import duties only. Furthermore, 
revenue is generated not only by the direct activities 
of the MNC but also by the activ~ties which it indirectly 
encourages. This is crucially dependent upon the link 
industries generated by DFI, a question which has also 
been discussed above. 
When discussing the revenue effect the distinction between 
the corporate and the national economy must be borne in 
mind. It cannot simply be assumed that the corporation 
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will realise its objectives by recording its profits in 
the accounts of any particular subsidiary. It may, for 
reasons outlined below, attempt to shift its profits 
from subsidiary x to ·subsidary y or z, or it may wish to 
' ' 
record its profits in the acco~nts of the parent company. 
This of course assumes that the firm exercises some 
degree of control over the location of its profits. 
The discussion of the chann~ls of profit remission is 
an important aspect of. this section. 
Robin Murray (1971, 1972) /has provided a useful framework 
within which the problem may be analysed. Murray draws 
a distinction between the exercise of monopoly power in 
economic space and the exercise of monopoly power in 
territorial space. The former refers to the attempts 
made by the holder of the monopoly power to" ••• secure 
••. the maximum proportion of surplus value produced by 
the society in whiqh he operates" (p. 219) l The exercise 
of monopoly power in geographical space refers to the 
fi.rn,' s ability to transfer its surplus to the geographical 
area of its choice. In essence the entire dissertation 
is concerned with both aspects of monopoly power. This is 
po less true of the present discussion although it does 
concentrate upon the latter aspect of monopoly power. 
Strictly speaking the nation state has the power to control 
the transmission of profits to areas outside of its fiscal 
jurisdiction. Furthermore the objectives of the firm will 
coincide, in certain instances, with those of the host 
country. The most obvious example of this arises as a 
result of a tax differential between the source and 
host countries and, given that the corporate profits 
tax is generally lower in the less developed than in the · 
industrialised world, it should follow that the firm will 
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be content to record its profits in the underdeveloped 
host economy. 11 This argument does not, however, take 
account of the multiple objectives of the· multinational 
enterprise. 
The primary objective of the MNC, like that of any firm, 
.{ is assumed to be the maximisation of profits, but in the 
case of the MNC, it is the maximisation of global 
'' profits and not those of any particular subsidiary. 
As Vaitsos (1972 a) and Penrose (1968) have pointed 
out, .it is perfectly feasible that the firm should view 
the profits of the subsidiary as part of the corpora-
tion' scash flow - thus the profits of any· particular 
subsidiary may be used to offset expenditure in one 
of the firm~ other productive units, thus avoiding 
taxation altogether. This will be particularly important 
in the situation where the firm's parent company is 
essentially administrative or where the parent incurs 
substantial overhead expenditure. Where the profit of the 
subsidiary may be used to offset expenditure incurred 
in another geographical area any attempt by the LDC to 
control the remission of profits will run counter to 
· the global profit maximisation aims of the firm. Vaitsos 
(1972 a) notes that, 
"Given the ability of a firm to 'eipense' certain 
outlays that are directed towards future returns 
(such as R&D) ... (and) •.. if these expenses, 
together with the direct costs for the operation 
of a given firm (assume that it is the parent), 
exceed therevenue from sales in its home market 
and to non-affiliates abroad, then it will be 
to the overall advantage of the trans-national 
enterprise to transfer untaxed income from its 
foreign affiliates through transfer pricing to 
cover these costs. In this way it reduces its 
global tax payments by reducing taxable income 
elsewhere through appropriate adjustments." (p. 34) 
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I have already indicated that because of agglomeration 
economies and the vertically integrated structure of 
the firm, it will prefer to incur its overhead expen-
diture - R&D, global administration, marketing, legal 
costs, etc. - in the economy of the parent. Moreover, 
particularly in the case of the large mineral extractors, 
the major prof it points are frequently situated outside 
the source country. 12 Thus, for this reason alone, there 
is considerable incentive for the firm to rem+t profits 
from the subsidiary to the parent. 13 
Formally the firm remits its profits by means of dividend 
payments and/or the payment of interest on loans advanced 
by the parent to the subsidiary. Given that interest 
payment are frequently considered as an expense it will 
usually be to the firms benefit to remit its profits in 
this manner, effectively providing the firm with an 
incentive to rely on loan rather than equity capital as 
a source of finance tor its subsidiary. There are, how-
ever, other, somewhat more surreptitious, channels of 
profit remission which the firm may utilise,· for example, 
pricing of the inputs and output of the subsidiary, and 
the royalty payment on the technology transferred. These 
channels of profit remission are collectively referred 
to as "transfer pricing" which, in effect, permits t).1.e 
firm to understate the profits earned by the subsidiary, 
simultaneously overstating the profits earned by the 
parent company. 
'l'here are many varied reasons why the firm would prefer 
to use transfer pricing rather than dividend or interest 
payment as a means of profit repatriation. Firstly, the 
firms public image would suffer if it was seen to be 
remitting a substantial portion of its profits to a 
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foreign shareholder. More important, however, are the 
restrictions which the host government frequently places 
on prof it remission by way of dividends and when the 
host government attempts to seal off the conventional 
channels of remission, the firm will resort to transfer 
pricing as a means of profit repatriation. 14 
Where the parent acts as the central purchasing agent 
for the MNC it may remit profits from the subsidiary to 
the parent by selling machinery or other essential inputs 
to the subsidiary at inflated prices. Research undertaken 
in Colombia revealed that the inputs purchased by Colom-
bian subsidiaries in the pharmaceutica1l industry from their 
US parent were overpriced by 155 per cent, in the rubber 
industry by 40 per cent, and the chemical industry by 
25,5 per cent (Vaitsos, 1970 a}. Similar studies under-
taken in other Latin American countries support these 
findings. Similarly, underpricing of the output of the 
subsidiary may also be used as a vehicle for the remis-
s ion of profits - the activities of the aluminium MNCs 
in the Caribbean are outstanding examples (Reno). 
· It is extremely difficult to close these channels, and 
the LDC government must ensure that all channels are 
sealed off. Closing one will merely result in intensive 
use of one of the other channels. Note however that 
' 
certain factors restrict the use of transfer pricing. 
.. ·-
Fees and royalty payments, for example, must be related 
in some way to technology used by the subsidiary. Further-
more, the attitudes of divisional managers must be con-
sidered, insofar as the low profits in any particular 
division cast aspersion upon the ability of the responsible 
manager. The problem may be overcome by using more than 
one set of books (see Shulman). 
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It would thus appear that stated profit figures are 
generally unreliable indicators of the subsidiary's p~~, 
formance. Nevertheless,the corporate profit tax based, 
of course, upon the stated profits, constitutes an 
important portion of the revenue accruing to the host 
economy, and it is to a brief examination of alterna-
tive taxation policies that I now turn. 
The objectives which the host country hopes to realise 
through taxation of the MNC's subsidiary depend, to a 
large extent, upon the role and importance of the 
industry in each particular LDC. The present an~lysis 
is concerned with the case where the industry accounts 
for the great bulk of the country's export earnings 
and is its major growth determinant. Within this frame-
work, maximisation of the host government share of the 
value of the industry's output is identified as the primary 
objective of taxation policy. Other objectives cannot, 
however, be ignored, particularly where the attainment 
of the primary objective conflicts with the attainment 
of any subsidiary objectives. Subsidiary objectives might 
include maximisation of th.e.backward and;. forward linkage 
effects, tax measures designed to influence the rate of 
mineral extraction'and the geographical pattern of 
development, anq a host of political objectives, all of 
which may presuppose a taxation policy inconsistent with 
the attainment of the primary objective. 15 
Most important, however, the government must ensure that, 
in attempting to maximise its share of the value of the 
subsidiary's output, it does not decrease its sh~re of 
the global industry's output. The.relationship·between 
/the host and the MNC is highly asymetrical, for, whereas 
j { the LDC is often wholly dependent upon the acitivities 
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.of the MNC, the MNC has alternative sources of raw !I . 
;,materials which it may draw on. This re-emphasises the 
need for a bargaining model of DFI. The inequitable 
deployment of bargaining strength arising from the 
asymetrical nature of dependence is an important factor 
prompting the LDC to grant significant concessions 
(e.g. differential tax rates, depletion allowances, 
etc.) to the MNC. These concessions naturally conflict 
.with an attempt to maximise the goV,errunents $hare ·of the 
subsidiary's profits but are necessary to secure the 
LDC' s share· of global output. 
As noted above the subsidiary's profit is commonly used 
as the tax base, frequently supplemented by a tax on 
dividends remitted and an "excess" profits tax. Where a 
corporate profit. tax is relied upon the price of the 
subsidiary 1 s output is of crucial importance. The MNC 
may attempt to hold down the price of its output thus 
reducing its tax commitment. The LDC may be able to 
prevent this by establishing posted prices in terms of 
which the subsidiary's tax burden will be assessed. Alter-
natively the government may compel the MNC to sell its 
output at stipulated prices. 
Aiternatively the LDC may decide to use the volume of 
output as the tax base. In recognition of the difficul-
ties involved in determining the subsidary 1 s profit, 
several of the bauxite. rich LDCs have attempted to levy 
taxation according to the quantity of bauxite produced 
in each tax year. Given the highly volatile price struc-
ture characteristic of the mining industry a tax of this 
nature is ill advised as it will preclude the LDC from 
benefiting from the high profit periods of the MNC, and 
will also encourage the MNC to opt for high prices at a 
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low level of production (see Reno). Where, however, the 
corporate income tax acts as a discincentive to increas-. 
ed output, the LDC is well advised to reduce the level 
of taxation once a stipulated volume of production is 
achieved. 
The duty levied on the impo~ted inputs required by the 
MNC is another important source of revenue for the LDC. 
This will be particularly important in the early, con-
struction stage of the corporation~ activities and will 
decline markedly after the first few years of produc-
tion - the planners should thus not view it as a con- · 
tinuing source of revenue. Any attempt by the MNC to 
.remit profits by means of overpriced inputs will lead 
to an increase in import duty charges. This factor might 
explain Vaitsos' conclusions that bargaining over tariffs 
is generally viewed by the MNC as being of greater 
importance than most of the other items on the bargain-
ing agenda. A low tariff structure is also an important 
concession frequently granted by the LDC to the MNC and 
constH!U.tes an important source of competition between 
LDC's vying for foreign investment. 
I do not suggest that the above discussion constitutes 
an exhaustive analysis of the important question of 
revenue and taxation. It has attempted merely to outline 
the two crucial problems in this sphere, namely, 1 the 
asymetrical nature of the dependence which exists between 
the MNC and the LDC, and, secondly, the,corporation's 
ability to determine the geographical location of its 
profits and, so, the size of its ~ax base. The former is 
broadly similar to Murray's exercise of monopoly power 
in economic space insofar as it places a defin!,te limit 
on the LDC's ability to extract surplus from the MNC by 
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tipping the bargaining powers in favour of the latter; the 
second refers to tne exercise of monopoly power in 
geographic space. 
I 
The above analysis underlines the importance of the 
investor 1·s contribution to government revenue. The 
importance of this contribution becomes particularly 
apparent when seen in relation to the weak linkage and 
multiplier effects of DFI. The revenue contribution is 
also accentuated by the high import propensity of the 
MNC's workforce which suggests that the government planners 
would be well advised to extract their share of the 
surplus in the form of corporate taxation rather than 
by encouraging higher wages. The wage structure of the 
MNC is, in part, attributable to the capital.intensive 
techniques favoured by the MNC and also to the str~cture 
and characteristics of the LDC's labour force. The use 
of ·,capital intensive techniques perpetuates the structural 
deficiencies of the LDC's labour market and encourages 
further use of similar techniques. Furthermore, the high 
wages paid by the MNC will probably result in an overall 
increase in the national wage level, and,. as such, will 
retard the development of a domestically controlled 
industrial sector. 
In essence, most of the mineral exporting LDCs are 
heavily dependent on the revenue earned from the taxation 
of the MNC's profit. Recognition of this situation leads 
Girvan to several highly pessimistic conclusions, and he 
argues that the LDC will become structurally dependent 
upon the revenue and foreign exchange provided by the 
activities o; the MNC. lie notes that, 
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" the mineral export industry does not expand 
indefinitely: the very factors which make it 
important to the national economy - the high 
rate of growth of output and the growth of the 
tax ta~e - are those that make it necessary 
for the company or companies to shift the loca-
tion of new capacity elsewhere ..• This puts 
pressure on the most important propulsive 
mechanism of the system - the growth of public 
spending - and the most important permissive 
mechanism - the growth <Ilf imports. Hence the 
political economy will either have to contain 
these mechanisms, or to find ways and mearis of 
allowing them continued operationn {p. 523/524). 
Thus Girvan suggests that in a foreign controlled, mineral 
extractive economy the responsibility for future develop-
ment is completely shouldered by the planners {as opposed 
to the investment multiplier) whose activities are 
determined by the revenue and foreign exchange contri-
butions of the MNC. The weakness of the investment multi-
plier is directly related to the structure of the MNC 
and the market determined laws of location, implying, 
as they do, the use of capital intensive techniques of 
production. But the LDC is largely dependent upon the 
resources offered by the MNC, and any attempt on the 
part of the host country government to increase radically 
its revenue share will hasten the demise of the multi-
national' s subsidiary. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 5 
1 Cf. chapter 11. 
2 An example of ·the misleading use to which these 
criteria may be put is provided in chapter 6. 
3 This appears to have been true of the companies 
operating on the Zambian copperbelt (see Baldwin). 
4 This raises an extremely important question which 
I shall not detail at this stage. La Clau in fact 
argues that the ,capitalist class benefits from the 
maintenance of two contradictory modes of produc-
tion, namely, the capitalist and pre-capitalist 
modes. From La Clau's Marxist perspective the 
situation cannot be maintained indefinitely and 
the.contradiction will be resolved by the rise 
of the predominant (capitalist) mode. For an 
excellent application of this argument to Southern 
Africa see Wolpe. 
5 Streeten notes: "The foreign firms pride themselves 
on the high labour standards which they introduce 
into less developed countries, the high wages they 
pay, the short hours the workers work and the 
generous welfare services they provide. In fact, 
all these are detractions from, not contributions 
to, the development effort. It is precisely in the 
area where host government and foreign firms seem 
to pursue common interests, when the profit motive 
and national aspirations seem to coincide, that 
most damage is done ... 11 (p. 244) • 
6 Although even if the unskilled workers are not 
provided with any specific skills they are familiar-
ised with an industrial milieu which, in itself, 
will increase the skill level of the workforce. 
7 For a detailed discussion of the problems faced 
by the LDC in establis~ing a capital goods producing 
sector, see Arrighi, Baldwin, Murray (1~72). 
8 Murray )1972) cites studies by Christaller, Borgue 
and Alexandersson in support of this statement. 
Christaller shows that even the service sector 
requires a minimum size "catchment area" (using 
population as a measure) which suggests that even 
this sector is likely to consist of small scale 
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services which will not employ a great number of 
locals or significantly contribute to national in-
come. Alexandersson distinguishes. between "ubiquitous" 
and "sporadic" industries, the former being found in 
most urban areas and comprising 20 service and three 
manufacturing industries (construction, printing and 
publishing, food processing). 
9 In Zambia both Anglo American and RST were extremely 
reluctant to establish a local refining plant, 
largely because of the high tariff barriers iri. the 
developed countries but also because a processing 
planb in Zambia would have competed with established 
European fabricators, some of whom were major 
customers of the abovementioned corporations. The 
imminent possibility of one of their rivals 
establishing a Zambian processing plant eventually 
encouraged Anglo and RST to integrate fof:'wards. -
The Economist (London), 22nd April, 1967. 
10 Although as Baran persuasively notes: 
" ••• it is not railways, road and power stations 
that give rise to industrial capitalism: It is 
the emergence of industrial capitalism that leads 
,_,!_ ·t0r, the building of railways, the construction 
of roads and to the establishment of power sta-
tions. The identical sources of external economies 
if appearing in a country going through the 
mercantile phase of capitalism, will provide, 
if anything, external economies to merchant 
capital" (p. 193). 
11 The existence, or otherwise, of an agreement between 
the source and host. countries preventing double 
taxation might be an important consideration. For 
present purposes it is assumed that such an agree-
ment is in force. 
12 Lonrho is a case in point, with 96 per cent of its 
profits earned abroad - Chairman's Statement, 
reprinted in the Cape Times, 4th January, 1974. 
13 Tax differentials do sometimes provide an· incentive 
for remission from the subsidiary. Anglo~s interests 
in Zambia are an example, with Zamanglo incorporated 
in a "tax haven", Bermuda. Note too, thq.;t. although 
tax considerations of ten appear to be· of· l?aramount 
importance when decisions regarding· profit rem±·ssion 
are made, there are other factors that must considered, 
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e.g. currency fluctuations, the stability of the 
host government, the rate of inflation in the 
host economy, etc. For a detailed discussion of 
these factors, see Shulman. 
14 For a formal analysis of transfer pricing see 
Horst. Horst's analysis.is unconvincing insofar 
as he only considers the height of the .tariff 
charged on inputs as a determinant of transfer 
pricing. There are, of course, other objectives 
which the firm will wish to realise and it might 
continue to utilise transfer pricing despite high 
tariff walls. · 
15 For a more detailed discussion of these subsidiary 
objectives see Behrman. 
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CHAPTER 6 
The Value Retained 
It is, of course, impossible, at this stage, to ascribe 
any approximate magnitudes to the items in the value 
added table. It is assumed that the mining venture is 
one of significant size, and it therefore follows that 
gross output will be considerable, if not in relation 
to the industry's global output, then at least in rela-
tion to the total value of the host country's industrial 
output. The absolute amount of profit earned is also 
assumed to be considerable, particularly when compared 
with the profit earned by existing local enterprise, 
and tax receipts earned by the government from the 
foreign owned enterprise will also be considerable. A 
large scale, capital intensive,mineral extractive enter-
prise will require costly mat~rial inputs, although much 
of this expenditure will be incurred abroad. The number 
of workers employed will be small in relation to the quan-
tity of capital employed but, given the small number of 
workers in cash employment in the host country, the wage 
bill of the MNC will constitute a significant portion 
of the national wage bill. 
Although the question of the value retained is implicit in the 
above analysis it is necessary to focus directly UJ;On this 
imp::>rtant issue. Rayn:ond Mikesell and many of the contributors 
to his volume (see particularly Mamalakis) ·;purport to measure 
the impact of DFI entirely in terms of the project's 
/ 
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foreign exchange contribution, that is, by comparing the 
value of exports with total foreign exchange receipts in 
the form of the MNC's domestic expenditure plus its pay-
ments to the government, Mikesell et al are able to cal-
culate the ratio of foreign exchange earnings to export 
values and thus assess the "impact" of the enterprise on 
the host country. Although there are several problems 
associated with Mikesell's particular formulation, 1 there 
are several fundamental questions which must be posed 
concerning the calculation of foreign exchange receipts: 
Firstly, many Latin American writers assert that, over 
a stated period of time, the flow of capital on invest-
ment account from the metropolis (read, USA) to the satellite 
(read, Latin American sub-continent) is dwarfed in sheer 
magnitude by the· reverse flow, that is, by the flow of 
profits from the satellite to the metropolis. The satellite 
is thus a net loser of foreign exchange and, on this basis, 
the MNC, as the prime mover of capital between nations 
is viewed as "exploitative" and an "agent of neo-
imperialism" (see particularly Frank, Magdoff) • This 
argument is based upon an extremely superficial analysis 
that warrants considerable re-examination. 
· Essentially the above argument implies that the only 
balance of payment impact of DFI arises from the inflow 
of capital and the remission of profits. This .:Ls, o~ 
course, incorrect. If the foreign capital is invested 
in import substituting industries the quantity imported 
declines, and if it is invested in export industries 
the volume of exports increase,~ the foreign exchange posi-
tion being affected in both cases. In fact, using data 
of the early 'sixties for US manufacturing subsidiaries, 
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Vernon (1971) shows that satellite countries are only 
small net losers of foreign exchange, the annual loss 
increasing slightly over the life of the subsidiary. 2 
Furthermore, insofar as Frank's analysis suggests that 
new investment can be compared with d.ividends and in-
terest remitted, it might be ·argued that, on the assump-
tion that each new capital inflow is used productively, 
each debt should generate a suf f{cient increase in 
productivity to service itself. 3 Finally the balance 
of payments is a macro-economic concept and should be 
dealt with by macro-economic tools, thus any a~gument 
which suggests a restriction of DFI by reference to the 
balance of payments is a second-best argument (Johnson)! 
However, the imperfect nature of the LDC's economy will 
justify the use of second-best policy (Kindleberger). 
Secondly, and of more fundamental importance, when 
attempting to measure the impact of DFI in terms of the 
enterprise's contribution to foreign exchange, it must 
be assumed that, a) either these foreign exchange earnings 
finance inputs required by the LDC that are only obtain-
able from abroad thus relaxing a foreign exchange con-
straint. That is, as Areskoug puts it, it must be assumed 
that" •.• the policy makers attempt to create an incremental 
trade (goods and services) deficit, above and beyond any 
such de~icit expected to be financed through private 
capital inflows or reserve reduction, of a magnitude 
equal to the official capital inflow in .that year" 
(p. 183) 4 or, b) that the inflow of foreign exchange has 
a positive impact on the level of domestic savings, 
that is, that a savings constraint is relaxed. 
Although I do not intend debating this highly complex 
subject in any detail, it appears that there are strong 
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theoretical and empirical grounds for questioning 
these assumptions. Acceptance of these assump-
tions implies that government policy measures w~ll 
always be able to ensure that the additional foreign 
exchange is directed into investment with no consump-
tion linkages. 
An econometric study undertaken by Weisskopf shows quite 
conclusively that savings generated by inflows of 
foreign capital do not necessarily supplement domestic 
savings and, in fact, indicates that there is. an inverse 
relationship between foreign capital inflows and ex ante 
savings. 
Areskoug asserts that when the effect of the foreign 
capital inflow on the domestic financial variables is 
considered (as opposed to those models which only take 
account of the effect on the ~ variables) the 
question of the government policy response to the 
foreign capital inflow must be considered. 
'l'he government may respond to the inf low by using ex-
penditure increasing policies (i.e. increasing the 
level of government expenditure) or expenditure switching 
policies. If the government chooses to use expenditure 
increasing policies it will induce a situation of infla-
tionary excess demand unless it is able simultaneously 
to depress the level of private spending. Econometric 
research undertaken by Areskoug revealed that those 
governments that relied on expenditure increasing policies 
diverted a large portion of the incremental foreign 
exchange into consumption expenditure giving rise to 
the expected pressure on the domestic price level. 
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Admittedly these arguments are extremely inconclusive 
and deserve more detailed treatment. They do however 
cast doubt upon those models which glibly assume that 
an inflow of foreign capital automatically relaxes a 
foreign exchange and/or a savings constraint. 
Bearing these qualifications in mind, it will be use-
ful to examine each element in the value added table 
outlined in chapter 5, and attempt to estimate the portion 
of value added which is likely to be retained in the 
host country, or, in Killick's terminology, the mean 
foreign exchange content of the value added. The 
following will comprise little more than a brief summary 
of selected aspects of the contents of chapter 5. 
Material Inputs: In the value added table material 
inputs are disaggregated into imported and locally 
produced inputs. Obviously the foreign exchange re-
quirement of the former will be 100 per cent, whereas 
purchases of locally produced inputs will not require 
any foreign exchange. The real problem, of course, is 
to estimate what portion of the material inputs will 
be imported. 
For reasons outlined above it appears that the lion's 
share of the material inputs will be imported. Capital 
intensive techniques of production will require simi-
larly capital intensive inputs; the integrated struc-
ture of the MNC suggests that many of the important 
inputs will be produced within the firm itself; in 
general, the market determined laws of location ensure 
that most of the important inputs will be produced in 
the advanced, industrialised economies and will thus 
have to be imported by the subsidiary. In esse·rice, backward 
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linkage effects of DFI are weak and, therefore, most of 
the material inputs required will be imported. Some of 
the required inputs may be produced locally - construc-
tion inputs like bricks, nails, possibly protective 
clothing for the miners, but the costly inputs, the 
machinery, steel, etc. will have to be imported. 
Wage and Salary Payments: In order to calculate the 
foreign exchange required as a result of the wage and 
salary payments, the import propensity of the MNC's 
labour force must be estimated. 
The import propensity of the highly paid workers will 
be considerably greater than that of the low paid 
workers, and the fact that the former are generally 
expatriate raises their propensity to import. The 
expatriate employee will attempt to maintain the mode 
of living of his home country and a demonstration effect 
is likely to filter down from the expatriate workers to 
/ . 
the highly paid nationals. Furthermore, with the excep-
tion of fresh foodstuffs, the locally produced consumer 
goods demanded by the highly paid will be luxury goods 
and their production will embody a high import content. 
The import propensity of the low income unskilled and 
semi-skilled employees will be considerably lower than 
that of their high income colleagues, although the 
existence of a demonstration effect cannot be discounted. 
Furthermore in an isolated mining town the retail outlets 
will cater to the needs of the high income earners, 
bolstering this demonstration effect. 
It would thus appear that the foreign exchange content 
of t.he MNC's wage bill is likely to be significant. The 
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larger the portion of the wage bill attributable to 
expatriates, the greater will be the foreign exchange 
content. 
Profits: There is not very much that one can say about 
the foreign exchange content of the subsidiary's profits. 
Profits are remitted to shareholders and the locat~pn 
of the shareholders determines the foreign exchange 
content of the profits. In the case of a wholly owned 
foreign subsidiary the amount of profit will .reflect 
the foreign exchange requirement. Where the host govern-
ment or local citizens share in the ownership of the 
subsidiary the foreign exchange content will obviously 
·be smaller. 
Government Revenue: It is virtually impossible to make 
a general estimate of the government sector's propensity 
to import. In a LDC where the government will be engaged 
in providing much of the basic social and physical infra-
. structure, the foreign exchange requirement is likely 
to be significant, although lower than that of the other 
categories mentioned. The provision of social infra-
structure - schools, hospitals, local government - is 
not li~ely to embody a high foreign exchange content. The 
·provision of physical infrastructure, particularly insofar 
as it involves the purchase of sophisticated equipment 
(e.g. power stations) is likely to involve a high Joreign 
exchange element, although the funds for costly projects 
of this nature will not usually be drawn from recurrent 
government revenue. Control of a large mineral extrac-
tive industry generally presupposes the ci;-eation of a 
government department staffed by trained, skilled 
administrators, technicians and economists. In this sense 
' 
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then the revenue from the mining sector might contain 
a significant fore~gn exchange content. 
In general, it would appear that the impact of the 
foreign owned sector cannot b.e measured in terms of 
.the enterpriseB value added. ·The value added will 
diverge from the value retained, the lat~er meas~re 
constituting .a more meaningful indicator.of the cor-
poration's impact. 
i-
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How, for example, is the price and/or quantity 
of S arrived at, and does D constitute the 
bulk of remissions abroad? 
c) From whom ·and at what price is M imported? Is 
it not conceivable that the nature of DFI 
allows the investor to impose a similar 
oligopolistic structure on the market for 
inputs? 
2 However, Vernon's analysis is based explicitly on 
the dubious assumption that the stated profit figures 
reflect the true remission. · 
3 It would however appear that this argument is 
only necessarily valid in a situation of competitive 
markets. That is where the foreign investment is 
encouraged by or gives rise to an oligopolistic 
market structure or the existence of a tariff, further 
investment could in fact lead to "immiserising 
growth 11 • Thus the argument is only necessarily 
valid when it is assumed that the investor is only 
able to extract a certain portion of the productivity 
increase, and is therefore only tenable in a 
second-best sense. 
4 Areskoug's article is concerned with the effect of 
official foreign aid inflows. In the passage 
cited, "official" and "private" may be transposed 
without disturbing the analysis. 
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CHAPTER 7 
DFI and the Distribution of Income 
Many of the issues raised in this chapter have been 
referred to in previous chapters but whereas the analysis 
thus far has concentrated on the question .of value added 
and retained this chapter will focus attention upon the 
distributional criteria. 
This chapter also concentrates on the problem of what 
Ki.ndleberger refers to as "disaggregated interest groups", 
a problem which is inextricably bound up with the question 
of distribution. That is the distribution of income and 
i
i the distribution of access to income generating opportu-
nities gives rise to the existence of various socio-
economic groups with divergent interests. This has important 
implications for: the nature and effectiveness of government 
policy, and to the magnitude and direction of economic 
development. 
7~2. ~h~_Q!§~~!eB~!Qn_g£_!U£QID~ 
If, as Vaitsos (1972 a) has pointed out, the MNC is able 
to extract the entire rental and all the additional 
income accruing from its investment, there will be no 
direct intracountry distributional effects as long as 
prices are unaffected and full employment prevails. · 
If the increase in productivity (income) generated by 
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the inf~ux of foreign factors is reflected in lower prices 
to the consumer (as opposed to premium prices for the 
foreign factors) the distributional effects will be 
determined by the consumption package of the host country 
consumers. In the case of min~ral extraction, particularly 
where the ore is unprocessed, a price reduction is not 
likely to affect distribution in the host country. 
If, on the other hand, under the reasonable assumption 
that foreign investment flows into the relatively cap~tal 
intensive sector of the host economy, and if the returns 
and rental accruing from the investment reflect itself 
in a cP,-ange in the general level of factor prices (as 
opposed, that is, to a premium on the factors specifi-
cally employed by the MNC) distribution could move both 
relatively and absolutely in favour of capital and 
against labour. 
The above analysis is outlined in the following diagram 
(reproduced from Johnson, p. 46). 
Capital 
M 
Ml 
N 
0 N 
Labour 
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Prior to the investment there are two sectors employing 
diff~ring capital-labour ratios, x and y. Foreign 
factors flow into sector x. If the entire rental accrues 
to th.e investor prices will remain unchanged and the 
investor earns a profit on his technological superiority 
(illustrated by the difference in efficiency between x 
and x 1) at the rate of MM1/oM1 • Where the increased 
efficiency is reflected in a product price reduction 
the price of x falls by MM1 in terms of capital with no 
effect on factor prices. If, on the other hand, the 
product price level prior to the introduction of the 
foreign capital is maintained, and the increased 
efficiency is reflected in a change in overall factor 
prices, the new price ratio is reflected by MM, an 
absolute and relative decline in the price of labour. 
Thus, given that an increase in efficiency does not 
manifest itself in a reduction in product prices, it 
appears that the foreign investor's influence in. 
determining distribution will be exercised through a 
change in factor prices. Furthermore the analysis shows 
that the distribution will move in favour of capital 
and against labour. 
The capital employed by the MNC stems, it has been assumed, 
from the advanced metropolis. In the case of joint ventures, 
that is, where a portion of the capital is raised in 
the host country, the increased price of capital will 
benefit the local owners of capital - the government 
sector or individual capitalists. A certa.in portion of 
the working class also benefits from the introduction of 
foreign cap.ital, most noticeably those directly employed 
by the MNC. 
"" \ 
I• 
'' 
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The question of distribution is analysed more fruitfully 
within an "interest group" or "class" framework. In 
essence it is hypothesised that large-scale DFI encourages 
the emergence of div~rgen~ interest groups, and possibly 
exacerbates tensions existing between established socio-
economic groups. Ih Streeten's words: 
11 the nation state is not monolithic. Diffe,... 
rent interests within it align themselves diffe-
rently with the foreign owned firm. Among those 
who will side with it are bribed officials, 
""'I i I \ " I 
/f \ \ 
the small employed aristocracy of workers who 
enjoy high wages and security, the satellite 
bourgeoisie to whom world wide mobility and 
prospects are opened, and the domestic industries 
producing complementary goods who benefit from 
the concessions which the MNC has achieved for 
itself. On the other side of the fence are the 
masses of unemployed, non-employed and under-
employed, those who suffer from the higher costs, 
the competitors, actual and potential, and those 
who dislike foreigners. In view of the division, 
it is misleading to speak of the interest of 
\ 
; 
I \ 
I 
l 
the nation state" (p. 257). 
7.3 E!~~gg~~SeE~9-!~~~~~§~-9~QgE§ 
The formation of these interest groups has already been 
analysed in some detail. 
;The capital intensive techniques employed by the ~C, the 
jattempts to stabilise its workforce, give rise to a small, 
I !relatively highly paid workforce. We have seen that a 
, 
clear tri-partite division is discernible within the 
MNC's workforce: the highly paid technical and managerial 
personell, frequently referred to as the "elite"; a "sub-
elite" (accounting, clerical, secretarial, artisan staff) 
,whose wage level is determined by a combination of MNC 
' I I 
I 
I 
I 
\ 
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priorities and the civil service wage structure; and the I 
I 
proletarianised, semi-skilled and unskilled workforce. 
The latter are often incorporated in an amorphous group 
referred to as the "labour aristocracy". This term, 
although in common usage, will not be employed, Although 
the unskilled and semi-skilled· workers might find them-
selves in a privileged position vis-a-vis the unemployed 
urban dwellers and the peasantry, it is probably mislead-
ing to refer to them as an "aristocracy''. 
Furthermore,the MNC stimulates the formation of a small 
services sector :.and a class of small retailers. The 
livelihood of these establishments is likely to be 
strongly dependent upon the demand generated by the 
corporation and their employees. The lack of integration 
between the MNC and the remainder of the host economy 
places the burden of development, not on the investment 
multiplier, but on the LDC planners which necessitates 
the formation of a bulky, sophisticated, civil service. 
The combined effect of the colonial civil service struc-
ture and the MNC's wage policy sets the high wage 
level prevailing in the civil service, the maintenance 
of which is strongly dependent upon the revenue derived 
from the MNC. 
It is extremely difficult to represent the emergence and 
position of these interest groups within a single frame-
wor~. It appears, however, that three broad groups have 
been identified. Firstly, the corporation~workforce, 
composed, as it is, of a highly paid elite, a sub-elite, 
and a semi-proletarianised force of unskilled and semi-
skilled workers; secondly, the retailers and service 
sector, including the civil service, whose position is 
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strongly dependent upon the .·presence of the MNC; and 
finally, the government in power, the bulk of whose 
revenue is so strongly tied to the existence of the MNC. 
But what of the other side of the fence? The small 
commercial farming sector is strongly dependent upon 
the demand generated by the growth of the modern sector, 
but, as outlined above, there is every likelihood that 
the high wages paid by the mining company might reduce 
the magnitude of this demand. Furthermore, insofar as 
the MNC's wage level sets the national wage level, em-
plo¥ment in the modern sector might be reduced in the 
long run, and those who remain unemployed or who are 
laid off as a result of the capital intensive bias 
generated by a wage increase, will be forced to fall 
back on the rural sector. 
It would thus appear that the MNC encourages the forma-
tion of a national elfte, varying in wealth and influence, 
from the managerial staff of the MNC to the unskilled 
miner, from the ruling political power to the small 
retailer established in the mining town. The nature and 
strength of their ties vary considerably but, in the 
broadest sense possible, it does appear that their 
interests are furthered by the presence of the MNC. 
I must at this stage digress slightly and examine the 
superficially powerful argument which suggests that the 
creation of a national elite is an important, indeed 
necessary, factor stimulating further development. This 
argument turns on the size of the "re-investment coeff i-
cient 11, that is, it·is postulated that, whatever:.the 
short run effects, capital ~ntensive techniques, in 
the long run, release a greater supply of investment 
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funds. This argument has been used by Dobb, Sen, and 
Galenson and Leibenstein - these writers all assume 
the existence of a centrally planned economy where the 
reinvestment of the surplus and the prevailing wage 
level are closely determined by the planner. 
Essentially the same argument is used to justify the 
creation of a highly paid national elite. That is, it 
is argued that the highly paid elite will save a greater 
portion of their earnings thus releasing a greater supply 
of investment funds. Furthermore, it is argued, 
domestic demand will be stimulated by the greater 
spending power of the small high income group. 
As far as the predominantly expatriate elite is concerned 
(as opposed to the sub-elite and proletariat), it appears 
that a substantial portion of their earnings is banked 
in the source country or is earned in the form of a bonus 
paid on the expiry of their contract. Furthermore, it is 
by no means certain that the portion of the earnings of 
the elite and sub-elite that is saved, will be reinvested 
in the host country. In fact, the nature of the commer-
cial banking sector in most LDCs reduces the possibility 
of substantial reinvestment. Where the banking sector ~s 
dominated by foreign owned banks and where the LDC is not 
.. 
able to control the outflow of funds, a large portion of 
the savings of the LDC will be reinvested .in the metropolis. 
Furthermore, as noted above, the stimulus to local pro-
duction of consumer goods is reduced by the high income 
elasticity of demand of the highly paid elite, and 
possibly by ~·demonstration effect on the expenditure 
patterns of thesub-elites and workers. The creation of 
an elite will not necessarily generate demand for locally 
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produced consumer goods - for imported consumer goods, 
certainly, but not necessarily for locally produced 
commodities. 
It would thus appear that the creation of a national 
elite does not necessarily offer the investment bene-
fits frequently referred to. But does it actually reduce 
the policy options available to the satellite government? 
At the one extreme, insofar as the government itself is 
part of the elite created and maintained by the MNC, the 
possibility of a convergence of interest between the MNC 
and the government could drastically reduce the welfare 
of the LDC citizens. Meillassoux, noting the high portion 
of Middle Eastern government revenue spent on internal 
security, coupled with the high proportion of government 
revenue derived from the petroleum industry, concludes 
that there is an important link between DFI and the 
maintenance of the internal political structure (cited 
Murray, 1972). 
But, discounting for the moment the possibility of a 
government-MNC alliance, any conflict between the govern-
ment and the MNC may manifest itself as a conflict between 
the government on the one hand, and the urban workforce 
and local capitalists on the other. For example, any 
attempt by the government to increase its share of the 
MNC's surplus might reduce the share of the working class, 
and thus a conflict between the government and the MNC 
concerning the distribution of the returns on the invest-
ment, might appear as a conflict betweenth~ government 
and the proletariat. In fac~ the distribution of income 
encouraged by the MNC might prevent successful implemen-
tation of a government policy measure designed to 
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redistribute income from the urban to the rural areas, 
insofar as measures of this nature imply that the small, 
but politically powerful, elites would have to bear 
the brunt of the redistribution. 1 It is interesting to 
note that Nicholas Kaldor, drawing on his wide experience 
as a tax consultant to many LDC government, writes that, 
11 since I invariably urged the adoption of 
reforms which put more of the burden of taxation 
on the privileged minority of the well-to-do, 
and not only on the broad masses of the popu-
lation, it earned me (and the governments I 
advised) a lot of unpopularity, without, I fear, 
always succeeding in making the property owning 
classes contribute substantial amounts to the 
public purse. 
The main reason for this ••• undoubtedly lay 
in the fact that the power, behind the scenes, 
of the wealthy property-owning classes and 
business interests proved to be very much 
greater than the responsible, political func-
tionaries suspected" (p. XVIII). 
Kaldor also found that in two countries that accepted his 
proposals, British Guiana and Ghana, attempted reform of 
the tax system was met by considerable opposition from 
the trade unions, w.ho, he found, objected to the intro-
duction of greater equity in taxation, although none of 
the proposals would have directly affected the wage 
earning classes. "In underdeveloped countries", concludes 
Kaldor, "the moneyed interest is capable of exerting 
·its influence in strange and unexpected ways: if not 
through the Cabinet, or through Parliament, or through 
the revenue administration, then, in the last resort, 
through organised labour" (p. XX). 
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It is, of course, very difficult to arrive at any 
unequivocal conclusions regarding the possibility of a 
convergence of interests between divergent national 
groups and the MNC. The possible conflicts which have 
been identified may arise from any large scale industrial 
development, domestic or foreign controlledr.! However, 
in the case of a foreign investor the conf+ict is 
exacerbated by the very element of "foreigness", that 
is, by the fear that a share of the control of the LDC's 
economy has been surrendered to foreign owned interests, 
and that certain national groups will ally themselves 
with the needs of the foreigner at the expense of the 
perceived interest of other groups in the society. 
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NOTE •ro CHAPTER 7 
l 'l'he opposition of the Chilean copper miners to 
Allende's socialist programme is cited as an 
example of an alliance between the labour elite~ 
and the foreign owned MNC. 
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CHAPTER 8 
Summary and Conclusions 
The theoretical framework used in this paper stresses 
what appear to be the two crucial characteristics of 
DFI, namely 
I 
1) the structure of the MNC and its tendency to 
maximise profits from a global perspective, 
and 
2) the technological dependence of the LDCs on 
the developed, industrialised West. 
Furthermore, it appears that the process of global profit 
maximisation coupled with the overriding market determined 
laws of location perpetuates the situation of techno-
logical dependence~ 
The primary implication of this is that the LDC finds 
itself in a situation from which it cannot easily emerge 
it may grow, but the growth is achieved without develop-
ment. The rapid growth in the GDP of many LDCs, burgeon~ 
ing government revenue, and the emergence of a small, 
but prosperous, high income group within the satellite 
are sound indicators of a growing economy but they do 
not necessarily imply development, because the funda-
mental situation of dependence is not alleviated. In 
Dos Santos' words, 
"The relation of interdependence between two 
or more economies, and between these and 
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world trade, assumes the form of dependence 
when some countries (the dominant ones) can 
expand and can be self-sustaining, while other 
qountries (the dependent ones) can do this 
only as a reflection of that expansion .•. " 
(p. 231). . 
The process of DFI reinforces the condition of dependence -
a large portion of the surplus realised by the foreign 
investor is remitted abroad thus reinforcing; the geo-
graphical concentration of capital required for large 
scale industrialisation; the linkage effects are realised, 
for the large part, in the metropolis; the LDC does not 
acquire the means to develop its own R&D capabilities and 
it remains technologically dependent on the advanced 
economies. DFI obviously fulfils certain sorely lacking 
needs in the host economy - it does, to some extent, 
disseminate industrial skills and knowledge; it makes a 
significant contribution to the government coffers; and 
it does provide employment for a small nurober of LDC 
nationals. In effect, if DFI is assessed purely in terms 
of value added and even value retained criteria its con-
tribution is significant. Thus we are faced with a seemingly 
insoluble contradiction - it appears that if any LDC wishes 
to industrialise it will have to tie itself to the inter-
national economy, it-cannot industrialise in isolation. 
On the other hand, the process of DFI, the process by 
which the LDC integrates itself with the international 
economy, reinforces the condition of dependence, it 
reinforces the tendency towards the geographical centra-
lisation of the means of production. The foreign owned 
industry remains a small developing enclave and the · · 
important linkage and spillover effects are realised in. 
the metropolitan economies. 
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As Baldwin points out, in an economy characterised by 
an efficient allocation of resources the pecuniary 
externalities g~nerated by DFI will not be important, 
that is, changes in market demand and supply merely 
result in a reorganisation of given factors. Technological 
spillovers, on the other hand, may be of importance, even 
under conditionsof efficient resource allocation. 1 
However, in an economy where resources are not 
allocated efficiently (e.g. a less developed economy) 
both technological and pecuniary externalities should 
be of significance. The importance of technological 
spillovers has already been recognised - the additional 
skills acquired by the corporation~ employees, the infra-
structural facilities such as power and transport, may 
all be utilised in the wider economy. But whether or not 
these technological spillovers make a significant contri-
bution to economic development will depend, to a large 
degree, upon the extent of the pecuniary externalities. 
'£hus Baldwin's analysis of the Zambian economy concludes 
that, 
"Unlike economies in which resources are fully 
employed and efficiently allocated, changes in 
demand conditions, that is, pecuniary spill-
overs, in underdeveloped areas do affect the 
quantitative and qualitative features of the 
basic means of production 
••• Demand repercussions, in other words, cause 
not just a shift in resource allocation but 
lead to an increase in the productive powers of 
existing resources. Unfortunately, the nature 
of the production function for copper was such 
that the direct an:d indirect demand effects 
derived from the industry were not very iarge." 
(p. 215) 
Thus when comparing the overall impact of plantation 
economies with mineral extraction, Baldwin concludes 1 
that, 
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I 
"In terms of facilitating the training of skilled 
labour, the mineral industries are in a more 
favourable position than are the agricultural 
producers of export commodities working under 
a plantation system. But the low level of 
domestic demand generated by mineral industries 
tends to confine the demand for skilled labour 
to the mineral export industry itself. A small 
part of the population gains considerably from :-. 
the creation of the mineral export industry, but 
develo ment fails to affect the rest of the 
economy to any significant extent. ' p. 73) 
There are, of course, policy measures available to the 
LDC whereby it might raise its share of the return from 
the investment. Although these alternative policy measures 
have not been analysed it is probably generally correct 
to assert that the MNC is not as tax elastic as one might 
suppose, and the host government may impose a harsher or 
more sophisticated system of taxation on the foreign 
investor without significantly reducing ;the inf low of 
foreign capital; the LDC government may, within limits, 
compel the MNC to adopt a wage-employment policy more 
suited to the host's needs than would normally be followed 
by the MNC; it may, to a limited degree, compel the MNC 
to purchase some of its requirements in the LDC or, in 
very exceptional circumstances, establish a local process-
ing plant; indeed the host government may even ensure 
that the MNC is, on entry, subject to a certain degree 
of local control, or it may take steps to nationalise 
the investors share without seriously reducing future 
inflows. 2 The nation state is not, as Kindleberger would 
have us believe, "through as an economic unit" for 
political autonomy does permit some degree of control 
over the nation's economic base. 
But these measures, welcome as they are, serve merely to 
reform marginally the existing system - they cannot 
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redetermine the logic of a market economy. Thus, I must 
stress again, the ml,lltinational corporations are not, as 
it were, viewed as the "bad guys" who, with malicious 
. . 
intent, undermine the LDCs'attempt to develop economi-
cally - the corporations merely conform to the dictates 
of economic rationality which appear to ensure the relative 
advance of the already developed nations and the continued 
underdevelopment of the less developed countries. In 
essence, the less developed countries will not develop 
by further injection of capital funds, technology, or 
skilled manpower - they can only develop once the 
structure of inter-relationships within the international 
economy undergoes fundamental change. 
Possibly the o~ly fundamental solution to the problems 
outlined above lies in active co-operation between less 
developed countries. Seers (1963) envisages the creation 
of an international agency, possibly under the auspices 
of the United Nations, and Penrose (1968) suggests the 
11 
••• development of a method by which international firms 
are incorporated under international law and subject to 
a single international tax" {p. 273). Cooper ~nd Clark 
strongly encourage co-operation as a means of overcoming 
the technological dependence of the less developed countries 
on the industrialised nations. 
A co-operative organisation would give rise to certain 
important benefits - to list but a few, it could, for 
example, help dispel the harmful bargaining which takes 
place between LDCs' vying for the services of the MNC; 
mineral exporting cou~tries:/ in particular, could benefit 
from the establishment of a marketing agency. Cipec and 
Opec of fer sound pointers in this direction; the creation 
of a sophisticated patents off ice might serve to counter 
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some of the harmful effects of the international patenting 
system; an organisation of this nature could be used as 
an·· information pool which wou.ld allow the LDCs to dis-
criminate between alternative investors and techniques 
of production. 
Ultimately, however, the LDCs would have: to co-operate 
in a manner which allowed them to.alleviate the situa-
tion of technological dependence, and which enabled them 
to capture the external· economies at present b,eing 
realised in the metropolis - whilst the output o; a 
single LDC's mining sector might not justify the 
establishment of a processing and refining plant, the 
combined output of several LDCs might permit the reali-
sation of the necessary economies of scale; an individual 
mineral exporter may not be able to provide many of the 
inputs requireq in the mining operation, but the combined 
resources and, particularly, the combined markets of 
several LDCs might enable a single producer supported by 
the associated LDCs to compete with established metropolitan 
suppliers. 
Obviously co-operation of this nature could, and frequently 
does, enhance the prospects of the most powerful member of 
the• asso.ciation, leaning the process of underdevelopment 
of its co-operating partners unchecked. In essence, if a 
co-operative venture is to ensure an equitable spread of 
development, . the co-operating partners will have to<, , 
relinguish a significant degree of their sovereignity 
to the centralised planning councils, a pre-requisite 
which most attempts at co-operation have failed to realise, 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 8 
l Scitovsky defines "pecuniary externalities" as 
the situation where" ..• the profits of the firm 
depend not only on its own outputs and factor 
inputs but also on the output and factor inputs 
of other firms 11 (p. 246). That is, pecuniary 
externalities include interdependence of producers 
through the market mechani~ and, as such , is a 
meaningless concept in· equilibrium theory. "Tech-
nological externalities", on the other hand, are 
concerned with direct interdependence amongst 
producers. That is, when the output of firm A 
depends not only on the factors utilised by it, 
but also on the output of and factors utilised by 
firms a1 ••• n. Th~s technological externalities can 
be incorporated within the framework of general 
equilibrium theory. It is interesting to note 
that one of the only two significant examples which 
Scitovsky and Meade found of technological externa-
lities in industry, is the case where firm A b~ne­
fits from the labour market created by firms B1 •.• n. 
2 See Appendix. 
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APPENDIX 
Alternative Ownershi£ Structures 
The above analysis implicitly assumes that the corpora-
tion's subsidiary is wholly owned by foreign shareholders. 
There are, however, alternative ownership structures 
which may affect the tentative conclusions reached above. 
Two aspects of ownership structure will be discussed: 
1) 
1) where the host government stipulates the 
conditions of entry governing DFI, that 
·is, where the host government stipµlates 
that a certain portion of the subsidiary's 
equity has to be held by host country nationals 
or government; 
2) the nationalisation debate, that is, where 
the government acquires a share or total control 
of the enterprise after the initial investment 
has been undertaken. 
Joint Ventures 
-----------~-....., 
The governmen~s abiiity to enforce joint control as a 
condition of entry will be determined by the bargaining 
powers of the two parties and, frequently, where the 
corporation insists on complete control, the government 
might have.to breach or modify stated policy. Neverthe-
less, empirical research confirms that strong policies 
encouraging joint control do give rise to a foreign 
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investment pattern that includes more local control than 
is found in 0ther countries (Wells, Table 1). Moreover, 
it appears that corporations whi-ch tend to avoid local 
participation in areas of. free choice, have almost the 
sante proportion of their subsidiaries in LDCs which insist 
upon joint control as in those where they may exercise 
complete control. 
Furthermore, joint ventures are often entered into at the 
behest of the corporation itself, and it appears that the 
mineral extractive MNCs are more willing to enter into 
joint ventures than the non-extractive MNCs. This 
obviously implies that the MNC envisages some definite 
benefit arising from joint control. Firstly, joint control 
does offer some form of insurance against nationalisation, 
insofar as subsequent nationalisation might affect the 
interests of both the foreign investors and the local 
capitalists who have acquired a share of the control of 
the subsidiary. Effectively therefore, conceding a portion 
of control to local citizens allows the MNC to purchase 
a certain amount of political pressure. Secondly, by 
permitting local participation the firm may acquire access 
to specialised marketing knowledge and channels of 
distribution. 
It is however by no means certain that the interests. of 
the host economy are advanced by joint control: 
Firstly, the ~!NC may reduce the quantity produced and/or 
exported from the joint+y owned subsidiary in relation 
to its wholly owned subsidiaries, 1 Empirical evidence 
supports this assertion (Wells). 
Secondly, the corporation will have an added incentive 
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to withdraw profits by means of transfer payments, 
although the government will be in a better position 
to safeguard its interest in this regard. Although 
Vaitsos finds marginally less evidence of overpricing 
in the case of joint c6ntrol,. it appears that higher 
payment is demanded for know-how and management fees 
from a jointly owned than a wholly owned subsidiary. 
4s Wells notes,·" .•• a common royalty fee of 2,5 per 
cent of sales would offset reduction of over 130 per 
cent on transfer pricing, if purchases of components and 
parts from the parent accounted for 4,2 per cent of sales, 
including the overpricing margin" (p. 24}. 
Finally, a joint venture does generate added competition 
for scarce capital funds. Local capital will only go to 
the MNC if it earns a higher rate of return than alter-
nate uses permit. There is nevertheless a case for 
protecting local users of capital. 
Thus there is no clear-cut answer concerning the question 
of joint control. Nevertheless I would agree with Wells, 
who argues that, 
"In spite of the lack of clear economic gain to 
the country from having more joint ventures, the 
government may still be right in its insistence 
that the foreigne+ take in local, partners. If 
a feeling of local control over industry or the 
political ea::;e of allowing foreign investment. 
weighs heavily in the list of government objec-
tives joint ventures may provide advantages 
over wholly owned subsidiaries ••• Joint ventures 
seem almost always to transfer some control 
from the parent to the local partner." (p. 35) 
Thus the scepticism regarding the possibility of economic 
gain from joint ventures sterns ;Largely from the MNC's 
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ability to remit profits by means of transfer pricing or, 
more fundamentally, its tendency to maximise global 
profits - a joint venture agreement does not close these 
channels of remission and does not alter the corporations 
fundamental objectives, The local partner may however act 
as a watchdog with varying degrees of success and govern-
. ment attempts to encourage joint ventures should be 
furthered. Where possible, however, government, rather 
than Local capitalists, should secure a share of the 
control of the MNC!:l subsidiary. 
One of the most controversial questions concerning DFI 
relates to the current spate of nationalisation in LDCs 
for, as Bronfenbrenner notes, 11 ••• confiscation of 
property and property income runs counter to Western 
notions of economic morality. More important it runs 
. counter to Western economic interests." (p. 213} 
There are three broad arguments against nationalisation: 
Firstly, it is argued that nationalisation violates the 
natural rights of the investor. This argument does not 
warrant serious attention - the "natural 11 rights sanctioned 
by "natural" law and supposedly accepted in the advanced 
industrial countries might not accord with the "natural" 
laws of the Bamangwato tribe or Cuban government. The 
imposition of "natural" law in this regard might justifiably 
be viewed as just another example of "cultural imperialism", 
albeit one with distinct economic overtones. 
Secondly, it is argued that, if the advanced Western 
countries provide us with a development model, the tendency 
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towards nationalisation is inexplicable insofar as con-
fiscation of privately owned interests did not make a 
significant contributiop to Western economic development. 
Bronfenbrenner convincingly dismisses this arg~ent. He 
argues that confiscation of a· sort did characterise the 
early economic history of many Western countries - the 
USA, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand.all provide 
examples of confiscation of natural resources from 
aboriginal tribes. Moreover, the demonstration effect 
filtering down from the industrialised countries and 
the use of sophisticated planning techniques by the LDC 
planners give r~se to a desire for more rapid econom~c 
advance in the contemporary LDCs than prevailed in the 
early years of the industrialised countries' development. 
Finally, the LDCs are confronted with two conflicting 
political ideologies and a crucial factor in this con-
flict is the question of ownership of property. There 
is therefore no generally accepted natural law or pre-
vailing ideology to which individual LDC governments 
are expected to subscribe. 
Thirdly, and most important,. it is argued that nationa-
lisation of foreign owned property is detrimental to the 
economic interests of tne LDC. 
Essentially the desire for nationalisation is prompted 
by what the LDC views as the excessive return the MNC 
earns on its investment and the large proportion of that 
return which leaves the host country. The return demanded 
by the MNC is determined, in part, by the supply price 
of capital plus a certain allowance for risk. Particu-
larly in the case of mineral extraction the degree of 
risk attached to the investment declines enormously once 
the exploration process proves successful. Thus, what 
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was initially viewed by the LDC as a fair return, now 
becomes excessive in relation to the reduced· risk. The 
LDC thus threatens to amend the original conditions of 
entry by demanding a larger share of, or total, owner-
ship of the corporations subsidiary. Thi~ of course, 
serves to raise the risk associated with the venture, 
prompting the MNC to demand a greater return which, in 
turn, leads to a greater desire by the LDC to nationalise 
the corporation~ interests. Nevertheless there are 
certain important obstacles confronting a LDC intent 
upon nationalising foreign owned inte.rests: 
Firstly, the source country and international aid bodies 
may bring pressure to bear upon the host country. The 
Hickenlooper Amendment to the US Foreign Assistance Act 
threatens withdrawal of aid if US interests are 
expropriated. The World Bank similarly threatens with-
drawal of its assistance in the event of nationalisa-
tion of foreign owned interests. 
Secondly, the vertically integrated structure of the MNC 1 
may prevent the LDC from marketing the output of the 
industry and/or purchasing crucial inputs. Where the 
marketing outlets are controlled by the MNC, they can 
effectively prevent the sale of the nationalised 
subsidiary's output. The problem may be overcome to some 
exten~ by co-operation between mineral exporters (e.g. 
Cipec and Opec) and the formation of a marketing organi-
sation. Furthermore, unless the producers can combine 
effectively, the metropolis might close its ~~~~ets to 
the output of the nationalising satellite (e.g. cuban sugar). 
The problem is intensified when the processing facilities 
are controlled by the MNC and are situated in the metro-
polis. 
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Thirdly, the MNC might organise the production process 
in such a way as to make post nationalisation production 
impossible. The Zambia Copperbelt companies (Anglo and 
RS'r) are alleged to have failed to train Zambians in 
certain key positions so as to ensure that the companies 
remained indispensable in the mining process. Moreover, 
nationalisation effectively means that the workers 
previously employed by the MNC now become government 
employees. Any attempt to reauce the wages of the already 
privileged mining labour force will manifest itself as 
a government-worker conflict. If, on the other hand, .the 
government does not attempt to reduce the wages of the 
mine worke1rn, it will be forced to raise the wages of 
all other workers in its employ. 
Finally, the government may not be able to afford 
nationalisation. If compensation is paid the government 
may be hard pressed to raise the necessary foreign 
exchange. 
Thus, it would appear that the vertically integrated 
structure of the MNC, coupled with the market determined 
laws of location, ensu+e the LDC's dependence upon.:.:t.se 
corporation. This, bolstered by the actions of the metro-
politan governments and multilateral aid bodies, brings 
into question the wisdom of nationalisation. 
There is, however, one. important caveat - it is, in 
fact, unlikely, in the event of nationalisation, that 
the MNC will take steps to halt production or seal off 
the marketing channels of the nationalised subsidiary. 
The LDC will not be able to operate the former subsidiary 
without the assistance of the MNC. Thus Hoskins notes 
that, 
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" there is·an important aspect that the 
investor should not overlook - namely that 
confiscation, in essence, is simply a change 
of ownership. If the expropriated enterprise 
is a useful part of an economic system, then 
legal ownership is - at least for economic 
purposes - immaterial ••• the only significant 
difference is that the investor should act as 
a contractor or agent rather than a proprietor" 
(p. 111). 
The corporatio'n would exercise control over exporting, 
the provision of inputs, and the technological and mana-
gerial requirements of the LDC, even after nationalisa-
tion. Thus the only channel of prof it remission closed 
to it is that by way of dividend payment, and it may 
rechannel the bulk of its profit remission to transfer 
pricing and, of course, management fees. 
Nevertheless, frequently expropriation or part-expropriation 
is to be encouraged. Firstly, insofar as the MNC does 
not wish to forgo its activities in the LDC, nationali-
sation does provide a means of renegotiating an existing 
contract and might encourage the MNCs to compete amongst 
themselves for the management contract offered by the LDC 
government. 
Furthermore, political imperatives would appear to suggest 
that nationalisation will be resorted to by the LDCs to 
an increasing extent. As Hirschman has pointed out, the 
MNC itself should take steps to facilitate the eventual 
transfer of its assets to the LDC - in this way it can 
avoid a headlong clash with the ·government which will, in 
most cases, be detrimental to both parties Hirschman, 
in fact, suggests alternative mechanisms whereby planned 
withdrawal might be institutionalised. 
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NOTE TO APPENDIX 
l This argument is, of course, not valid under con-
ditions of perfect competition. 
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S E C T I 0 N III 
DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN BOTSWANA 
A STUDY OF THE COPPER-NICKEL INDUSTRY 
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CHAPTER 9 
Mining in the post-Independence Era - an Introduction 
9.1 !~~~gg~~~!2g 
Section I attempted to outline Botswana's political 
development and to survey the major characteristics of 
the political economy. The pattern of economic life in 
Botswana is similar to that of many LDCs - the great 
majority of the population is dependent upon the agri-
cultural sector for its livelihood although the most 
important agricultural asset, livestock, is inequitably 
distributed. The manufacturing sector is small and is 
dominated by the Botswana Meat Commission. Alt~ough 
statistics are unreliable, there is evid~nce of consider-
able unemployment, particularly in the urban areas, and 
many Botswana. citizens are compelled to seek work in South 
Africa. Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and South Africa 
· are partners in the Southern African Customs Union and 
in the de facto Currency Union. 
At independence (1966) Botswana still relied upon 
budgetary assistance from the United Kingdom. In the post-
independence era there have been several important mineral 
discoveries, and it is now hoped that the opportunities 
for large scale mineral extraction will provide means 
for the development of the Botswana economy. 
Mining activity in Botswana is financed and managed by 
several large multinational corporations. Section ~I 
attempted to provide a survey of current literature in 
the field of direct foreign investment in less dev~loped 
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countries - chapters 3 and 4 outline a general theoretical 
model of OFI and chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 examine the effect 
which direct investment will have on the host country. 
This section will attempt to assess the effect of OFI 
in the copper-nickel industry on the Botswana economy. 
Although the analysis concentrates on the copper-nickel 
industry, minerals of a varied type and of varied economic 
significance are found in Botswana. This chapter will out-
line the nature and extent of current mining activity in 
Botswana, and the likelihood of future developments. 1 
9.2 
a) Manganese 
Shortly after independence the mining of manganese ore 
was revived at two places in south-eastern Botswana, 
namely, the Kgwakgwe mine approximately 50 km north~west 
of Lobatse, and the Gopani mine south-east of Lobatse, 
adjacent to the Transvaal border. In 1970 R 842 836 worth 
of manganese ore was exported, but exports decreased to 
R 432 340 in 1971. 
Adverse conditions in the manganese market forc~d the 
closure of Anglo-American's Kgwakgwe mine at the end of 
1971, and of the Gopani mine in March of the same year. 
Closure of these mines led to the dismissal of 350 and 
60 persons respectively. 
The Cyril Hurvitz Exploration Company (Pty} Limited is 
in possession of a mining lease for manganese over an 
area of 1913 hectares around Otse, near Lobatse~ adjacent 
to the railway line. Proved reserves amount to 300.000 
tonnes of battery grade ore and medium scale mining is 
likely to conunence in the near future. 
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b) Diamonds 
In 1966/67 De Beers Prospecting (Botswana) (Pty) Limited 
discovered diamonds in the Orapa area, west of Letlhakane, 
approximately 180 km west of Francistown. The largest 
pipe, Aki, extends over a surface area of approximately 
112 hectares, rivalled in size only by Tanzania's 
Williamson pipe. Another pipe, Dki, approximately 50 km 
south~east of Orapa, has been located, and othe~ rec~nt 
discoveries, which are as yet unconfirmed, are likely to 
make the Botswana dia+uond fields amongst the world's 
richest. Further prospecting activity is being carried 
out by the De Beers group, as well as by United States 
Steel (Northern Ngamiland) and Cyril Hu~vitz Exploration 
(l'lgwaketse District) • 
The approximate grade of 0,89 carats per tonne at Orapa 
is relatively high, but the relatively low average value 
of production (approximately R 8,00 per ton) is explained 
by the low proportion of gem to industrial stones 
.(12 : 88). The, as yet unconfirmed, discoveries in the 
Orapa vicinity are thought to bear a. higher proportion 
of gem stones. The Aki pipe was brought into full produc-
tion in July 1971 and i$ being mined by De Beers Botswana 
Mining Company, a member of the De Beers Group of 
companies. The De Beers Botswana Company has been allo-
cated a quota of 4 per cent of the sales of the Central 
Selling Organisation for the Orapa mine. The 1972 
diamond production was valued at about R 20 million. 
c) Copper and Nickel 
In 1959 Bamangwato Concessions Limited (BCL), a subsidiary 
of Botswana RST (BRST) commenced prospecting activity in 
the Bamangwato tribal territory. Copper deposits were 
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discovered west of Francistown in the early'sixties and, 
in 1964, substantial copper and nickel bodies were locat-
ed at Selebi and Pikwe, approxi:qiately 90 km south-east 
of Francistown. By 1971 it was firmly established that 
ore reserves at Selebi and Pikwe totalled: 
Million Tonnes % Nickel % Copper 
PIKWE 
Proven 22,1 1,45 1,14 
Probable 9,0 1,13 1,09 
SELEBI 
Proven 10,0 0,70 1,56 
Probable 2,6 0,88 1,28 
Mining at the rate of approximately 2 million tonnes per 
annum, the life of the Selebi-Pikwe mines is expected to 
extend over some 23 years. Mining operations at Pikwe 
commenced in late 1973, and smelting operations in early 
1974 when the first shipment of matte was delivered to 
the us refining plant. Mining of the Selebi deposits is 
exp~cted to conqnence in 1979. The Smelting process is 
also expected to release 127 500 tonnes of marketable 
sulphur each year. 
BCL also discovered copper deposits in the Matsitama 
area, 80 km west~northwest of Francistown. in 1963/64. 
In 1968 it was announced that the Matsitama ore reserves 
totalled 
Million Tonnes % Copper 
Proven 4,7 2,24 
Probable 1,72 2,15 
Oxidised Ore l,46 2,87 
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It appears however that no further work has been carried 
out on these deposits. BCL is also investigating copper 
deposits in the vicinity of the old Bushman Mine. 
Substantial copper deposits estimated at 7,6 million 
tonnes of ore (1,4 per cent copper, 0,8 per cent nickel) 
have been located at Selkirk and Phoenix in the Tati 
area. The mineral rights in this area are privately 
owned (by the Tati Company) and, although the initial 
exploratory work was undertaken by an Anglo American 
subsidiary, Sedge Botswana (Pty) Limited, it appears 
that Anglo and the Tati Company have not been able to 
reach agreement regarding more intensive prospecting 
or actual exploitation. 
US Steel and the South African Vendome Company (Pty) 
Limited are also engaged in copper prospecting in 
Ngamiland in the extreme north-west. 
d) Coal 
The Geological Survey Department has devoted consider-
able time and energy to prospecting for coal. Its 
efforts have been rewarded by the discovery of substantial 
deposits at Morupule, approximately 6 miles,west of 
' Palapye, and at Mmamabula, approximately 80 miles south 
of Palapye. The Anglo American Corporation is now 
responsible for prospecting in these areas. To date, 
their activities have proved reserves of approximately 
5 000 million tonnes over an area of 256 square km in 
the Morupule area, and· a further 400 million -tonnes O'?'er 
an area of 44 square km in the Mmamabula region. The coal 
is of a low grade (non coking) but is suitable for power 
. generation. 
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~he 1973 - 78 National Development Plan briefly mentions 
the prospect of converting Botswana's coal resources into 
. oil, 3 which, if successful, will substantially increase 
. the value of the coal deposits.· A recent report indicates 
that the Royal Dutch-Shell group have been awarded a 
special prospecting licence to seek coal, oil shales, 
and radio-active minerals over an extensive area in the 
eastern and southern regions. The report indicates that 
the company's chances of finding oil shales are small, 
although there are indications of vast undelineated coal 
fields on the edge of the Kalahari. 4 
e) Brine 
Makgadikgadi Soda Limited, a subsidiary of BRST, has 
concluded lengthy inves.tigations into the brine deposits 
located beneath the Sua Pan which forms the Eastern 
part of the Makgadikgadi Depression, ·west of Franc~s­
town. The production of salt, soda ash, and sodium 
sulphate is under consideration. Deposits are sufficient 
to support the minimum commercially feasible levels of 
production which are estimated at 80 000 tons of soda 
ash and 100 000 tons of salt per annum. Although the 
company has not yet released its final report it appears 
that production will commence within the current plan 
period (i.e. before 1978). 
f) Other Minerals 
Various other minerals are being sought in Botswana. 
Asbestos Investment (Pty) Limited is prospecting for 
asbestos in the area of the old Moshaneng mine and 
Johannesburg Consolidated Investment is undertaking wide-
spread prospecting activities in the Mochudi area. Semi-
precious stones are being sought in many areas of Botswana. 
I 
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As at 31st December, 1971 42 prospecting licences were 
in force. In 1971 private firms spent approximately 
R 4 200 000 on prospecting activities. An additional 
R 60 000 accrued to-the Central Government for licencing 
and rental fees, and a further R 60 000 to the District 
Councils. As at 31st December, 1971 there were 3 mining 
leases in force covering the Orapa Diamond mine, the 
Selebi-Pikwe copper-nickel deposits, and the manganese 
mine at Otse. A small notarial mining lease was backdated 
to February 1967 to.cover the Gopani manganese mine. Mineral 
rights in the Tati area are privately owned. All mineral 
rights vested in the tribal authorities were transferred 
to the state by the Mineral Rights in Tribal Territories 
Act of 1967. Prospecting rights and mining leases are 
granted in terms of the Mines and Minerals Act of 1967 
which consolidated all previous legislation concerning 
mining. 
This dissertation will concentrate on the development of 
the copper-nickel resources at Selebi-Pikwe. Manganese 
mining is conducted on too small a scale to warrant 
detailed attention. At this stage, the exploitation of 
the coal resources is dependent entirely upon the demand 
generated by the Selebi-Pikwe complex and, therefore, will 
be discussed as an integral part of trre copper-nickel 
project. Although, on the face of it, the sophisticated, 
large-scale diamond mining industry warrants detailed 
attention, it appears that certain characteristics peculiar1 
to diamond mining will limit the extent of its impact 
upon the rest of the economy. Whilst it is an extremely 
important contributor to government revenue and foreign 
exchange, it will provide employment for only a small 
number of workers when compared with the copper-nickel 
industry. Furthermore, it will generate insignificant, 
if any, linkages to the rest of the economy. 
I 
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The copper-nickel industry, on the other hand, is likely 
to be of considerably greater significance. The capital 
\
.sum required is enormous in relation. to total capital 
formation in Botswana and, of course, in relation to 
/that of any other enterprise;. with the exception of the 
Civil Service and, possibly, the Botswana Meat Commission 
it will provide employment for a greater number of workers 
than will any other enterprise; its contribution to 
government revenue will be considerable; and it is hoped 
that it will encourage, via the investment multiplier, 
the further development of the industrial sector. Further-
more, the copper-nickel industry has necessitated 
considerable expenditure on infrastructural facilities. 
It is not .. necessary to rationalise a decision to study the 
copper-nickel industry in these terms. Conversely, the 
relative size and potential impact of the copper-nickel 
industry does not suggest that a study of diamond, or 
even manganese, mining would be inconsequential or 
irrelevant. I wish merely to suggest that if, by 
industrialisation, Botswana is to escape from the impasse 
in which so many LDCs find themselves, the obvious industry 
' to concentrate on _ : is the copper-nickel industry. 
I 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 9 · 
1 This chapter relies heavily upon. information 
contained in the annual reports of the Geological 
Survey Department. The most recently published 
report is that for the year ended December, 1971. 
Additional information contained in the National 
Development Plans, 1970 - 75 and 1973 - 78 has 
also been used. 
2 See Map c. 
3 This technique is used by SASOL. 
4 Cape Times - 6th March 1974. 
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CHAPTER 10 
Botswana's Copper-Nickel Industry - the Corporate 
and Technological Structure . 
10.1 Introduction ___________ ..... 
The tentative conclusions reached in Section II rest on 
the assumption that the process of DFI in LDCs is dominat-
ed by large MNCs operating within oligopolistic markets. 
These firms use sophisticated, capital intensive tech-
niques of production in the host country. This pattern 
is confirmed by an analysis of the corporate and techno-
logical structure of Botswana's copper-nickel industry. 
The ensuing chapter provides little more than a brief 
summary of the extremely complex financial arrangements 
governing the Selebi-Pikwe project. 1 At the ceremony 
marking the successful negotiation of the major mining 
cont~acts, Sir Ronald Prain, then chairman of the 
companies responsible for the mining of the Selebi-Pikwe 
copper and nickel resources, said, 
"By any reckoning this is an historic occasion. 
It marks the culmination of sixteen years of 
discussion, scientific endeavour, negotiation, 
and the creation of an international financial 
structure which can have few, if an , arallels 
in complexity and sco2e cited Ostrander, 
p. 1) • 
One cannot but agree with Prain. The financial structure 
of the Selebi-Pikwe project involves at least three 
governments (Botswana, West Germany, South Africa) and 
numerous government agencies; several giant MNCs -
/ 
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. American Metal Climax,the Anglo Arnerican/Ch~rter Consolid-
ated Group and their subsidiaries, Metallgesellschaft, 
and, to a lesser degree, Mineral Separations Ltd, and 
\ N.M. Rothschild and. Sons, Ltd; banking and other financial 
I I institutions in West Germany, South Africa and the United 
'Kingdom; and, not least, several multilateral aid bodies. 
I must repeat therefore that this chapter does not 
pretend to provide more than the barest skeletal out-
line of the complicated arrangements between the govern-
ments, the companies and the other authorities. 
\ 
The companies directly involved in the exploitation of 
the Selebi-Pikwe resources are aotswana RST, Limited 
I (BRST) and its subsidiar¥, Bamangwato Concessions 
Limited (BCL). 
Negotiations concerning the granting of prospecting 
rights in the territory of the Bamangwato tribe commenced 
in 1959. The two parties to the negotiation were the 
Bamangwato Tribal Authority and Rhodesian Selection 
Trust (later renamed Roan Selection Trust), a company 
controlling an important share of the Zambian (then, 
Northern Rhodesian) Copperbelt. The US multinational, 
American Metal Climax, held a 43,3 per cent share in RST• 
At the 1959 negotiations BCL was formed in order to 
undertake exploratory work in the territory. The presence 
of copper'.and nickel was confirmed at Selebi and Pikwe 
in 1963 and 1965 respectively. 
In July 1967 BRST was incorporated in Botswana to hold 
RST's interest in the mineral riches fully confirmed 
earlier that year. BRST's sole assets comprised a 
/ 
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60,95 per cent interest in the share capital of BCL, and 
a 64,63 per cent interest in Makgadikgadi Soda Limited. 2 
The remaining 39 per cent of BCL's share capital was held 
by Mineral Separations Limited (23 per cent), the Anglo 
American Corporation of South Africa {AAC) (11 per cent), 
and the International Nickel Company (5 per cent). 
International Nickel's share was purchased subsequently 
by the AAC raising the latter's share to 18 per cent. In 
the event of BCL becoming a mining company it was agreed 
that the Botswana government would receive a 15 per cent 
gratuitous share in the company. In April 1968 a BRST 
rights issue offered to RST holders gave AMAX a substan-
tial share (43,3 per cent) in BRST, an assortment of 
small shareholders controlling the remainder of the 
company. 
In order to finance the Selebi-Pikwe project the major 
financiers required considerable guarantees but would 
not accept BRST as the sole guarantor. Amax agreed to 
guarantee one-half of the required sum. Mineral Separa:.. 
tions were unwilling to participate in the guarantees. 
The AAC/Charter Consolidated Group indicated it was 
willing to participate in the guarantees provided that 
its shareholding in the project' which, at the time, 
comprised a 16 per cent share in BCL, be increased 
considerably to equal that of Amax. They also demanded 
participation in the technical and managerial control 
of the project. It was decided that BRST should purchase 
the minority shareholding in BCL by offering the minority 
shareholders BRST shares in exchange for their holdings 
in BCL. The great majority of Mineral Separations inter-
est in BCL was purchased by AAC/Charter and Amax. ~CL 
was required to increase its equity share capital by , 
R 30 000 000. 
/ 
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The re-organisation of BRST and BCL was affected by a 
rights issue amounting to R 18 700 000 in mid-1972. The 
ultimate outcome of.the re-organisation is that BCL is 
controlled by BRST which holds 85 per cent of the former's 
equity. The Botswana government has received a 15 per 
cent gratuitous share of BCL's equity. 
BRST's equity is controlled as follows: 
·. \•' 
. . \ 
x 
C/Charter 
ineral Separations 
• M. Rothschild and Sons 
General Public (small lots} 
29,82 % 
29,82 
5,73 
' 0 ,06 
34,57 
100,00 % 
======== 
Thus Amax's share in the project has declined slightly, 
the public's interest has remained the same, and AAC's 
share has risen substantially. 3 
The estimates of the cost to BCL of the project have 
escalated rapidly. Originally it was estimated at 
R 86,5 million4 and, on the basis of this estimate, the 
financial agreements were negotiated. R 43 million was 
provided by a West German consortium of banks led by the 
Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau (KfW); .R 13,5 million was 
provided by the Industrial Development Corporation of 
South Africa (IDC), conditional upon·:the purqhase of 
equipment to the same value from a South African producer. 
The balance of approximately R 30 million was provided for 
by th~-.enlarged equity capital of BCL, and the necessary 
bridging finance was provided by Union Acceptances 'Limited, 
a menIDer of the AAC/Charter Group. 
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In November 1971 the cost estimates were revised upward 
by R 14,5 rnillion5 to R 101 million. The KfW loan then 
stood at approximately R 47,8 million. 6 Amax and AAC/ 
Charter have agreed to lend BRST the shortfall and· they, 
in turn, will advance the necessary funds to BCL. By the 
end of 1973 BRST had borrowed approximately R 21 million 
' 7 
from Amax and AAC/Charter. 
In December 1972 and 1973 t~e cost estimates were revised 
upwards once again, because of technical complications. 
Furthermore, these technical complications have 
delayed revenue inflows and, as a result, addi-
tional brid9ing finance, conservatively estim-
ated at R 15 million, was required. 8 In the light 
of these rapid cost escalations and the consequent 
postponement of revenue inf lows BRST has decided to 
increase its equity share capital by a substantial amount. 
As at December 1973 the company was authorised to issue 
22,5 million shares (par value R 2 each) and 17 979 292 
had been issued leaving about R 9 million of unissued 
capital. This is deemed insufficient to meet require-
ment$ and the company has decided to increase the 
authorised capital to R 80 million. 9 
In the most recent BRST interim report the Phase I cost 
estimates (that is, exclqding the Selebi Mine) have been 
revised upwards to R 200 000 000 although the directors 
acknowledge that the total requirements may well exceed 
this figure. 10 Technical problems continue to plague the 
project and the level of output is extremely low. In the 
six month period between 31st December 1973 and 30th June 
1974 loans to BRST had increased from R 75 086 000 to 
R 101 543 000 - Amax anp Anglo have provided approximately 
R 18,5 million of the additional loans and therefore must 
have lent approximately R 40 million to BRST. 
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The bulk of the loan and completion guarantees have been 
undertaken by AAC/Charter and Amax. A West German firm, 
Metallgesellschaft, has provided considerable guarantees. 
In addition to the companies'' financial arrangements, 
the Botswana government ha~ had to raise considerable 
sums of money in order to provide the required infra-
structure. 11 
Thus, in effect, the financial and technical resources 
of Selebi-Pikwe project are controlled by BRST 1 s two 
major shareholders, the AAC/Charter Group and Amax. 
It is not necessary to attempt to detail the size and 
wealth of either company. The AAC/Charter Group.controls 
substantial interests in many sectors of the South African 
economy, particularly mining, although its interests 
extend well beyond the confines of the republi~. Its 
interests in, inter alia, Zambia, Rhodesia, Canada, 
Australia, Zaire, Portugal, Swaziland, secure, beyond 
all doubt, its multinational status. Vernon (1971) cites 
Amax as being one of the nine largest of the US MNCs 
· epgaged in non-petroleum mineral extraction. 
Both companies have a substantial stake in copper mining, 
particularly in Southern and Central Africa. 
In Section II it is argued that the process of DFI usually 
1 transfers technology of a characteristic type. This techno-
\ 
logy will be of a capital intensive nature and the skill 
component of the small workforce is likely to be large. 
·~ 
" 
' I 
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Baldwin identifies three important characteristics of 
copper production: a) a low aggregate labour coefficient1 
b) a high capital coefficient; c) significant economies 
• of scale. 
The general characteristics outlined above are 
apt description of the Selebi-Pikwe copper-nickel project. 
Any attempt to calculate the labour and capital coefficients 
is bedevilled by a lack of statistical data. It is parti-
cularly difficult to distinguish between ·.those workers 
employed in copper production itself and those employed 
in the construction of the mine and the infrastructural 
facilities - if the latter are included in the employment 
figure the labour coefficient will be considerably higher 
in the initial pha,ses of the project than in the later, 
purely production, phase. 12 Moreover, as will be pointed 
out below, the official statistics do not disaggregate 
sectoral employment figures by individual enterprise. 
With the assistance of government and company officials 
and company reports I have been able to estimate the numbers 
employed by BCL and BRST and this estimate has been used 
in calculating the number of employees per R 1 000 of out- · 
put (the labour coefficient) for the copper-nickel industry. 
Bearing these difficulties in mind, the following table 
is the result of an attempt to calculate the labour 
coefficient of selected industries in Botswana. 
The table below indicates that the mining sector is 
considerably less labour intensive than the.construction 
sector. It does, however, appear that the manufacturing 
sector is marginally less labour intensive than the mining 
sector. This situation will be reversed in the near future. 
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TABLE 10.1 Labour Coefficientsa) for Selected 
Botswana Industries, 1971/72 
(per R 1 000) 
Industry Labour Coefficient 
lMiningb) 0,101 
Manufacturingc) 0,095 
Construction 0,311 
Notes: a) see footnote 12 for a definition of 
labour coefficient 
b) this figure is calculated from 1971/72 
employment and output figures for the 
whole mining sector 
c) manufacturing includes, and is ¢omin-
ated by, the Botswana Meat Commission 
By 1971/72 production had not commenced at Selebi-Pikwe 
although approximately one-half (that is, 1 000) of the 
copper-nickel industry workers were already in the 
employ of the company. Thus within the next year the 
output of the mining sector will increase greatly and 
employment will increase only slightly, lowering the 
labour coefficient in the mining sector by a considerable 
13 
.amount. 
Unfortunately it is impossible to calculate the capital 
coefficients for these industries, as figures for capital 
investment in the manufacturing and construction sector 
are not available. The mining sector's capital investment 
is considerably greater than thatof any other sector. 
In 1971/72 gross capital formation in the mining sector !' 
totalled R 27,3 million and in the manufacturing and 
construction sectors gross capital formation totalled 
R 2 million and R 1,7 million respectively. These figures 
/ 
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are not a realistic indication of the relative size of 
the capital investment in each industry, 14 but it appears 
that the copper-nickel industry's capital coefficient 
will be moderately high. 
The copper-nickel project has made use of the most 
sophisticated capital intensive techniques available. 
Initially, the ore at Pikwe was to have been mined by 
underground methods only, although, at a later stage, 
it was decided to switch a significant part of the mining 
process to the open cast method. The latter method is 
considerably more capital intensive because it involves 
the purchase of heavy bulldozers, graders, etc. The work-
'force employed in open cast mining contains q larger 
skilled element, thus increasing the human capital com-
ponent. Unofficial estimates of the decline in employment 
resulting from the switch from underground to open cast 
methods range from 150 to 600 workers. The smelting process 
employs a highly sophisticated method and machinery 
developed in Finland. 
It appears that the mining company has fa?~d considerable 
technical problems since the commencement of operations • 
. The Anglo-American Annual Report (1973) refers to the 
"teething problems" confronting the Selebi-Pikwe operations, 
although the rapidly escalating cost estimates for the 
project suggest that the technical problems are of quite 
a serious nature. The exact nature of these technical 
problems is spelt out in the BRST Chairman's most recent' 
annual report. The major problems appear to stem from 
particular features of the Selebi-Pikwe ore which have 
necessitated, inter alia, the construction of an expensive 
washing plant and costly alterations to the ore feeder 
system. Other peculiarities of the ore content have resulted 
/ 
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in minor explosions in the concentrate drying, transport 
and storage facilities and consequently to a series of 
plant stoppages. In September large production losses 
occured as a result of major plant breakdowns in the 
boiler system. Considerable uncertainty has been created 
by the situation in Lo~.:renco Marques and ti1e company 
. 14 
might be compelled to use alternate port facilities. 
Remedial measures are being undertaken at considerable 
cost. As pointed out above, these technical problems have 
resulted in the postponement of revenue inflows and the 
company has needed to sec~re additional bridging finance 
to meet its recurrent obligations and the additional 
capital costs involved. 
10.4 Conclusion 
----------l The copper-nickel ore at Selebi-Pikwe is mined by 
\ . Bamangwato Concessionfll Limited. This company is controll-
ed by Botswana RST, which owns 85 per cent of BCL's 
equity capital and the ~emaining 15 per cent is held 
by the Botswana Government. BRST, in turn, is controlled 
by two large multinational corporations, the Anglo Ameri-
can/Charter Consolidated Group and American Metal Climax. 
The project is highly geared and loans have been raised 
from a number of sources. Technical problems have·· 
necessitated an increase in both the loan and equity 
capital. Anglo and Amax have provided the additional 
loan finance and an offer OI a.rights,issue, probalUy in 
early 1975, will raise the additional equity capital. 
Both Amax and AAC/Charter have considerable experience 
in copper mining in Southern and Central Africa (Zambia) 
and they have elected to use highly capital intensive 
techniques of production - the 1971/72 labour coefficient 
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of the mining sector is low and will decline markedly 
when the value of the Selebi-Pikwe output is included 
in the calculation. It is unlikely that the company (or 
the government, had. they undertaken the venture) could 
have employed significantly different techniques of 
production. If the government had elected to mine on a 
considerably smaller scale the technological charac-
teristics might have been modified. Small scale copper 
extraction did not prove successful in Zambia or 
Botswana, and if extraction on a large scale is desired 
it is unlikely that the technology employed could have 
been modified very significantly. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 10 
l For a detailed acpount of ,the financial arrangements 
see: Botswana RST Limited, Circulars to Shareholders 
dated 19th July, 1971; 30th November, 1971; 28th 
April, 1972. See also Botswana RST Limited Annual 
Report, 1973. 
2 The company that will be responsible for the eventual 
exploitation of 'the brine deposits of the Sua Pan. 
3 Note that Amax's 43,3 per cent interest in BRST when 
it controlled 60,95 of BCL is only slightly smaller 
than a 29,82 per cent interest in BRST which now 
controls 85 per cent of BCL. 
4 See Circular to Shareholders dated 19th July, 1971, 
para·6. 
5 See Circular to Shareholders dated 30th November, 
1971, para 6. 
6 The Deutsche Mark total remains the same (DM 222 mil-
lion) . The small increase probab.iy results from 
currency fluctuations. 
7 Botswana RST, Chairmans Statement, year ended 31st 
December, 1973 . 
. 
8 Chairmans Statement, 1973. 
9 Idem - note too that none of these estimates include 
the additional finance required by 1977 to bring the 
Selebi Mine into operation. It is estimated that this 
will require an additional R 5,7 million. 
10 See Botswana RST Limited - Interim Report to Share-
holders dated 25th September 1973. · 
11 This is discus$ed in chapter 12. 
12 The labour coefficient is defined as the number of 
employees per R 1 000 of annual gross output. A 
simple example will clarify this point. If annual 
gross output is <1valued at R 10 000 and 10 people 
are employed .the labour coefficient is equal to ·l.' 
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If the number of employees doubles, the labour 
coefficient will also double, i.e. if output 
remains at R 10 000 and the number of employees 
increases to 20, the number of employees per 
R 1 000 of output is 2. Conversely, if employment 
, remains constant and output doubles the labour 
coefficient will halve. 
13 See tootnote 12 for a hypothetical example. By 
1976 the value of the output of the Pikwe 
Mine will be at least R 50 million and the 
numbers employed by BCL and BRST will be about 
2 500. The labour coefficient will thus be as 
low as 0,05. 
14 See Botswana RST Limited - Interim Report to 
Shareholders dated 25th September, 1974. 
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CHAP'I'ER 11 
The Appraisal Crite~ia 
11.l ~~~fg2g£~!g~ 
The corporate structure of the copper-nickel mining 
industry in Botswana closely approximates the ideal-type 
outlined in Section II. The firms involved in the finan-
cial and managerial control of«: the Selebi-Pikwe venture 
are large MNCs with mining and industrial interests in 
many parts of the world, including the neighbouring 
territories in Southern and Central Africa. The firms 
have quite rationally .and predictably elected to employ 
a capital intensive technique of production. The implica-
tions of this structure for the Botswana economy are 
broadly sim!l~~ to those outlined in Section II with 
relevant modifications made in light of peculiar circum-
stances prevailing in Botswana. Thus, before prodeeding 
any further, ~t is n~cessary ; _ to outline a set 
of criteria in terms of which the growth of the mining 
development at Selebi-Pikwe can be assessed. 
11.2 The Criteria 
------------
The most recent national accounting data ez:nphasip the 
measurement of value added. 1 
The Ministry of Finance ~nd Development Planning has'-
at tempted to project ;I.ts calgulation of value added 
..... _ .. b~ 
and, in so doing, has arrived at the following ~stimates 
- (see Table 11. 2). 
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TABLE 11.1: Production Account of Mining Activities 
1971/72 (1973 prices) {R million) 
Inputs Outputs 
Intermediate Consumption 5,5 Sales of Charac-
Depreciation 0,1 teristic Products . 15,7 
Wages and Salaries 1,0 Minerals not yet 
sold 1,0 
Indirect Tax 0,1 
Operating Surplus 
.!.Q.t..!" 
Value Addeda) 11,2 
Total 16,7 16,7 
Source: National accounts of Botswana 
TABLE 11. 2: Estimated Production Account of Mining 
Activities in 1977/78 11973/74 prices) 
I 
Diamonds Selebi- Sua P.an 
Pikwe 
Intermediates 0,6 8;0 3,5 
Depreciation - - -
Wages and Salaries 5,8 5,9 1,0 
Profits 32,6 29,9 8,0 
Interest Paid - 6,2 -
Va,lue Added at 38,4 42,0 9,0 Factor Cost 
Indirect Taxes-Subsidies - - -
Value Added at 38,4 42,0 9,0 Market Price 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Development Planning 
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Mining is expected to make a significant contribution 
to the Gross Domestic Pro'duct, and a somewhat smaller, 
but still highly significant, contribution to the Gross 
National Product. The divergence between the contribution 
to the Gross National Product ·a'nd( 0 tl'te ,; Gross: -Domestic; Ptoi-
duct arises largely from the remission of factor payments 
to expatriate workers and, of course, to those shareholders 
resident and incorporated abroad. 
TABLE 11.3 Estimated Gross Domestic Product and Gross 
National Product at Factor Cost (1973' 
Prices) for 1971/72 and 1977/78 
Sector GDP GNP GDP GNP 71/72 71/72 77/78 .77 /78 
Agriculture 25,2 24,8 35,1 34,3 
Hunting, Fishing, 2,2 2,2 2,6 2,6 Forestry 
Mining and Prospecting 12,5 5,4 60,8 45,6 
Manufacturing 7,7 6,8 12,3 11,2 
Construction 9,4 7,5 13,0 10,4 
Water and Electiricty 0,5 0,5 5,6 5r;6 
'.Crade, Hotels and ~,~ 5,3 11,7 ILl0,5 Restaurants > i . . :..-
!Transport and Communii'°:', ( ·, :·· 3,4 8,3 6,6 
cations 4,2 
Financial Institutions 
Business Services and 4,6 2,3 9,1 4,6 
Real Estate 
Personal and Community 0,8 0,8 1,2 1,2 Services 
Private, Non-Profit 0,9 0,9 1,4 1,4 Services 
Central Government 9,8 9,0 22,0 19,3 
Loca! Government 2,3 2,3 5,3 , 5, 3 
Traditional Ownership and 
own Construction of 2,4 2,4 2,9 2,9 
Dwellings 
Unallocated - 0 ,.8. - . .0 ,.8. - 1.,.6. - 1,.6 
Total 87,6 7,28 189,7 159,9 
Source: National Development Plan·, 1973 - 78 
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Mining is thus expected to make a significant contribution 
to the growth of the Botswana economy. Whereas in previous 
years the mining sector acted as a drain upon the Gross 
Domestic Product, 2 by 1971/72 approximately 14,3 per cent 
of the GDP was directly attributable to the mining sector, 
expected to rise to approximately 32,0 per cent in 1977/78. 
In 1971/72 approxiJnately 7,4 per cent of the Gross Natio-
nal Product is directly attributable to the mining sector, 
rising to 28,5 per cent in 1977/78. This leads us to an 
extremely important point: The value added is only 
significant in so far. as a portion of that value is 
retained in the Botswana economy. My primary focus is, 
as it were, on national value added rather thqn domestic 
value added. This priority is incorporated in the model 
computation outlined in Section II and will be dealt with 
in the following chapters. 
The value added computation used by the Botswana planners 
is considerably more compressed than the model computa-
tion used in Section II. In the later chapters, .when 
each of the elements involved in the value added calcu-
lation is analysed, I will expand the individual 
categories used by the Botswana planners in order to in-
corporate all the elements suggested in Section II. 
But this is not sufficient, for there are certain broader, 
but no less important, criteria enunciated by the 
Botswana planners and politicians, an assessment of 
which cannot satisfactorily be incorporated into' the 
value added tables presented above. 
Introducing the 1970 - 75 National Development Plan, the 
vice-president and Minister of Finance and Development 
• 
\ 
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Planning, Dr Q. K. J. Masire, stated that the government.'s 
key economic objectives were, 
"l) to ensure the fastest possible rate of 
economic growth in a manner designed to 
raise the living standards of the great 
mass of the inhabitants of Botswana; 
2) to achieve budgetary self-sufficiency in 
the shortest possible time consistent with 
rapid economic growth; 
· 3) . to maximise the number of new job oppor-
tunities; and 
4) to promote an equitable distribution of 
income, in particular by reducing·income 
• different0ials between the urban and rural 
sectors through rural development." 
In the introduction to the 1973·- 78, National Development 
Plan these objectives were restated, although the vice-
President noted that budgetary self-sufficiency had 
already been attained. The other three objectives remain 
in force and accord closely with Seers' three criteria 
of equity, employment, and elimination of poverty, the 
Botswana government's accent on rural development merely 
constituting a special case of (or, possibly, a means of 
attaining) all three objectives. 
These objectives have been restated by the President who, 
on one occasion, noted that, 
"My idea of an independent economy is one whibh 
is less vulnerable to weather conditions and 
which is capable of being managed in a way which 
permits government to plan for the welfare of all 
it~ citizens; to create as many jobs as possible, 
to spread development as equally as possible · !1 
throughout the country, to see that rural develop-
ment keeps pace with the development of our towns, 
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and, above all, to ensure that agricultural and 
other rural activities 3can bring people a decent living. 11 (p. 5) . 
It should be noted that the growth of the mining sector 
is not seen as providing a pal1iative for Botswana's 
economic ailments. The 1973 - 78 National D~velopment 
Plan acknowledges that mining might introduce severe 
"economic distortions" and generate serious "social 
problems". The President has stressed that the base upon 
which Botswana's economy is developing, namely livestock 
and mining, is too narrow and will have to be widened 
·to incorporate the broad mass of the population. Thus, 
it would appear that the Botswana government is concerned, 
at least formally, that the returns from the mining pro--
ject be equitably distributed throughout the country. 
They do not, it would seem, agree with Taylor Ostrander, 
an Amax, BCL and BRST executive, who asserts that 
" fortunately as business men and mining 
executives, lawyers and economists, we had 
neither the time nor the inclination to enter 
into elaborate analyses of the differentations 
between our separate 'elitism', or make the 
elaborate probings of personal relationships 
and animosities so beloved by sociologists" 
(p. 3). 
11.3 ~2D£11!2!2D 
Thu~, given that the Selebi-Pikwe copper-nickel resources 
are being exploited by large M~Cs employing capital inten-
sive techniques of production, the remainder of this 
dissertation will concern itself with an assessment of 
the copper-nickel industry in terms of the criteria out-
lined above. 
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In the following chapter I will analyse the question 
of employment and wages, linkages, and government revenue. 
All are related to the question of value added and 
retained, both directly and indirectly, as a result 
of the mining operations. They are also, of course, 
related to the question of distribution or, what I choose 
to call, the equity criteria. Thereaf.ter the balance 
of payments implications will be examined which, inter 
alia, allow us to consider the question of value retained. 
The question of distribution will be the subject of the 
fourteenth chapter. This latter chapter will, in essence, 
constitute a summary of much that precedes it, although 
it will also raise the question of the power relation-
ships arising in response to the growth of the foreign 
controlled mining sector. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 11 
1 In the table below (11.1) value added is derived 
by deducting the value of intermediate consump-
tion (R 5,5 million) from the value of outputs 
(R 16,7 million), or by summating the factor 
payments - the operating s~rplus figure in Table 11.1 
is a residual. Note that because Botswana is a member 
of the Customs Union it is inevitable that th~ 
figure for intermediate consumption will include 
an element of indirect taxation. Duty is imposed 
at the point of entry and therefore Botswana im-
ports are frequently valued on a duty-paid basis. 
Therefore the figure for intermediates is unaveidably 
inflated. 
2 In previous years mining has acted as a drain on 
the GDP because of the convention of debiting 
prospecting expenses in the year in which they 
are incurred. The value of the output from 
prospecting services is zero although, obviously, 
if the knowledge acquired is valued prospecting 
activities might make a substantial contribution 
to GDP. In 1968 the mining sector reduced the 
GDP by over R 1 million. 
~ See also Africa Contemporary Record, 1971/72; 
1972/73. 
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CHAPTER 12 
The Development of the Copper-Nickel Industry and the 
·Botswana Economy - Labour, Linkages and Government Revenue 
In the previous chapter it was established that the 
Botswana government employs two complementary sets of 
criteria - the narrow value-added approach and the 
broader distributional criteria - which are similar to 
(and indeed strongly influenced) the criteria used in 
Section II. 
This lengthy chapter will attempt to assess the impact 
of the Selebi-Pikwe project upon wages and employment 
and government revenue, and measure the extent of the 
linkages generated by the copper-nickel industry,in 
terms of the criteria enunciated above. The contents 
of this chapter closely follow the framework used in 
chapter 5. 
In the introduction to this dissertation mention is 
made of the unreliable nature of many of the statistics 
· used. This shortcoming is particularly evident in this 
Chapter and Chapter 13 and, where necessary, an attempt 
will be made to correct errors arising as a result of 
inadequate date. 
12.2 ~~!221!! 
In the introductory chapter an attempt was made to outline 
I , 
' •'' 
) 
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the general characteristics of the labour market, and 
it appears that the situation in Botswana does not 
differ materially from the h¥pothetical LDC of Section II. 
A significant portion of the population is unemployed; 
traditional agriculture is the major source of income; 
the skill level of the local workforce is low and the 
I 
economy relies heavily upon skil~ed expatriate labour; 
there is widespread migration between the urban and 
rural areas and between Botswana and South Africa. This 
section concentrates upon wage and employment practices 
in the copper-nickel industry, although the implications 
., 
r 
1' I 
I 
of the wage and employment structure created in the 
mining sector are extremely widespread and will exercise 
an important :influence over conditions in the labour 
market as a whole. 
One of the most important shortcomings of the employrnenrh 
statistics is the failure to disaggregate sectoral data 
by individual establishment. Furthermore it should be 
noted that employment projections do not only take 
account of the expansion of present mining activity but 
also recognise the possibility of commencing exploita-
tion of additional mineral resources, particularly the 
brine deposits of the Sua Pan. 
Despite the lack of 9fficial data on employment at 
Selebi-Pikwe I have, with the assistance of government 
and mining officials, been able to estimate the numbers 
employed in the copper-nickel industry. It appears that in 
1972 employment at Selebi-Pikwe accounted for 1 000 of 
the l 680 people employed in the mining sector. It is 
estimated that by 1972 approximately 50 per cent of the 
I, 
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\ Selebi-Pikwe employees were at post thus, at present, 
1 the copper-nickel industry should employ approximately 
\
2 000 people. These estimates are corroborated by 
BRST's Annual Report for 1973 - at year end BCL employed 
1968 Botswana citizens and 263 expatriates. If this number 
remains constant until 1978 then, by that year, copper-
nickel mining will account for approximately 65 per cent 
o~ total employment in the mining and quarrying sector. 
The 1973 Manpower Report covered nine mining and 
quarrying establishments (which incorporates all mining 
and quarrying activity). Of the remaining eight, two 
employed more than 200 people, these being the Orapa 
Diamond Mine and a large quarrying establishment. Eight 
of the nine mining and quarrying establishments were 
responsible for somewhat less than 40 per cent of total 
employment in the mining sector .• Thus the overwhelming 
importance of the Selebi-Pikwe project as regards the 
provision of employment in the mining sector is a well-
established fact, and even ·if we are forced at' times to 
rely upon disaggregated statistics it appears that the 
analysis will not be significantly impaired. 
The table below indicates the relatively minor role 
played by the mining industry in. the provision of 
employment. In 1972 and 1978 only transport and 
communications and local government account for a 
smaller proportion of total employment. We see .that 
from 1972 to 1978 mining's share of total employment 
is expected to increase marginally, whilst in the same 
period manufacturing's share is expected" to increase 
slightly and central government's quite markedly. Con-
struction's share of total employment, on the other 
hand, is expected to decrease from 13,4 per cent in ... 1972 
to 10,8 per cent in 1978. It is interesting, however, to 
note the four-fold increase in construction employment 
between 1968 and 1972. 
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TABLE 12.1 Employment by Economic Sector - 1968 - 1978 
Sector 1968 share. 1972 share 1978 % % 
Agriculture 4 143 16,8 5 058 10,5 6 650 
Mining and Quarrying 814 3,3 l 680 3,5 3 200 
Manufacturing l 691 6,8 2 639 5,5 5 730 
Construction 1 566 6,3 6 468 13,4 8 670 
Connnerce and Finance 4 263 17,2 6 342 13,2 10 650 
Transport and Comm.unicatio~ I , 135 4,6 I 121 2,3 2 200 
Local Government 977 3,6 I 022 2, I 2 000 
Education I 842 7,5 3 361 7,0 4 500 
Other Services 2 301 9,3 3 152 6,5 5 000 
Central Government 5 989 24,2 9 328 19,4 18 100 
Domestic Services N/A 8 029 16,7 13 300 
Total 24 721 48 200 80 000 
Source: National Development Plan 1973 - 1978 and 
Manpower and Employment in Botswana 
share 
% 
8,3 
4,0 
7,2 
10,8 
13,3 
2,8 
2,5 
5,6 
6,3 
22,6 
16,6 
Notes: N/A - not available. Errors may appear owing to 
rounding. 
Furthermore, as I shall outline below, mining accounts for 
a very small proportion of skilled employment in Botswana -
I 1,2 per cent of all skilled workers are employed in the mining sector. The Central Government accounts for 39,9 per 
cent of skilled employment, education for 22,9 per cent, 
commerce and finance for 10,4 per cent, and the manufac-
turing and construction sectors for 4,9 per cent and 
6,1 per cent ·respectively. 
- 180 -
1 
It has been established that mining accounts for a 
relatively small portion of ~otal employment in the 
Botswana economy. 
The theoretical analysis suggests that the large scale, 
technologically sophisticated foreign investor will rely 
heavily upon imported skilled workers. Mining's small 
contribution to skilled employment in the· economy would 
suggest otherwise. The following table, 12.2, does, at 
first glance, further invalidate the hypothesis that the 
MNC' s labo,ur force is biased towards skilled employment. 
The only sectors which have a lower skill intensity than 
mining are the agricultural, construction and services 
sectors, the latter's (i.e. services) low rating is 
explained by the inclusion of domestic servants in this 
category. Education, as is to be expected, has an ex-. 
tremely high skill intensity as does the Central Govern-
ment. The skill intensities of the manufacturing, commer-
cial and transport sectors are all markedly higher than 
that of the mining sector. 
so few I However, despite the fact that mining employ' skilled workers it has experienced ponsi~erable diffi-culty in localising its skilled workforce. 90 per cent 
of the Central Government's skilled workforce are 
Botswana citizens, and the commercial (80 per cent), agri-
cultural (69 per cent), manufacturing (78 per cent) and 
construction (58 ·per cent) sectors have not lagged 
I behind. Mining's localisation position (37 per cent) thus appears relatively unsatisfactory although somewhat 
superior to the localisation position of the transport 
sector (28 per cent). 
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How is this to be explained? Obviously the other sectors 
are not controlled by a foreign corporation and are thus 
not able to utilise a well established cadre of skilled 
workers.i More important, howeve~ the relative localisa-
tion positions be~r out Arrighi's hypothesis that 
capital intensive techniques do not only employ a smaller 
\ 
nurr~er of workers than do more labour intensive industries 
but they also require a larger proportion of high-level 
manpower than do more labaur intensive industries. 
Botswana's reliance on expatriate labour is particularly 
strong at the skill level required by the mines and it 
~ is primarily for this reason that, firstly, they have 
been unable to localise their skilled workforce, and, 
secondly, have been compelled to pay their.highly skilled 
workers such high wages. 
Table 12.3 provides supporting evidence. It in fact 
indicates·: that mo+e than half of the mining sector's 
skilled employees are paid a wage in excess of R 150 
per month. This is considerably higher than any other 
sector with the exception of transport and communications. 
In the skill intensive sectors of central government and 
education only 13,1 per cent and 6,0 per cent respectively 
of the skilled employees are paid a wage in excess of 
R 150. The skill differential and, therefore, the earnings 
differential coincides with the degree of localisation, 
that is, the more.non-Batswana employed the greater the 
nurr~er of workers earning in excess of R 150. The skill 
requirements of the capital intensive mining sector cannot 
be met from within the ranks of Botswana citizens - the 
mines therefore draw a large portion of their labour on 
the international market and are forced to pay the going 
wage. 
. ' J . 
TABLE 12.2 Total and Skilled Employment and Vacancies, by Sector and Citizenship, 
· April ·- May ·1972 · · · · · · · · · 
Sector Total . Skilled ~rnplo.yment .. Vacan- Total Skill Localisa-Employ- .. ' . . '·. 
cies Skilled In ten- tion 
ment Batswana non- Total in Jobs sity Position Batswana Skilled (4)+(5) %(6) of %(2) of 
Jobs {1)+(5) ( 4) 
. (1). 
. . . . (.2) . (.3.) .. ' .... .(.4.). ' ' (.5) . ' . (6). (7) (8) 
Agriculture .5 058 279 125 404 33 437 8,6 69,1 
Mining and 1 680 105 178 283 18 301 17,7 37,1 Quarrying 
Manufacturing 2 639 484 139 623 41 664 24,8 77,7 
Construction 6 468 453 323 776 175 951 14,3 58,4 
Commerce and 6 342 1 062 260 1 322 89 1 411 21,9 80,3 Finance 
Transport and 1 122 61 155 216 28 244 21,2 28,2 Communications 
Local Govt. 1 022 416 24 440 25 465 44,4 94,5 
Education 3 360 2 349 545 2 894 209 3 103 86,9 81,2 
Other Services 11 180 532 248 780 52 832 7,4 66,5 
Central Govt. 9 168 .. . 4. .5.52 .. .. 4.9.3.' . ' .. 5 .. 0.4.5 . .1. .3.0.8. ' . . . 6. .3.5.3 . . ' .6.0,6 ' 90,2 
Total .48 039 10. .29.3. .2. .49.0. 1.2. 7.8.3 . 1. .9.78 .. ' .. 1.4. 76.1 . 1.3, 4 80,5 
Source: Manpower and Employment in Botswana - extracted from Table 2.1 
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TABLE 12.3 
Sector 
Agriculture 
Mining and 
Quarrying 
Manufactur-
ing 
Construe-
ti on 
Commerce 
Transport 
Local Gvt. 
, t. 
Education 
Other 
Services 
Central 
Government 
Tetal All 
Sectors 
Percentage Distribution of Workers With 
or Requiring Post-Primary Education or 
Training in Each Earning Range above R 150, 
by Citizenship and Sector, April/May 1972 
Citizenship i. R R R R R R % 
151 201 251 301 401 500+ earning 
~o to to to to above 
200 250 300 400 500 150 
% % % %. % .% 
Batswana 4,4 I , 8 I , 2 3,7 1,2 I, 2 
non-Batswana 12,6 9,8 7,0 7,0 I , 4 I, 4 
TOTAL 6,9 4,3 3,0 4,7 1,3 I, 3 21,5 
Batswana 4,0 I, 3 - - - -
non-Batswana 6,3 7,5 6,3 31 ,6 27,8 18.9 
TOTAL 5,1 4.5 3,2 16,2 14,2 9,7 52,9 
Batswana 3,0 I , 4 1,6 0,8 0,4 0,2 
non-Batswana 7,9 5,7 14,3 22,3 12,9 12,2 
TOTAL 4' 1 2,4 4,4 5,6 3,2 2,8 22,5 
Batswana 2,8 1'5 0,8 0,4 - -
non-Batswana 5,8 4,6 7,4 37,1 12,6 12,3 
TOTAL 4, I 2,8 3,6 15,7 5,2 5,1 36,5 
Batswana 4,1 1,6 I , 3 1 , I 0,6 0,9 
non-Batswana 13,5 8,4 8,0 I I , 8 8,4 9,7 
TOTAL 6,0 3,0 2,6 3,2 2,1 2,6 19,5 
Batswana 11 '4 3,2 3,2 - - -
non-Batswana 8,3 3,8 16, I 42,5 15,4 3,8 
TOTAL 9,2 3,7 12,5 30,5 l l , I 2,7 69,7 
Batswana 4,0 0,4 - 0,2 0,2 -
non-Batswana 25,0 - 4,1 4' 1 4' I. 8,3 
TOTAL 5,2 0,4 0,2 0,4 0,4 0,4 . 7 0 
.. ' 
Batswana 0,5 0,2 0,1 0,1 - -
non-Batswana 16,8 5,6 1,2 2,0 I, 2 1 '2 
TOTAL 3,6 I, 2 0,3 0,5 0,2 0,2 6,0 
Batswana 1, 8 0,8 0,4 0,4 0,2 -
non-Batswana 6,9 6,9 12,2 9, I 10,9 I I , 7 
TOTAL 3,6 2,7 4, I 3,1 3,6 3,7 20,8 
Batswana 2,6 2,3 0,5 0,7 0,5 Q,2 
non-Batswana 10,7 10,7 12,3 27 '7 9,3 l '4 
TOTAL 3,4 3,2 l '6 3,3 I , 3 0,3 13' 1 
Batswana 2,5 1,6 0,6 0,7 0,4 0,2 
non-Batswana I I , 2 7, I 8,5 19,0 8,8 6,3 
TOTAL 4, I 2,6 2,1 4 t 1 2,0 1 , 4 . 16 '3 
Source: Manpower and Employment in Botswana -
extracted from Table D.8 
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Thus, the table above indicates that the mining sector 
pays a significant portion of its workforce a wage in 
excess of R 150 per month. The recipients of this high 
wage are predominantly expatriate. The majority of 
skilled Batswana are clustered at the lowest skill echelon 
and, in fact, are skilled by definition only, that is, 
they have received a sma.11 amount of post-primary educa-
tion or training but occupy job categories that do not. 
require significant specialised knowledge or experience. 
In fact, we note from Tabie 12.4 that although the average 
wage of skilled Batswana mine employees accords with the 
mean wage of all sectors, the mean wage of skilled non-
Batswana mine employees is approximately 75 per cent in 
excess of the mean wage of all sectors, higher than any 
other sector of the economy. It is also important to note 
that Table 12.4 only refers to monthly salaries - it does 
not include bonuses, inducement allowances and the like, 
all of which make a substantial contribution to the 
earnings of non-Batswana mineworkers, in fact it is 
unofficially estimated.that wage~ and salaries of non-
Batswana mine employees constitute only 50 per cent of 
total earnings, and the other half of their earnings 
comprise bonuses and allowances which are not inciluded 
in Table 12.4. 
It is, in fact, interesting to note that the Manpower 
Report acknowledges that the heavy industry sectors, of 
which mining is the prime example, are particularly 
plagued by a shortage of skilled manpower but notes that 
it is in these sectors" .•• where the risks for salary 
increases of a magnitude in excess of those granted by 
Government are high, and they should be given first 
priority by the Government Staff Inspector/Job Analyst 
when he commences his duty in the private sector" (para 
4.12). 
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TABLE 12.4 
Sector 
Agriculture 
Mining 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Commerce 
Transport 
Local Govt. 
Education 
Other Services 
Central Govt. 
.. 
Total 
All Sectors 
Workers With or Requiring Post-Primary 
Education and their Average Monthly 
Earnings in Rands - April/May 1972 -
by Citizenship and Sector 
Batswana non-Batswana 
Number Mean' Number Mean Differential 
Earnings Earnings Batswana/ 
non-Batswana 
103 105 53 174 1 . 1 '7 . 
75 70 79 460 I . 6,6 . 
482 62 133 328 I . 5,3 . 
450 66 321 345 1 : 3,3 
900 81 218 270 1 . 3,3 . 
59 96 151 320 1 . 4,2 . 
416 60 24 254 1 . 2,7 . 
1 647 46 383 124 1 . 6,7 . 
458 41 210 273 1 : 3,4 
4 552 74 493 249 1 : 5,2 
. 
9 142 67 2 065 262 1 : 3,9 
Note: With the exception of the Central Government 
establishment the number of workers in the other 
sectors are incomplete totals. Table 2.1 of the 
Manpower Report in fact. estimates that there are 
actually 105 Batswana and 178 non-Batswana in 
skilled employment in the mines. The differential 
in the other sectors is not as great. 
Source: Manpower and Employment in Botswana. 
No official attempt has been made to calculate the average 
wage of unskilled workers. Using data from several of the 
tables contained in the Manpower Report I have attempted 
to calculate the level of unskilled wages. 
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TABLE 12.5 Average Monthly Wages of Unskilled Workers: 
April/May 1972 - by Sector (Rand) 
Sector Total Monthly Wage Average ( 
Unskilled Bill Monthly Wage/ 
Workers Attributable Unskilled 
to Unskilled Worker 
Agriculture 4 654 28 564 6 
Mining 1 397 65 368 . 47 
Manufacturing 2 016 62 176 31 
Construction 5 692 258 247 45 
Commerce 5 020 150 572 30 
Transport 906 45 927 51 
Local Govt. 582 4 389 8 
Education - - -
Other Services 10 600 52 389 5 
Central Govt. 4 123 116 824 28 
Total 36 990 784 461 22 
Notes: 1 I have been unable to interpret the data on 
education for the purposes of this table. 
2 The unskilled wages in agriculture, local 
government, and services, whilst still re-
maining lower than any other sector, will 
be increased somewhat by the addition 9f 
non-cash wages. 
Sources: Calculated from Manpower and Employment in 
Botswana. 
Whilst acknowledging the unreliable nature of the above 
table it does appear to confirm a trend, a trend similar 
to that prevailing at the higher level of skills, namely, 
J 
that wages, at all levels of employment, in mining and 
transport, exceed those paid in other sectors of the 
economy. 
--
./' 
{" 
// 
I. 
I 
I 
- 187 -
There are several import~nt factors prompting the mines 
to pay a relatively high unskilled wage rate, namely: 
a) eompetition from the South African mines. The Botswana 
mining companies are competing with the South African 
mining ~ector for their unskilled miners and, in 
order to maintain their labour force at a satisfactory 
level, they Will have to pay a wage similar to that 
offered by the South African mines. Bear in mind that 
a considerable number of the unskilled mineworkers at 
Selebi-Pikwe will have had some experience on the South 
African mines and it is these experienced miners who 
the copper-nickel industry will attempt to attnact. 2 
b) An attempt to stabilise their unskilled workforce. No 
official information on company policy as regards sta-
bilisation is available. A senior official of BCL 
assured me that the company has experienced great 
difficulty in stabilising its workforce, .that is, 
the unskilled workers retain strong links with 
traditional agriculture which presupposes that they 
spend some time in their tribal villages. The maintenance 
of their tribal links also ensures a form of old age 
pension. The mines' failure to provide a pension on 
retirement suggests that stabilisation of the work-
force is not one of BCL's major priorities. 
c) The mining companies, particularly the South African 
element, are unlikely to lay themselves open to a 
"starvation wage" charge. The Botswana Christian · 
Council have attempted to draw up a Poverty Datum Line 
for Selebi-Pikwe - they estimate the poverty datum 
line to be R 39,68 for a family of five, the effective 
minimum level rising to R 59,98. The mines thus pay an 
I 
' I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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average unskilled wage in excess of the poverty datum 
line, although somewhat below the effective minimum 
level. 
1 Thus, we can distinguish three categories of employees -
1 the skilled non-Batswana, the skilled Batswana, and the 
· unskilled workers. In the mining sector the wages of 
the skilled non-Batswana are considerably higher than 
those available in any other sector. The skilled Batswana 
mine employees receive an average wage slightly higher 
than the national average and somewhat lower than the 
transport and commercial sector. The unskilled mineworkers' 
average wage is considerably higher than the national 
average but is similar to the unskilled wage level pre-
vailing in the transport and construction sectors. 3 It 
nas been shown that the high wages offered by the mining 
company to both. skilled and unskilled workers is easily 
explained from the company's point of view. 
I do not, at this stage, wish to debate the pros and 
cons of a high wage economy in which the national income 
is.unevenly distributed. The two major arguments against 
a high wage mining sector in Botswana are, firstly, that 
it might exacerbate an already uneven distribution of 
I 
income. It might give rise to a significant differential 
between skilled and unskilled workers and between high 
level skills and the more ~udimentary skills, concentrating 
) 
income in the hands of a few expatriates. It might also 
Widen the rural-urban earnings differential. 
The second argument is related to the first. It asserts 
that the high wages offered in the mining sector will 
exert an upward pressure on the general wage level. As 
early as 1970 Jackson warned that, 
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" a high level of wages in mining could easily 
become a further focal point for local wage demands 
and thus permanent.ly disrupt the wages structure 
of Botswana in the way that has occurred in many 
other underdeveloped countries" (p. 562). 
-This warning has been reiterated by Landell-Mills and, 
in a more general sense, by Ghai and, the Botswana Govern-
ment. A similar view is expressed by some of the entre-
preneurs interviewed by Selwyn. 
On the other hand, it might be argued that a high wage 
mining sector will stimulate domestic savings and 
release funds for reinvestment in the Botswana economy. 
It might also stimulate consumption of locally produced 
goods. 
These arguments will be examined at a later stage. 
~l-~2£~!§_~ng_~eE~E~!~E~2-2~-~h~-~!~~§ 
/
The analysis thus far brings to the fore the important 
distinction between Batswana and expatriate mine employees. 
We see that although the mining sector accounts for a 
relatively small proportion of total skilled employment 
I a large proportion of these skilled mining employees are expatriates earning a wage in excess of R 150 per month. 
Thus the considerable divergence between the wages of 
skilled Batswana and non-Batswana is attributable largely 
to the mines need for high-level manpower and consequent 
reliance on expatriate labour. Thus, to reiterate, one 
of the essential problems facing the Botswana planners 
is the simultaneous occurrence of widespread unemployment 
in the country as a whole coupled with the employment of 
a large proportion of expatriates in her most important 
industry. This gives rise to the divergence in wage rates 
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between· the highly 'sk.illed and less skille.d employees. 
These problems - expatriate employment and high wages -
are closely interrelated and must be met by interdependent 
policy measures. The government has responded to these 
problems by the enunciation of a localisation programme 
and a wages and incomes policy. 
a) Localisation 
The Botswana authorities have a long standing commit-
ment to localisation of employment and, although 
official activity regarding localisation has concentrat-
ed almost exclusively upon the Civil Service, the 
question of expatriate employment in private enter-
prise has not been ignored. Section III of the Mines 
and Minerals Act provides that the President may 
prohibit the employment of non-citizens in mining 
operations. It also provides that the Minister may 
demand from the holder of a mining right a sum 
sufficient to cover the cost of repatriation of 
expatriate employees. 
The mining companies have explicitly recognised the. 
localisation priority and Clause 11 (b) of the Master 
Agreement provides that, 
"BRST, the Company (BCL) and BCL (Sales) recognise 
·:that it is the objective of the Government to 
attain national self-sufficiency in high level 
manpower by 1990. BRST (insofar as it has opera-
tions in Botswana), the Company, and BCL (Sales) 
undertake to endeavour to employ only citizens 
of Botswana at all levels of responsibility by 
such date subject always to observing good manage-
ment practice." 
It appears that the mining companies are sincerely 
attempting to localise their workforce. BCL has 
I 
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.,, submitted a detailed training programme to the Labour 
Commissioner outlining its localisation programme. 
But, sincerity notwithstanding, the capital intensive 
techniques employed by the mining sector necessitating 
a significant cadre of high level manpower might render 
rapid localisation incompatible with "good management 
practice". Localisation of the Central Government 
establishment has proceeded apace but, as indicated. .. 
by Table 12.2, the private sector, particularly mining, 
has lagged behind. 
Obviously, in the long ruri, the only way in which 
localisation can be ensured is by the improvement of 
the education system,;detailed analysis of which is 
beyond the scope of this paper. The private sector 
will have to assist in this regard. It is, at this 
stage, impossible to assess the contribution made by 
the mining companies to raising the general level of 
skills. Bare statistics are not very revealing. They 
reveal that in 1972 25 employees of the mining sector. 
were receiving training in one form or another, seven 
of whom were, somewhat inexplicably, non-Batswana. 
Thus, approximately 30 per cent of total skilled work~rs 
in the mining sector are receiving some form of train-
ing, which is somewhat lower than the average for 
. the private sector. But obviously the mining sector's 
contribution to the level of skills does extend some-
what beyond wha_t the statistics suggest, although there 
is no evidence indicating that the mining sector's 
contribution is any more significant than that of 
any other sector. The government has attempted to 
encourage the provision qf skills by the private sector. 
Section 41 (1) of the Income Tax Act provides that 
125 per cent of any expenditure incurred by a company 
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registered in Botswana on "approved education" (that 
is, excluding primary and secondary education) or 
training of a Botswana citizen may be deducted from 
taxable income. 125 per cent of the cost of employment 
of an approved training officer may also be deducted 
from the company's tax base. BCL has, to some extent, 
taken advantage of this of fer - it pays for •.the training 
of workers bonded to it, it has employed a training 
officer who provides limited classroom training in 
certain skills, and, though not tax deductible, it 
finances one of the primary schools in Selebi-Pikwe. 
Informal on-the-job training.is also provided. It is 
interesting to note that the mining company will raise 
the skill level of those workers already in possession 
of some training or experience. It will not, as in 
most other LDC's, necessarily raise the skill level 
of the Batswana miners. Industrial development in a 
LDC usually implies that totally unskilled rural 
peasants are employed on jobs which, although formally 
designated as unskilled, do involve some form of 
training, albeit informal, on-the-job training~ In 
Botswana this is not likely to be the case in so far 
as most of the unskilled miners will have done at 
least one stint on the South African mines and their 
skill level will not be raised by employment at 
Selebi-Pikwe. 
One of the major recommendations of the Manpower Report 
suggests that the rate of growth of the government 
sector be decreased and/or that the government relax 
its practice of bonding trainees and university graduates 
and so release a larger supply of educated and trained 
workers to the private sector. They rationalise·. this 
suggestion by pointing out that in so far as the s~ill 
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:.intensity of the private sector is lower than that of 
the government sector the opportunity cost (in terms 
of unskilled employment opportunities foregone) of 
skilled employment in th.e Central Government is likely 
to be high. This is, however, a particularly weak 
argument - the skill requirements of the private 
sector, and particularly the mining sector, differ 
greatly from the skill requirements of the Central Govern-
ment. The opportunity cost of employing skilled and 
educated employees in the Central Government as 
opposed to the mining sector is thus not likely be 
as high as the respective skill intensities suggest. 
Rather than releasing skilled employees to the private, 
particularly the mining, sector, the government should 
concentrate on encouraging or even compelling the 
mining companies to train, at their expense, Botswana 
citizens to satisfy all their skill requirements. 
Finally, the Botswana authorities may enforce locali-
sation in so far as the employment of an expatriate 
must be sanctioned by the Department of Labour. If the 
authorities are of the opinion that the post for 
which an expatriate permit is required may be filled 
by a Motswana it will not issue the required permit. 
Permits of this nature are only granted for a maximum 
nwr~er of years and if a company requires renewal of 
any particular permit the government may refuse renewal 
on the grounds that the company could, iin the inverven-
ings years, have trained a Motswana to occupy the post~ 
b) Wages and Income1.s Policy 
·~ \Localisation of expatriate held posts will, by defini-
\tion, raise the level of local participation in the 
.., ·1\economy •. It is also a necessary condition for narrow...: \'j 
p ling the earnings differential between highly skilled 
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f. .. and unskilled employees. It is, however, not a sufficient 
condition for achieving the latter objective, for if 
Botswana citizens are substituted for expatriates at 
i . 
\
the prevailing wage levels the expatriate elite will 
merely be transformed into a national elite. In recog-
nition of the need for a low wage economy the Botswana 
government acquired the services of a consultant, 
Professor D. P. Ghai, whose report led to the formula-
tion of a national incomes policy. 4 
Most of the debate concerning the desirability or 
otherwise of a low wage economy revolves around the 
question of income distribution and is dealt with in 
chapter 14. This section is concerned with the incomes 
policy of the Botswana Government. It is, however, not 
possible to ass·ess policy measures without an under-
standing of the desired goals. Therefore, without 
wishing to anticipate forthcoming discussion, it should 
be noted that chapter 14 will argue in favour of a low 
wage economy - it will be argued that the reinvestment 
potential of a surplus extracted in the form of higher 
wages is· low, that consumption of locally produced 
commodities is not stimulated significantly by the 
creation of a national elite, and that a high wage 
mining sector will force up the national wage level. 
In so far as the arguments against high wages do not 
imply a reduction in pre-tax personal income levels 
but rather a reduction in disposable income the economy's 
needs might be accomodated by a highly progressive 
personal income tax. In Botswana personal income is 
taxed at progressive rates as stipulated by the Tenth 
Schedule of the Income Tax Act, 1973. Non~residents 
are taxed at a flat rate of 20 per cent although it · 
appears that most of the expatriate mine emp'loyees will 
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be subject to resident rates. The wages of the expatriate 
employees do not, .howevert comprise their total income 
which is supplemented by various inducement allowances. 
Certain of these are taxable - bonuses are taxable 
but it appears that gratuities are exempt from income 
taxation. The taxation rates on these allowances are 
generally somewhat lower than those applicable to 
other sources of income. 
Reduction of retained income does not reduce the 
potentially inflationary consequences of a high wage 
economy. If Botswana is to encourage export of manu-
factured commodities it cannot afford to allow the 
price of its exportables to be i,pQreased by a high·wage 
bill. It will be relatively easy for the mining compa-
nies to bear the burden of a high wage· bill, but it 
is not reasonable to expect small scale manufacturing 
industry / the growth of which is one of the majo·r 
priorities of the planners, to bear the burden of a 
similarly high wage bill. The Manpower Report bases 
its projections of skilled manpower employment in the 
mining and manufacturing sectors upon an estimated 
price elasticity of demand of 0,1. Whilst this estimate 
appears to be reasonable in the case of the mining 
sector it cannot be applied to the nascent manufactur-
ing ·sector, where t.~e price elasticity of. ldemand for 
skilled labour is likely to be closer to, or greater 
than, unity rather then zero. 5 Thus a high wage rate 
in the mining sector might retard the(igrowth of 
output and employment in :·.the manufacturing sector. 
Moreover, and to touch briefly upon the question of 
distribution, it is reasonable to expect a high degree 
of tax illusion to exist and it will be extremely diffi-
cult to convince the less skilled Batswana workers 
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that inequality has been reduced by taxation when 
pre-tax rates continue to exhibit a significant 
divergence. As regards the divergence between the 
earnings of the unskilled urban worker and his rural 
-\> counterpart,the difficulty in conununicating the effects /.7\ 
of an income equalising tax to the rural peasants is 
likely to be even greater and is unlikely to prevent 
migration fr<ilm the rural to the urban areas. Inequality 
must, as it were, not only be reduced, it must also 
be seen to be reduced. 
The alternative available to the authorities is a ceiling 
on wage rates or on the rate of increase of wages coupled, 
of course, with similar restrictions on profits and 
prices. In the case of skilled employment the govern-
ment explicitly recognises .that, because Botswana will 
have to rely on expatriate skills for some time to come, 
total earnings per skilled worker will be high. If, 
in the event of localisation, a citizen is substituted 
for an expatriate at the prevailing wage the objective 
of w~ge restraint will not have been achieved. In an 
attempt to solve this problem the government have 
# 
stipulated that wages and salaries offered by the 
private sector may not significantly exceed those paid 
forsimilar categories of employment in the public 
sector. In fact, a recent amendment to the Regulation 
of Wages and Conditions of Employment Act provides 
that the Minister is empowered to specify maximum wage 
rates for defined categories. The government have 
published guidelines to which the private sector is 
expected to adhere. The authorities do, however, 
recognise the need for various inducement allowances 
in the case of skilled expatriate employees but stipulate 
that these additional allowances must be clearly 
distinguished from the basic wage and must, as far as 
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possible, be paid on thetermination of the expatriates': con-
. , ·_tract. The Ministry of Finance and Development Planning 
·. · estimates that wages and salries paid to expatriate 
mining employees comprise only 50 per cent of total 
expatriate earnings. When any skilled job is localised 
the Motswana will receive the wage previously paid to 
the expatriate but will not receive any of the induce-
ment allowances. 
Without a minute breakdown of job categories it is 
impossible to assess whether or not the mining companies 
are adhering to the government guidelines. We have seen 
how the average skilled wage in the mining sector 
far exceeds that of the government sector although 
this might, and to a certain extent will, stem from 
the mining sector's relatively heavy reliance upon 
a relatively large cadre of high level manpower. How-
ever, several factors lead one to suspect that the 
average wage per job category in the mining sector 
exceeds that offered by the central government. An 
average monthly wage of R 460 per skilled expatriate 
worker (see Table 12.4) means that on average the 
expatriate mineworkers occupy positions which are 
equivalen.t to the "superscale" category in govern-
ment - in government the employees in this category 
are defined as "permanent Secretaries of Ministries 
and Heads and Assistant Heads of Departments who are 
responsible for the overall administration of their 
ministeries and departments and are involved in 
policy-making and implementation at the h,ighest level". 
In fact, the salaries of 37 skilled employees in the 
mining sector (that is, 23,9 per cent of total skilled 
mining employment) are the same or exceed the upper 
limit of thehighest grade in the civil service. If 
the wage rates of skilled employees on the mines are 
found to exceed those of the government sector the only 
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possible remedy is an absolute reduction of the 
wages in those categories of employment where the 
mining sector and civil service wages diverge. I do 
not suggest that the earnings of expatriates be 
reduced, but merely that the wage and salary component 
is reduced accompanied by an increase in the non-wage 
component, thus reducing the earnings of the Batswana 
replacements when the jobs in question are localised. 
This wilL of course, involve some political risk but 
it will be easier to effect when the jobs are in 
expatriate hands than at .a later stage when they have 
already been localisea. 6 
( As regards unskilled wages, official policy recommends 
i 
\ 
that the average earnin~s available in the rural sector 
plus a certain allowance for the higher cost of living 
in the urban areas must set the average unskilled urban 
wage rate. It is difficult to assess on this basis, 
whether unskilled wages in the mining sector exceed 
those of the rural areas although if the Central Govern-
I ment is to be used as a guideline it appears that the 
i . 
/mines do pay more than the suggested ceiling. In 1970 
Landell-Mills suggested that if rural earnings were 
to set urban wages an average monthly urban wage of 
' approximately R 14 would be appropriate. It will, in 
1 any event, b.e difficult to reduce the wages of the 
I I unskilled miners although the rate of· increase of un-
skilled wages might be slowed down. The mining companies 
are unlikely to pe~mit the wages of the unskilled 
miners to drop below the wage level prevailing in 
South Africa even though it might be in the interests 
of the Botswana economy to encourage a differential 
of this nature. 
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The success of the incomes policy is strongly dependent 
upon two important considerations. Firstly, as I shall 
point out later, the reinvestment coefficient of the 
mining companies is not likely to be very high and 
the government must ensure that the company does not 
receive the fruits of this depressed wage level. ~he 
government has indicated that it is aware1 of this 
but asserts that, 
"Since Botswana depends on attracting foreign 
private investment the Government must be, and 
is, prepared to permit investors to obtain com-
petitive profits related to international norms. 
The extent to which profits may be retained by an 
investor is determined by the level and structure 
of taxation ... " iNational Development Plan, 1973 -
7 8 , par a 3 • 4 2). 
· .1 .. ;The tax structure is discussed below. 
Secondly, in order to enforce a low-wage policy the 
government will have to establish its bona fides and 
its credibility will be severely eroded by the sub-
stantial wage increases which will be granted to 
civil servants later on in the year. This move stands 
in complete contradiction to stated policy and, whilst 
it might not actually raise wage levels on the mines, 
it severely limits the possibility of an absolute re-
duction in certain of the salary levels prevailing 
in the mining sector. Competition on the labour market 
between the Central Government and the mining sector 
has been unofficially cited as a cause of this wage 
increase which,. of course, supports the argument that 
Botswana's mining sector, like that of many other LDCs, 
is acting as a wage leader. 8 One cannot overemphasise 
the danger of this situation - the mining companies, 
are able to sustain a wage level far in excess of that 
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of the rest of the economy and even if a wage increase 
does not constrain the growth of the Central Government 
establishment it will act as a significant constraint 
on the development of' the manufacturing sector. If, 
at this early stage, the government response to compe-
tition from the mining sector is to increase the 
level of wages one cannot hold out much hope for the 
maintenance of a low wage economy. 
Whilst the Botswana government has taken steps to encourage 
the growth of worker organisation - for example, legisla-
tion stipulates .that a union is only required to represent 
25 per cent of the eligible workforce in order to gain 
1 ~ecognition - it nevertheless appears to exercise firm 
. I 
J control over union activities and leadership. 
I 
There are two primary reasons why the government would 
wish to: exercise control over union activities. Firstly, 
it appears that most of the opposition to the<·government 
is centred in the urban areas, particularly Francistown. 
I. In the early and mid 'sixties the unions constituted an 
... 1 important power base for the Botswana Peoples Party and, 
. l for this reason alone, the government would wish to super-
vise the activities of the unions particularly in a new 
urban area like Selebi-Pikwe. 
I Secondly, the unions may act as aniadded upward pressure on the : ..wage level. The unions' power in this sphere is 
I severely circumscribed by the large number of unemployed (see chapter 2), but it is possible that the mining compa-
nies, when confronted with the possibility of labour 
unrest, will attempt to purchase industrial peace by 
raising the wage rate. 
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The mining company entered into a recognition agreement 
with the Botswana Mineworkers'Union in July 1973. I have 
not been able to acquire a copy of the signed agreement 
although the draft agreement put forward byt the .company 
serves to indicate its attitude towards worker organisa-
tion. There are two noteworthy clauses in the draft agree-
ment. Firstly, the recognition clause (clause 1) coupled 
) with the job classification schedule effectively stipulates 
J that only unskilled workers may belong to the union -
first line supervisors are excluded. This clause has been 
criticised because it effectively bars from union member-
ship the educated workers who will have had some previous 
texperience in union activities. Also the company might f use promotion as a means of curtailing the activities of 
a union member. · 
Clause 2 {b) of .the agreement provides that "the Company 
will not be obliged to meet the Union to discuss any 
question concerning the engagement or promotion of any 
. . 
person employed by the Company, whether such person is 
a member of the union or not, or any other matter within 
I 
the prerogative of Management". This clause speaks for 
itself - it weakens the power of the union very consider-
ably, and certainly appears to prohibit the closed shop. 
I Moreover, it prevents the union from assisting government 
/ in its attempts to enforce localisation. 
It is unlikely that the union will exercise an important 
influence on company or government labour policy - its 
activities are restricted, for better or for worse, by 
the government· In addition it appears that company is 
extremely wary of the prospect of being confronted by an 
organised labour force, and the conditions prevailing in 
l Botswana's labour market weaken the union's potential 
/ impact. 
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The only significant labour-management clash that has 
occurred at Selebi-Pikwe, took place in late 1973 and 
appeared to centre on the activities of a Motswana 
personnel manager who was alleged to be discriminating 
in favour of the members of his tribe. This gave rise 
to a strike at the mine and to quite militant action 
on the·part of the mineworkers. It appears that the 
strike was supported by the union (although it was not 
at the time formally recognised) but it is not certain 
whether the union actually initiated the strike. The 
dispute was settled when the personnel officer in 
question was dismissed. 
i2.3 ~1n~~s~2-~n9_fn!~~2~!~2E~!~ 
The attitude of the Botswana planners towards the possi-
bility of the Selebi-Pikwe project generating linkages 
(which they loosely refer to as "indirect benefits") 
appears to be somewhat ambiguous. The 1973 - 1978 
National Development Plan notes that, 
"Mining, because it is a capital intensive and 
technologically sophisticated industry, is an 
enclave activity which in the absence of secon-
dary and service industries, has a minimal 
impact on the rest of· the economy." (para 3.26) 
This view is supported by the observation that, 
"Botswana has inherited an economic structure 
which has few internal linkages; hence the 
creation of a mining industry and the develop-
ment of the livestock industry do not automa-
tically lead to any substantial income streams 
in the other sectors of the economy." (para 8.3) 
These assertions are contradicted somewhat by the 
following statement: 
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"The development of mineral deposits is bringing 
about a transformation in' the Botswana economy 
and providing the stimulus for rapid industrial 
and commercial development. The diamond mine at 
Orapa is of necessity an enclave development, 
which will induce little further development ••• 
The copper-nickel mine at Selebi-Pikwe, on the 
other hand, will form a focus for secondary and 
tertiary development not only in the intermediate 
area, but in the region as a whole." (para 12.16) 
a) Backward Linkages 
The 1970 - 1975 National Development Plan asserts that, 
" with the advent of mining indust.ries in 
Botswana it is considered that many link in-
dustries can now be successfully established. 
Firstly, during the construction stage and 
thereafter, there will be a significant demand 
for paint, furniture, nails, concrete products 
and other inputs for the building industry. 
Secondly, once established the mines will 
provide a steady demand for many goods produced 
locally such as protective clothing and foundry 
and sheet metal work." (para 6.7) 
Moreover, the mining co~panies have agreed that they will 
procure supplies from Botswana suppliers always provided 
that 11 ••• such materials are not less favourable in 
price, quality and delivery dates than materials and 
products from foreign sources" (Master Agreement, Clause 11). 
The 1971/72 National Accounts value the intermediate 
consumption of the mining sector at R 5,5 million and 
by 1977/78 intermediate consumption of Selebi-Pikwe is 
expected to total R 8 million. The Botswana planne_r_s 
have not attempted to distinguish between imported and 
locally purchased inputs. Private, as yet unpublished, 
research undertaken in Swaziland indicates that the value 
of locally produced inputs for the iron ore and asbestos 
mines is negligible. ~illick's study of the Sierra Leone 
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diamond mines revealed that approximately 34 per cent 
of the inputs required for the diamond mining industry 
were purchased domestically. There is ,j1however, no sound 
reason why either of .these should necessarily reflect 
the situation prevailing in Botswana, although there is, 
of course, reason for believing that the Swaziland 
situation might be a reasonable indication of the 
state of affairs prevailing in Botswana. I will not 
attempt, however, to measure statistically the value of 
locally purchased intermediates but will rather attempt 
to identify the possibility of backward linkages being 
generated by the mining sector in Botswana. 
The 1970 - 75 National Development Plan envisages that 
the mining industry will generate significant activity 
in the construction industry. There can be little do\,lbt 
that the rapid growth of the construction industry in the 
early 'seventies is largely attributable to the develop-
ment of the mining sector. It has been noted above that 
between 1966/67 and 1972 employment in the construction 
industry rose by some 400 per cent and the contribution 
to GDP rose from 5,4 per cent in 1966/67 to 10,7 per cent 
in 1971/72. The rapid growth of the construction industry 
is not to be ignored despite the fact that the growth 
will not be sustained after the construction phase of 
the mines. Nevertheless to assert that the mining sector, 
via the impetus it provides to construction, will neces-
sarily generate demand for domestically produced inputs 
like paint, nails and concrete, is invalid - the 1971/72 
National Accounts estimate that intermediate consumption 
by the construction industry totalled R 10,l million 
"(and value of output R 18,7 million). Once again no break-
down is provided as between locally produced and imported 
inputs but there is no a priori reason for expecti~g 
the required inputs to be produced locally, because any 
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local producer will have to compete with the large scale, 
well established South African producers whose relatively 
large domestic market will permit the attainment of scale 
economies. The cement industry is a case in point - a 
consultants' report recently submitted to the Bo~swana 
Development Corporation' rejects the possibility of 
establishing a cement industry because of .the scale 
economies which would have to be attained to justify 
an undertaking of that nature. Similar constraints would 
apply to the other construction inputs. 
Inputs more specific to the mining industry - protective 
clothing being a good example - will meet with competition 
from the well established suppliers to the South African 
mining sector. 
As noted above the new Customs Union agreement does of fer 
a limited degree of protection to infant industries in 
the Southern African periphery (see chapter 2). For the 
most part, however, it appears unreasonable to expect 
Botswana to develop an import substituting industry 
whcih will be competitive with the large South African 
producers. In effect I am suggesting that the infant 
industry argument does not in general apply to Botswana 
and, more particularly, is certainly not applicable in 
the case of industries designed to provide inputs for 
the mining sector - the cost structure of a Botswana 
import substituting industry is likely to remain higher 
than that of its South African competitor even after an 
eight year period of protection. A possible solution of 
this impasse would be to establish the desired industry . 
under the cloak of a protective tariff and then stipulate 
that the mining industry continue supporting the domestic 
producer after the tariff barrier has been lifted eve~ if 
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the price on the South African market is lower. A stipu-
lation of this nature might be tantamount to the· imposition 
of a quota and, as such, would contravene Article 2 of 
the Customs Union Agreement. 
The development of the coal mine at Morupule is probably 
the most signific,ant backward linkage generated by the 
copper-nickel industry. The quality of the coal mined 
at Morupu.i..i;;: is of a particularly low grade although 
preliminary testing indicated that it was combustible 
and could therefore be used for power generation. Possible 
alternatives were importing power from South Africa or 
importing coal from South Africa or Rhodesia. The latter 
alternative was analysed by the consultants, Gibb and 
Partners, and rejected apparently on economic grounds. 
It is, however, unlikely that the former alternative 
(namely, the import of power from South Africa) is in 
fact more expensive although it does not accord with Bots-
wana's objective of lessening her dependence on South 
Africa. It was therefore agreed that Morupule Collieries 
Limited, a member of the Anglo American Group, would 
mine the coal deposits despite the fact that the power 
requirements of the Selebi-Pikwe project would constitute 
the only source of demand for the output of the Morupule 
Mine. The mine employs approximately fifty people and 
contributes in the usual manner to government revenue. 
Most importantly it provides Botswana with an independent 
source of power. There has, however, been one important 
problem, namely that the Morupule coal, though combustible 
during testing, has not been combustible in the power 
plant .because of a faul.t in the design of the power units 
bodies. Thus Botswana is . still compelled to rely on 
imported coal. The design of the boilerswill be modified 
to accommodate the characteristics of Morupule coal, 
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although at some considerable cost, unofficially estim-
ated at R 4,5 million. It is not at this stage clear 
who will pay for these modifications. 
We can dismiss the possibility of the mining sector 
encouraging the formation of a capital goods sector 
i:;upplying the heavy industrial equipment to the mining 
sector. The polarisation factor outlined above is 
likely to be particularly relevant to the case of 
heavy industry - it is not reasonable to expect a 
Botswana capital goods producer to achieve the scale 
economies attained by South African and international 
producers. The purchase of the capital goods required 
for the infrastructure is generally subject to conditions 
stipulated by the loan agreements and even the mining 
company itself is bound to purchase a stipulated por-
tion of its requirements in South Africa. 9 Furthermore, 
Anglo American's industrial interests and both Anglo 
and Amax's substantial interests in copper mining in 
Zambia and South Africa lead one to expect that it 
would be contrary to their interests to support a 
domestic capital goods producer. 
The other possible linkage relates to the extent to 
which the mining sector will stimulate the demand for 
consumer goods and therefore investment in the production 
of those goods. This question will be examined in chap-
ter 14. In so far as a large portion of Utr.he BCL monthly 
wage bill is attributable to a high wage expatriate 
workforce,demand for domestically produced goods will 
not be significantly stimulated. Those consumer 
goods produced in Botswana which have, at high levels 
of income, a positive income elasticity of demand are 
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essentially aimed at the tourist trade. The cheap furni-
ture, textiles, and even foodstuffs which might be 
produced in Botswana will, at high levels of income, 
have an extremely low income elasticity of demand, 
possibly even a zero or negative elasticity. The demand 
for these goods will probably be stimulated by the wages 
paid to the lower income unskilled workers employed 
on the mines.but even in the case of cheap consumer 
goods Botswana producers will face considerable compe-
tition from South African producers. Furthermore in the 
case of cheap consumer goods transport costs are of 
crucial importance. Unsatisfactory road conditions in 
Botswana might well ensure that it is cheaper to transport 
goods from South Africa or Rhodesia than from Gaborone, 
although Seleb:d:-Pikwe's position on the railway line and 
the proximity of Francistown is not likely to render 
tr.ansport costs prohibitive. The possibility of the town 
of Selebi-Pikwe itself becoming a cent~e of secondary 
industrial activity is severely constrained by a short-
age of water. These problems notwithstanding the possi-
bi~ity of encouraging the formation of consumer good 
industries is slightly strengthened by Clause 6 of the 
Customs Union agreement permitting protection of ctnfant 
industries. 
The population of Selebi-Pikwe could provide significant 
linkages to the rural sector, particularly to the neigh-
bouring villages of Mmadinari, Palapye and even Serowe. 
Obviously in many instances the quality :; of the product 
will have to be upgraded but the situation prevailing 
in Pikwe does not provide much room for optimism. Milk 
is imported from Bulawayo'· d(i!spi te the fact that there 
is a well-established village, Mmadinari, several miles 
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away which, with an organised marketing scheme, could 
conceivably produce sufficient milk for the requirements 
of Pikwe. The sale .of fresh vegetables is controlled 
by large retailers who generally purchase their require-
. 10 ' 
ments from South African and:.lRhodesia. Recently the 
Serowe Brigades have established a market place in 
Pikwe which will undoubtedly generate additional link-
ages with the rural sector. 11 The question of rural 
sector linkages will be discussed in greater detail in 
chapter 14. 
On the whole backward linkages stemming from mining 
are likely to be insiginificant. The capital intensive 
nature of the mining industry, Anglo and Amax's 
industrial and copper mining activities in South Africa 
and Zambia, and, most important, the existence of well 
established South African producers will inhibit local 
production of both capital goods and the lower priced 
requirements for the mining and construction industries. 
To date the only significant backward linkage is 
Morupule Colliery, although the Botswana Development 
Corporation in partnership with British Oxygen intends 
establishing a small industrial gas plant with a capital 
investment of approximately R 200 000 in Pikwe. 
b) Forward Linkages 
The ore extracted at Selebi-Pikwe is processed at the 
mine by means of a highly sophisticated flash smelter 
process developed in Finland. The matte is then shipped 
to the United States where it is toll refined at Amax's 
plant at Port Nickel, Louisiana. 
There are several factors which strongly militate against 
the establishment of a refining plant in Botswana. 
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Firstly, the output of Selebi-Pikwe is very small in 
relation to the output of the other major copper pro-
ducing countries. If Selkirk-Phoenix and Matsitama 
are exploited total output will increase quite consider-
ably but, even then, it is unlikely that Botswana's 
relatively small deposits will warrant the establish-
ment of a local refining plant particularly when one 
considers the proximity of•well established refining 
plants in Zambia and South Africa. Furthermore, th:e 
estimated life of the project is short and this will 
also discourage domestic refining. The lack of refining 
capacity also decreases the likelihood of nationalisation. 
Secondly, copper, and particularly nickel, refining is 
a highly capital intensive process. Employment creation 
is likely to be small and highly skill intensive. 
Botswana, in fact, offers no locational attractions 
as regards refining, with, of course, the exception 
of lowered transport costs. 
Thirdly, the goals of the firms invo'lved in the Selebi-
Pikwe project, particularly Amax, militate against the 
\ establishment of a local refinery. One of Amax's 
\
' primary motives for investing in Selebi-Pikwe is that 
its Port Nickel refining plant is operating at below 
capacity. The output of the Botswana mine is thus an 
important cost reducing factor at Amax's refinery. 
The possibility of establishing domestic refining 
capacity is, at best, highly unlikely. The Government 
has expressed the hope that the added output of Matsitama 
and Selkirk-Phoenix might justify the establishment of a 
local refinery. Amax has negotiated a fifteen year con-
tract for the refining of the Selebi-Pikwe matte, 
although, in the event of domestic refining becoming 
feasible, the 9over~ment would undoubtedly consider 
renegotiating the contract. 
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Apart from the processing and refining of the copper-nickel 
ore, another possible forward linkage sterns from the large 
sulphur byproduct of the flash smelter process. Most of 
the sulphur output is to be sold to a South African ferti-
liser firm, Triornf Fertilisers. Sulphur is an important 
element in the production of certain fertilisers and it 
might be put to effect~ve use by a local producer. Once 
again one expects that the government would renegoitiate 
the Triornf contract if the establishment of a small chemical 
or fertiliser plant were to b~orne a viable proposition. 
Ultimately however, it is difficult to disagree with a 
conclusion Selwyn draws from his study of industrial 
development in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, namely, 
that 
" very few of the firms engaged in resource 
based industries would take the process a 
single stage further locally than they were 
\ compelled to by the nature of the product or 
\
by government intervention. Many of the enter-
prises were controlleq by groups whose only 
interest in the peripheral country was as a 
1source of the material, and which would not of their own volition choose these countries 
as a location for any other activity." (p. 152) 
c) Infrastructure 12 (Map D) 
The Selebi-Pikwe project has necessitated the development 
of large scale infrastructure, the cost of which has been 
met by loans raised by the Botswana government f rorn 
various international aid bodies. The mining company 
has not been responsible for the provision of any of 
the infrastructural requirements other than sharing in 
the cost of the development of the township. The major 
facilities required by the mining project are water, 
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power, transport, and the township. The provision of 
facilities of this nature in a country sorely lacking 
in these basic necessities might provide a stimulus to 
the development of both the agricultural and industrial 
sectors. 
The United Nations Development Programme {UNDP) provided 
the funds for the original feasability study and appoint-
ed the World Bank as the executive agency. Sir Alexander 
Gibb and Partners were appointed as the consultants and 
were instructed to assess the feasability of alternative 
means of providing the water, power and transport facili-
ties. It was specifically provided that Gibb and 
Partners should, bear in mind the needs of nearby consumers 
in their assessment. The ODM {the British Ministry for 
Ov.erseas Development) assumed responsibility for assess-
ing the requirements of the township. The entire project 
is known as the Shashe Project and administration of the 
project was in the hands of the Shashe Project Management 
Unit, an arm of the Ministry of Finance and Development 
Planning. Upon completion, the project was handed over 
to the relevant para-statal bodies. 
Cost estimates of the project have varied considerably 
since the original feasability studies were undertaken. 
The latest estimate to hand {July 1973) is R 55 102 000, 
. although the most recent detailed cost statements (31st 
December 1972) estimate the cost .. of the project at 
R 60 575 000. Table 12.6 provides a breakdown of the 
project and also gives some indication of ':the fluctua-
tions in the cost estimates. 
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TABLE 12.6 
!. 
A. Power 
"· 
Facilities 
B. Water 
Facilities 
c. Roads and 
Railway 
D. Township 
E. Engineering and 
Administration 
F. Interest 
G. Preliminary 
and Other 
Total 
Shashe Project Cost Estimate 
31st December 197? (R '000) 
Original Projec~ Total Current Cost Estimate 
LC FC Total LC FC 
; 2 048 14 690 16 738 6 260 I 7 644 
3 040 9 132 12 172 6 327 7 044 
947 2 356 3 303 3 409 771 
2 311 3·333 5 644 6 337 963 
I 000 2 510 3 510 2 132 3 042 
4 259 4 259 3 793 
I 146 I 336 2 482 I 423 I 430 
JO 492 37 616 48 108 25 888 34 687 
Estimate 
Total 
23 904 
13 371 
4 180 
7 300 
5 174 
3 793 
2 853 
60 575 
LC = payments in local currency; FC = payments in foreign 
currencies. 
Source: Shashe Project Management Unit; Quarterly Report 
31st December 1972. 
The major sources of finance are the World Bank (IBRD), 
the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), 
and the US Agency for International Development (USAID). 
The World Bank loan of $ 32 000 000 covers various aspects 
of the project although a large portion of the loan (appro-
ximately 29 per cent) is earmarked for the provision of 
water facilities. It is apparently the first time that 
the World Bank has lent a swn of money in excess of the 
value of the recipients gross domestic product. The loan 
is repayable over a period of twenty five years at 
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714 per cent p·er annum. The loan is guaranteed by BCL, 
BRST, Anglo/Charter, Amax and Metallgesellschaft. The 
World Bank shares in a hypothec over the mining lease 
and holds mortgage bonds over company housing in 
Selebi-Pikwe. 
CIDA has provided a·C$ 30 000 000 interest free loan 
repayable over fifty years including a ten year grace 
period. The loan is earmarked for the provision of power 
facilities. 
TABLE 12.7 
Sources 
Project Sources of Eunds 
31st December 1972 (R 'OOO) 
§E~£!f!£_§~~!:!!:2:!!:!±~~g 
United Kingdom 
UNDP 
Canadian Technical Aid 
TOTAL 
§~y~~!F.!}~U~-~ygg~~~~~-~~!:!92 
Government Costs of Temporary Water 
Government Staff Seconded to Project 
Customs Duties 
Charges on Bridging Finance 
TOTAL 
United Kingdom - Temporary Water 
IDA Credit - Design 
CIDA 
IBRD Loan 
US AID 
TOTAL 
TOTAL of SOURCE of FUNDS 
Total Amount 
Available 
458 
209 
478 
1 145 ;: -~ 
===== 
20 
103 
464 
150 
737. 
364 
1 247 
23 904 
25 098 
5 366 
55 979 
------
------
57 861 
====== 
Source: Shashe Project Management Unit; Quarterly 
Report 31st December 1972. 
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The US AID's loan of $:6 732 000 is repayable over forty 
years, including a ten year grace period. Interest on 
the AID loan is at 2 per cent per annum during the grace 
period and 3 per cent per annum thereafter. The loan is 
earmarked for the construction of the main water pipeline, 
and also for the payment of capitalised interest during 
the construction period. US AID also provided $ 2,5 mil-
lion for the engineering design and certain preliminary 
works, $ 910 000 of which has been refunded from the 
World Bank loan. Both the Canadian and United States 
loans are unsecured. 
Power 
-----
Responsibility for the provision of the power facilities 
has been undertaken by CIDA who have lent Botswana 
$ 30 000 000 for this purpose. The loan agreement was 
signed in 1970 and, in the same year, the Botswana Power 
Corporation which is responsible for the administration 
of the power plant, was established. 
Before the construction of the Shashe River power unit 
the power resources were located in the Gaborone-Lobatsi 
area which could cater for a maximum demand of 2 300 
kilowatts per day and in the Francistown area with a 
maximum possible output of 400 kilowatts per day. The 
mine and the processing plant alone (that is, excluding 
the township requirements) were expected to use approxi-
mately 29 000 kilowatts per day thus necessitating the 
construction of a completely new power unit. As stated 
above the Government was face~ with choice of importing 
coal from Rhodesia or South Africa, importing power from 
South Africa, or using the Morupule coal resources. The 
latter alternative was adopted. Thus with coal from 
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Morupule and water from the dam on the Shashe River the 
power station itself might have been located at any one 
of the three sites, namely, the Morupule Colliery, the 
Shashe Dam, or at Selebi-Pikwe itself, the significant 
cost factors influencing the choice being the cost of 
pumping the water, transmitting the power, and transport-
ing the coal. Once all these factor were weighed up the 
Selebi-Pikwe site was ch9sen. 13 
CIDA then undertook to construct a 60 megawatt thermal 
power station at Selebi-Pikwe plus an 11 kilowatt trans-
mission line from the power station to the township and 
a 66 kilowatt line to the Shashe Dam pumping station and 
Francistown. 
The construction of the power station has been fraught 
with controversy. A condition of the CIDA loan was that 
Canadian firms using Canadian equipment construct the 
plant. A blueprint for the construction of a power plant 
had been drawn up several years earlier by a British firm 
and, with several minor adjustments, the Canadian contrac-
tors constructed the plant according to these specifica-
tions. The Shashe plant and all its components were of 
a considerably smaller scale than those normally con-
structed by the Canadian firms involved in the project 
with the result that the Botswana project constituted a 
special case for most of these firms - parts had to be 
constructed specifically for the Botswana project. The 
upshot of all this was the use of highly sophisticated 
technology and expensive Canadian manpower and materials -
these factors combined with special nature of the Shashe 
unit have resulted in, what is reputed to be, the most 
costly power station per megawatt in the world. Added to 
this is the fact that the boilers do not suit the 
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characteristics of the Morupule coal and Botswana will 
have to continue importing coal from South Africa until 
the power unit is modified. 
The power plant is administered and operated by the 
Botswana Power Corporation, a statutory body, whose 
major activity is the management of the Shashe Power 
unit. Canada is providing technical assistance although 
schemes have been initiated to train local personnel to 
man the power installations. 
It is the Botswana government• s intention that all the 
infrastructural projects should be self financing in 
so far as the returns should meet the debt serving obliga-
tion and recurrent expenditure. To this end the Botswana 
Power Corporation has entered into a 35 year agreement 
with BCL in terms of which the company agrees to pay 
minimum charges sufficient to cover the debt servicing 
obligation and a portion of the operating costs. 
~~E~!: 
The water facilities, consist of the Shashe Dam the 
total length of which is 3 000 metres with a maximum 
height of 25 metres; an eighty kilometre buried pipeline; 
a plant at Shashe for preliminary treatment and pumping 
of water; service reservoirs at Selebi-Pikwe and a full 
treatment plant for township· supplies. As at, the 31st 
December 1972 the estimated cost of the water facilities 
was R 13 371 000 the bulk of which has been provided for 
from the World Bank loan. The contractors are largely of 
British and Canadian origin. 
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The mine and plant alone were expected to consume 20 mil-
lion litres per day rising with the expansion of the town. 
Water demands from Francistown and Morupule were also to 
be catered for. 
Two possible locations for the dam were the Shashe and 
Tobane sites on the Shashe and Matloutse Rivers respec-
tively, the latter being nearer the mine but considerably 
further from Francistown. It appears, however, that 
because of unreliable rainfall in the Tobane catchment 
area, the Shashe site was the only really viable location 
although because of the distance of the Shashi site from 
Selebi-Pikwe temporary water supplies for the town had to 
.be provided by sinking boreholes. The water supply has 
been the cause of considerable concern. The original 
estimates· 1were found to fall seriously short of actual 
requirements, the rainfall in the initial period proved 
disappointing, and the saltation rate of the Shashe Dam 
has proved considerably higher than was at first expected, 
although many of these problems have been somewhat 
alleviated by the excellent rainfall of the 1974 season. 
The possibility of diverting water from the Shashe Dam 
for use in a small irrigation scheme was mooted but 
rejected, on the grounds that the poor soil in the area 
did not warrant the use of. scarce water resources. This 
argument appears highly suspect when one considers that 
one important reason for the poor quality of much of the 
soil in Botswana is the lack of irrigation. The feasability 
of tapping water for cattle watering was also rejected 
because of the possibility of overgrazing. Again this . 
argument appears highly questionable - overgrazing could 
be prevented by administrative means whilst the area 
surrounding the dam and the pipeline could have been 
turned into a valuable cattle !breeding region. 
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As regards the financing of the water facilities, substan-
tially the same measures that apply to the power plant 
were instituted in the case of the water facilities - the 
funds borrowed by the government were lent to the Water 
Utilities Corporation which has entered into an agreement 
with BCL in terms of which BCL guarantees pa~ent of a 
certain minimum ~harge for a period of 25_years. This will 
ensure that the debt servicing charges and the recurrent 
costs are met out of recurrent revenue. 
!!:~!!2E2!:~ 
It was estimated that approximately 300 000 tons of coal 
and coke per annum would have to be transported from 
Morupule to the smelter and power station at Selebi-Pikwe. 
Furthermore 150 000 tons of copper-nickel matte would 
leave the mine each year. The transportation facilities 
comprised the construction of a 65 kilometre rail spur from 
Serule to Selebi-Pikwe, a short rail spur from Morupule to 
Palapye, and an all-weather gravel road from Serule to 
Selebi-Pikwe. The estimated cost of the project was 
R 4 180 000. The possibility of a direct road link from 
Pikwe, south-east to the Tuli Block and north-west to 
Francistown has also been mooted. 
Clause 30 of the Master Agreement provides that BCL shall 
pay a surcharge fixed by agreement with the government to 
provide for the costs of the siding between Palapye and 
Morupule and the line between 5erule and Selebi•Pikwe, 
the cost of the feasibility studies, engineering and 
administration costs, and all interest charged on the 
costs incurred. Furthermore, if the proceeds of the surcharge 
fail to cover the costs ref erred to above the company will 
make up the shortfall. 
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Selebi-Pikwe is a small town of 2 000 plots. All township 
services - roads, sewers, etc., are provided, as are 
schools, health-centres, a town hall, post office, tele-
phone exchange, police station, and prison. Government 
. 
housing for approximately 350 families and bachelors has 
also been provided. The operation and maintenance of these 
facilities is in. the hands of the recently established 
Township Authority. The Selebi-Pikwe Commercial Develop-
' ment Corporation, a subsidiary of the Botswana Development 
Corporation, is responsible for the development and 
management of the commercial centre. 
The cost of the township is estimated at.R 7 300 000. 
BCL has agreed to pay tbe government 75 per cent of the 
Selebi-Pikwe township cow.men services in the form of;:;a 
25 year annuity, in return for the grant of land for BCL's 
employees housing in the township. Any cost incurred by 
BCL in the construction of the township is tax deductible. 
With the advantage of hindsight it is certainly easy to 
criticise the planning of the town. The population of 
the town has been sorely underestimated - the company 
originally estimated that 1 700 people would be required 
to operate the mine. White cites Zambian studies which 
indicate that each mineworker supports approximately 
9 people at the mine itself. This alone would suggest a 
population of some 15 000 excluding the burgeoning number 
of traders, government and municipal officials, and job 
seekers. The population growth of the area now known as 
Selebi-Pikwe has been phenomenal. In 1965 the area 
consisted of a few cattle posts belonging to the neigh• 
bouring village of Mmadinari, and by 1969, with the 
original exploratory work underway some two or three 
'"'"' ,/
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hundred people were living in the camps at Selebi-Pikwe. 
The planners attempted to cater for an initial population 
of 11 000 which was.expected to rise to 28 000 by 1978. 
With the decision to exploit the ore bodies the popula-
tion explosion began and now crude estimates of the 
population range up to between 35 000 and 40 000 inhabitants, 
a large portion of whom live in a mushrooming tin shanty 
area known as "Botshabelo" (literally "place of refuge"). 
The layout of the town is also open to considerable 
\ c~iticism. Hopkinson notes that 
\ 
' I 
' 
' 
} 
"The town proper has, by some peoples' reckon-
ing, been sadly misplanned. It is built so that 
there is a high density area, with houses crowd-
ed together, each house looking like the next in 
utter dullness. Safely across an open space of 
ground, called the park, there is a low density 
housing area, peopled largely by expatriates: 
class division is built into the place. At one 
end of the town there is an english medium school, 
at the other, two tswana medium. The main shopping 
area is now under construction, but people are 
astonished ~t the prices being charged for rental, 
which will rule out local traders, and turn the 
place from a friendly bazaar type place into a 
sterile supermarket precinct.". (p. 2) 
Certain peculiar features of the township require further 
comment. The Botswana Development Corporation has been 
criticised because of the rentals charged for accommo-
dation in the Selebi-Pikwe commercial centre. The 
criticism has persuaded the BOC to reduce the rentals 
from approximately_ 40 c per square foot to 30 c per 
square foot. The BDC are anxious to secu~e a profitable 
rate of return on their investment but their policy in 
this regard would appear to be extremely shortsighted, 
· because even the reduced rental will be too high for 
small local traders and will effectively reserve the 
-.. 
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shopping centre for well established retailers from 
Francistown or Gaborone or, possibly, South African 
chain stores. There is a state-controlled retail co-
operative in Selebi~Pikwe which might be expected to 
cater for the requirements and budget of the lower paid 
Batswana and support, where possible, local supplier.s • 
. . 
The contents of the co-operative store suggest otherwise. 
Moreover, it is situated a qonsideraple distance from 
the main residential area and is therefore supported 
. by those who ,are able to afford private transport. · 
. ·. 9~E~E~!-~Y§!!!:~!:!2!!_9!:...~h~-2he~h!:_!E!!:e~!:~!:!!i!:!!!:~-~EQj!;g!; 
The short run benefits from the scheme are obvious - it 
provided employment for several thousand people and 
undoubtedly served to provide certain skills. 14 In the 
longrun costs are insignificant insofar as the project 
will be self financing. All the proceeds from the sale 
of the Selebi-Pikwe mineral~ will be paid into a trust 
held in London and the power, water and township charges 
payable by BCL will be drawn from the funds held by the 
trust. 
Whether or not the infrastructure project will generate 
significant linkages into i;.the industrial and. agricultural 
sectors is open to question and at times it appears that 
certain features of the project specifically militate 
against this possibility. 
One cannot expect significant linkages to be generated 
by the provision of transport facilities. It does render 
industrial development in Pikwe itself a far more viable 
possibility but, unlike, for example, Zambia, the road 
and railway construction required by the mining sector 
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does not open up an interior region with no previous 
access to transport facilities. The proximity of Selebi-
Pikwe to. the major road and rail routes meant that 
extensive development of transport facilities was not 
required. 
The provision of electrical power will encourage industrial 
development in Selebi-Pikwe and will doubtlessly· facilitate 
the expansion of the Francistown area. In view of the lack 
of alternatives the high cost of the power station is 
unavoidable - the necessary funds would probably not 
have been forthcoming if the government had not been 
prepared to submit to ~onditions similar to those laid 
down by CIDA. 
Lack of water is undoubtedly one of the most serious con.;;; 
straints facing both industrial and agricultural develop-
ffient. The extensive requirements of the mining complex 
will mean that, despite the construction of -~he ·shashe 
Dam, lack of water will continue to hamper the develop-
ment of the surrounding areas. One cannot escape the 
conclusion that the neighbouring rural area might have 
benefited from use of the water from the Shashe Dam and 
the refusal to allow use of this water appears highly 
questionable. The supply of water from the Shashe Dam to 
the rural areas could have been strictly controlled so 
as not; to impede mining activity during particularly dry 
seasons. As far as industrial development in the neigh-
bouring areas is concerned, the Shashe dam will not 
relieve the water constraint and despite the added advant-
age of improved transportation and power facilities the 
government will still have to examine the possibility 
df tappin~ alternative water sources, notably the Okovango 
Swamps, if secondary industry is to be attracted to 
Selebi-Pikwe. 
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12 . 4 Revenue 
-------
The Botswana government derives revenue from the mining 
sector from four major sources, namely, corporate profit 
taxation, dividends and royalties, customs duties on 
mining imports, and taxation. of wage income. 
Estimates of fiscal benefits to be derived from the 
project vary considerably. The latest published estimates 
anticipate that revenue accruing to the government from 
BCL royal t:ies, taxes and' ;dividends will total from 
R 2 million to R 5 million over the first eight years 
of the projec~s life, from R 8 million to R 11 million 
over the next four years and more than R 12 million per 
annum over the next ten years. 15 These estimates are 
corroborated by the following estimates of the Ministry 
of Finance and Development Planning (Table 12.8). 
Customs revenue resulting from mining imports will be a 
substantial, although rapidly diminishing, source of 
revenue. Estimates of custom revenue are highly unreliable 
and will be discussed at a later stage. The Ministry of 
Finance and Development Planning estimate that revenue 
from personal income taxes, vehicle taxes and other minor 
sources of revenue will average around R 300 000 per 
annum. 
The revenue derived from corporate profit taxation and 
from dividends and royalties is determined, to a signi-
ficant degree, by the size of the miningr.companies' 
profits. 16 Thus any possibilities open to the firm whereby 
it might reduce the size of its tax base must be examined 
in detail. 
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TABLE 12.8 Estimated Government Revenue from 
Selebi-Pikwe 
1973/74 
1974/75 
1975/76 
1976/77 
1977/78 
1978/79 
1979/80 
1980/81 
1981/82 
1982/83 
Note: 
Government Revenue 
(R million) 
0,8 
5,0 
5,9 
6,8 
... 
7,5 
8,4 
10,0 
10,8 
10,5 
10,3 
1) Revenue includes the royalty, dividends, 
taxation, BCL township contribution, tempo-
rary water charges, charges on loans to the 
Water and Power Corporations, the Railway 
surcharge. 
Z) Table 12.10 and 12.11 indicate the relation-
ship between revenue from Selebi-Pikwe and 
revenue from other sources. Note that part 
of the revenue attributed to customs and 
excise ·duties is derived from imports for 
the Selebi-Pikwe project. 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Development Planning. 
Profit Remission 
----------------
It appears that BCL will not be able to reduce the size 
of its tax base by underpricing the output of '~he· Selebi-
Pikwe mine. BCL is committed to sell its output to BCL 
(Sales) Limited which is compelled to purchase all the 
Matte .offered to it at a price established by the Sales 
Agreement. 17 BCL (Sales) is a company incorporated in 
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Botswana and is subject to exactly the same taxation 
regulations and corporate control as BCL ibself. There 
is thus no advantage to be gained for BCL by underpricing 
its output to reduce its tax base - a reduction in its 
tax base will be reflected as. an increase in BCL (Sales) 
tax base. 
BCL (Sales) in :.turn, is committed to selling the matte 
to Metallgesellschaft (MG) 18 through the agency of RST 
International. 19 In terms of the output expected at the 
time of the signing of the sales agreement BCL are 
committed to selling, and MG are committed to purchasing, 
two-thirds of the actual production of nickel up to a 
maximum of two-thirds of the specified expected annual 
output, and the entire copper output up to the amount 
specified in the sales agreement. BCL have agreed to 
offer for sale in West Germany that portion of the out-
put which MG chooses not to purchase. 
The nickel price will be determined by the average daily 
selling price of the International Nickel Company of 
Canada, Limited. The copper price will be .determined by 
the cif price at which the major producers of copper 
sell electrolytic copper,·wire bars in West Germany. The 
agreement will 'remain in force for a period of 15 years. 
The agreement between BCL and MG derives from KfW loan 
to BCL guaranteed in part by the West German Government, 
and from MG's share of the guarantees on the World Bank 
Loan. 
The copper and nickel is sold by BCL (Sales} through the 
sole agency of RST International who receive a commission 
for their services. 
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The upshot of these complex, rigid arrangements is that 
the sale of the matte is not merely an interfirm account-
ing entry but is conducted at arms length which severely 
restricts the firm's ability to set price in terms of 
tax minimisation criteria which it might have established. 
I must remind the reader that' the matte is not sold by 
BCL (Sales) to Amax - Amax toll refine the matte and the 
sale is made directly from BCL (Sales) to the West 
German market. 
It appears that the government have also tried to restrict 
the firm's ability to control the supply of inputs. 
Clause 10 of the Master Agreement provides that BCL and 
BCL {Sales) may not acquire substantial assets outside 
of Botswana which are unnecessary to the conduct of the 
Selebi-Pikwe mining operations and prohibits them from 
acquiring, either directly or indirectly, any mine or 
mining right outside of Botswana. It would appear there~ 
fore that BCL is prohibited from establishing a purchasing 
company outside of Botswana and so remitting profits by 
means of overpricing inputs. BCL (Pty) Limited is a 
company incorporated in South Africa and was formed in 
order to reduce the R 13,5 million IDC credit. This 
credit has been exhausted although BCL (Pty) Limited 
remains in existence. This does not necessarily suggest 
that BCL (Pty) Limited is being used as profit conduit 
although it would appear that the very existence of the 
firm contravenes the Master Agreement unless, of course, 
BCL and BRST are not shareholders in BCL (Pty) Limited. 
I have been unable to acquire any further information 
regarding the activities of this company. 
The major shareholders of BRST, Amax and Anglo Americanf 
have a substantial stake in copper mining in Southern 
and Central Africa and also control important industrial 
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interests. Amax and Anglo control the management of BCL 
and it is not inconceivable that they sell inputs to BCL 
from a Zambian or South African subsidiary. A sale of 
this nature need not affect the size of BCL's profits if 
the asset is transferred at the prevailing market price, 
although if the asset has been depreciated by the seller 
the overall global profits of the corporation will be 
increased. It is difficult to ascertain whether any of 
the inputs required by BCL are manufactured in Anglo or 
Amax subsidiaries but given the industrial and mining 
interests of both companies it is difficult to believe 
otherwise. A factor which would militate against over-
pricing of this nature is the joint control exercised 
by Anglo and Amax - a senior government official indicated 
that a "healthy element of tension" existed between Anglo 
and Amax and the one is unlikely to allow the other to 
benefit consistently from the practice of overpricing. 
In the final analysis it is impossible to assert. that BCL 
does purchase overpriced inputs although the possibility 
does exist and should be borne in mind by the government 
planners. 
It thus appears that the bulk of BCL and BRST's profits 
will be remitted by way of dividends and interest to the 
major shareholders and lenders. The government have a 
15 per cent interest in BCL and BCL (Sales) but they 
hold no interest in BRST. Paradoxically it appears. that, 
whereas the government have attempted to seal off the 
"unconventional" channel of profit remission (that, is, 
the transfer pricing mechanism}, they have permitted, 
unhindered, remission by way of dividends. Clause 29 of 
the Master Agreement provides that dividends payable by 
BRST and BCL may be freely remitted. This was entrenched 
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in the Selebi-Pikwe Tax Agreement Ratification Act of 
1970, Section 11 (B) of which explicitly states that 
"Dividends paid by BCL or BRST (i) to companies resident 
within Botswana or, .(ii) to persons who are not resident 
within Botswana through a permanent establishment shall 
not be subject to Botswana tax". In mid-1973 the highly 
comprehensive Income Tax Act (no. 10 of 1973) was legislated 
and Section 32 (1) specifically provides that a resident 
company which pays a dividend to a non-resident will 
deduct tax of 15 per cent from the payment. But part II 
of the Second Schedule specifically exempts from taxation 
"any amount payable by way of dividends by Bamangwato 
Concessions Limited, BCL (Sales) Limited, or Botswana 
RST Limited to 
a) a resident company, or 
b} any non-resident who does not carry on 
business in Botswana through a permanent 
establishment situate therein". 
In effect, therefore, BCL and BRST may remit dividends. 
free of tax. The mining companies are not exempt from 
Section 71 (b) of the Income Tax Act which stipulates 
that all persons remitting dividends must furnish a 
return to the tax conunissioner indicating the amount of 
the payment and the identify of the recipient. This may 
act as a deterrent insofar as it will not be politic for 
the companies to be seen remitting a large portion of its 
profits abroad each year but there is no legally imposed 
financial burden deterring remission. This exemption could' 
prove costly and. I shall attempt to spell out the statisti-
cal implications of the·withholding tax exemption in the 
next chapter. If the government had refused to exempt 
BCL and BRST from the withholding tax they would have 
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contravened the Master Agreement - it does, however, 
appear strange that the government should have legislated 
in favour of a withholding tax of this nature and then 
exempted the major portion of the withholding tax base 
from the provisions of the act. 
A further possible channel of remission lies in the use 
of interest payments on intercompany loans. Once again 
the mining companies have been granteq substantial con-
cessions of a similar nature to the dividend concessions. 
Section 58 (1) stipulates that every resident who pays 
interest on a loan from a non-resident shall deduct tax 
from the interest payment. The Second Schedule of the 
act exempts any interest payable by BCL and BCL (Sales) 
from taxation and it also exempts BRST interest payments 
abroad from taxation in so far as the interest paid is in 
respect of money borrowed by BRST and made available to 
BCL for mining operations or exploration in Botswana .. 
Furthermore, the interest paid by BRST on loans made 
by it to BCL may be deducted from the interest received 
by BRST from BCL when BRST's tax returns are computed. 
The Selebi-Pikwe project is highly geared and the interest 
concessions are likely to be significant. It is extremely 
difficult to calculate the debt serving commitments of 
BCL and BRST. The Ministry of Finance and Development 
Planning estimates that in 1977/78 the Selebi-Pikwe project 
(presumably BCL) will pay out R 6,2 million in interest. 
They estimate that in 1977/78 the entire mining and quarry-
ing sector will remit R 20,2 million in the form of inter-
est and dividends thus the interest payments from Selebi-
Pikwe constitute a significant portion of total remission.· 
Furthermore the technical problems have necessitated 
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increased borrowings from Anglo and Amax and interest 
remissions are likely to increase. Anglo and Amax could 
in fact use these interest payments as an avenue of 
profit remission. 20 
Thus, in summary, it appears that although the Botswana 
Government have attempted to prevent remission of profits 
by means of price/manipulation, they have permitted tax 
free and therefore costless remission by way o.f dividends 
and interest payments.It is impossible to ascertain to 
what extent the mining companies will be able to manipulate 
the size of their tax base but, in any event, it appears 
that the tax levied on corporate income will remain a 
major source of revenue for the Botswana government. 
When, in 1959, the Bamangwato Tribal Authority entered 
into the agreement with RST the tax legislation then in 
force, namely the Income Tax (Consolidation) Proclamation 
of 1959, provided fQr corporate taxation at a rate of 30 
per cent. The mineral rights vested in the Bamangwato tribe 
were transfer~ed to the state in 1967 and in 1973 the In-
come Tax Act repea.led the 1959 Proclamation. 
Clause 9 (A) of the Selebi-Pikwe Tax Agreement Ratifica-
tion Act provides that BCL will be subject .to a tax of 
40 per cent on its t~xable income. This is somewhat higher 
than the normal tax rate.of 30 per cent specified in the 
Income Tax Act. Clause 8 (B) introduces a tax escalator 
and provides that if the "operating profit margin" exceeds 
48,5 per cent in any tax year the rate of taxation will be 
increased by an amount equal to the 8.ifference between an 
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operating profit margin of 48,S per cent and the actual 
margin, that is, if the operating profit margin in any 
year reaches 50,S per cent the rate of taxation will be 
increased to 42 per cent. Clause 8 (B) is subject to 
the provision that the tax rate shall not exceed 65 per 
cent in any one year. 21 . 
Although the mining companies are taxed at a somewhat 
higher rate than other companies, they are granted 
certain significant concessions in regard to taxation. 
As noted above, Clause 5 of the Tax Agreement provides 
that interest and commitment fees on monies borrowed by 
BCL are to be deducted when the company's tax base is 
computed. This has been affirmed by the Income Tax Act 
which also extended this provision to BCL (Sales) and 
BRST. It is interesting to note that when calculating 
the operating profit margin interest is included as a 
production cost and is therefore tax deductib~e, despite 
the fact that the interest paid by BCL, BCL (Sales) 
and, under ce+tain conditions, BRST i13 exempted from 
Botswana tax. 
Clause 6 details the items to be deducted as "capital 
expenditure" and sp'ecifies the method of deduction. 
This too has been q.onf.irmed by the Income Tax Act. 
The Income Tax Act defines "mining capital expenditure" 
as including, inter alia, expenditure incurred in the 
acquisition of a mineral, mining or prospecting right 
or mining or prospecting information from another person; 
the cost incurred in the construction of a mining site, 
the construction of puildings, works of a permanent nature 
and "other improvements"; any contribution made to the 
cost of providing power and communication facilities for 
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the mine and residential accommodation and welfare 
facilities for the employees; the costs of general 
administration and management which includes, inter 
alia, interests payable on loans raised to facilitate 
the development and operation .of the mine. Section 40 
of :~the Income Tax Act specifies that deductions allow-.. · 
able to the mining sector include all expenditure 
incurred outside of Botswana in the production of its 
assessable income from the Botswana operation. This 
latter provision is very loosely phrased and might be 
used as a means of profit remission •. As noted above, 
significant deductions are granted in respect of expen-
diture incurred in the training of the labour force -
this latter provision is a general provision and applies 
to apy company operating in Botswana. 
The amount of the deduction allowed to the mining companies 
is calculated in terms of a complex formula. Clause 6 (B) 
of the Tax Agreement provides that in the first year of 
commercial production an amount equal to the quotient 
obtained by dividing all capital expenditure in that 
year and all previous years by five, in the following 
three assessment years by dividing the capital expenditure 
unredeemed in the previous years plus all capital expen-
diture incurred in those years by four, three, and two 
respectively; and in each succeeding year by an amount 
equal to the unredeemed capital expenditure at the beginning 
of the year plus all capital expenditure incurred during 
that year. It is stipulated that the dedU~tions outlined 
above may not exceed 75 per cent of the taxable income 
for that year prior to charging the abovementioned deduc-
tions but after charging all other deductions, ~ecause it 
appears that the deductions referred to above are granted 
in addition to those generally permitted in terms of the 
Third Schedule to the Income Tax Act. 
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It thus appears that whereas the tax rate applicable to 
the mining companies is somewhat higher than that imposed 
upon other investors'· the deductions granted to the 
mining companies and, more particularly, the concessions 
granted which provide for rapid depreciation of their 
capital assets will significantly offset the additional 
tax burden. Joubert calculates that, while capital is 
being written off, the aggregate of royalty and tax paid 
is reduced from 44,5 per cent of gross profits to 16,75 
per cent .• It is interesting to note that the 1973 - 78 
Plan admits that "the generous provisions for relief for 
investors, incorporated in the new Income Tax Act, 1973,. 
will dampen the rate of growth of revenue from that 
. source, but this effect will be partly offset by the 
new wit~holding tax on dividends paid to non-residents" 
(para 4.9). In the light of BCL and BRST's exemption, 
. this statement is extremely optimistic. 
Duty imposed on goods imported for use in the mining 
sector is another important source of revenue. 
The revenue derived from ·this source will decline after 
the first few years of mining development and, as such, 
should be viewed as· an essentially transitory source of 
revenue. 
In the early construction phases large quantities of 
imported commodities will be:-required, -'not only by the 
mining companies themselves but particularly by the 
various contractors responsible for the provision of 
certain elements of the infrastructure and also for 
the construction of .:.tthe mine. 
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As noted above, the new Customs Union agreement ensures 
that the customs revenue received by BLS will reflect 
the value of dutiable goods produced and consumed in 
each country. This is a considerable advance upon the 
1910 Agreement and has resulted in a revenue boom for 
Botswana. It is estimated that the revenue sharing 
formula ensures that Botswana {like Lesotho and Swazi-
land) will receive approximately 20 per cent of the 
value of all dutiable goods imported into and consumed 
in the country in any year. The following is an extremely 
tentative estimate of mining imports and the customs 
revenue accruing as a result thereof. 
TABLE 12.9 
1973/74 
1974/75 
1975/76 
1976/77 
1977/78 
1978/79 
19 79 /80 
1980/81 
1981/82 
1982/83 
Mining Imports and Customs Revenue from 
the Mining Sector, 1973 - 1983 
{R million) 
Mining Imports Customs Revenue 
Mining Imports 
46,0 20,9 
7,7 27,6 
4,5 14,0 
13,1 6,4 
28,2 6,3 
15,9 3,5 
6,7 9,9 
10,8 3,6 
10,9 2,8 
27,0 1,.1 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Development Planning. 
The above table is extremely difficult to interpret 
largely becauseof the lag bet.ween imports and the receipt 
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of Customs revenue. Nevertheless, the table does serve 
to indicate the importance of this revenue source 
particularly in the early phase of the mining development. 
S2Y~!~!~2-sng_J2!Y!9~n9~ 
The original Deed of Concession negotiated between the 
Bamangwato Tribe and RST provided that, in the event of 
t~e formation of a mining company, a royalty amounting 
to 15 per cent of the excess of sales revenue over produc-
tion cost or a minimum royalty of £ 250 per month would 
be paid to the Tribal Authority. The value of the 
royalty was tax deductible thus reducing the effective 
rate to 13,04 per cent. The Mines and Minerals Act of 
1967 which amended and consolidated all previous mining 
legislation provides for a royalty amounting to 3 per 
cent of the gross market value of all minerals extracted 
, 
in Botswana. 
In terms of the Mines and Minerals Act and the Bamangwato 
Concessions Limited Mining Lease Act (1970) .:BCL was 
granted a mining lease and the royalty ultimately agreed 
upon between the government and the company differs con-
siderably from that provided either in the original Deed 
or in the Mines and Minerals Act. Clause 12 (A) of the 
BCL Mining Lease Act provides that the company shall pay 
to the government a royalty equivalent to 71:.l per cent 
of the excess of sales revenue over production cost. · 
Clause 12 (B) provides that in each financial year the 
company will pay an advance royalty of R 750 000. The 
Selebi-Pikwe Tax Agreement Ratification Act provides 
that royalties are to be construed as part of the cost 
of production and are, as such, tax deductible. 
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Joubert has pointed out several interesting implications 
arising from the changed tax rates (from 30 per cent to 
40 per cent} and the method of calculating royalties. A 
large proportion of the shareholders are United States 
citizens and US law permits foreign tax payment to be 
offset against US tax payments but it does not permit 
royalty payments to be offset. Thus the- total net amount 
of the tax, both US and Botswana, is reduced whereas 
the aggrec;rate of royalty and tax paymentsaccruing to the 
Botswana governments is increased from 39,13 per cent 
of gross profits to 44,5 per cent. 
When the original Deed of Concession was entered intq 
between RST and the Bamangwato Tribal Authority it was 
agreed that the Tribe would receive a 15 per cent 
gratuitous share of the equity of any mining company 
which might be formed to exploit the resources· of the 
Bamangwato Tribe. In 1967, when the mineral rights 
passed to the State~ so did all the rights, title and 
interest in the original Deed and agreements. The 
governmen~s equity share is confirmed by Clause 21 
of the Master Agreement. It is impos·sible to estimate 
the size of the dividends that BCL will declare in 
future years. The 1973 - 78 National Development Plan 
estimates that in 1975/76 the government will receive 
R 110 000 in the form of dividends, rising to R 830 000 
in the following year, and R 1 220 000 by 1977/78. The 
altered financial structure of the company is likely 
to affect these predicitions. Possibly all that one can 
assert is that BC~s dividend declarations are likely to 
be considerable because they constitute an inexpensive 
form of profit remission. 
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The company is committed to pay several statutory fees 
of which the most significant is the licence fee of 
R 75 000 per annum payable monthly in advance. 
In 1972 an extremely important piece of legislation was 
enactec;l, namely the Mineral Rights Tax Act. This act is 
particularly significa~t in that it provides for the taxa-
tion of privately owned mineral rights. The Vice-President 
specifically stated that, in so doing, the government did 
not contest the right to private ownership of mineral 
riglfts nor did it attempt, in any way, to deprive the 
owners of their mineral rights - the act merely wished 
to ensure that the nation as a whole derived a benefit 
from what was essentially a national resource. The act 
therefore provides that privately owned mineral rights 
will be taxed either using the land area of the mineral 
right as the base (R 40 per square kilometre per annum) 
or the value of the mineral right (10 per cent of the 
value per annum) whichever yields more revenue. Importantly 
however, any expenditure properly incurred in prospecting 
activity in the previous year will be offset against the 
tax liability. Therefore in certain years the holders of 
the mineral rights will not be subject to any tax liabi-
lity in terms of this act but, if no prospecting activity 
is undertaken, the full weight of the tax will be felt. 
There can be little doubt that this tax is specifically 
designed to persuade the holders of the mineral rights 
in the Tati Concession to carry out extensive prospecting 
activity in the concession area and/or to exploit the 
deposits known to exist at Selkirk and Phoenix. The Tati 
Company is not capable of undertaking mineral extraction 
itself and although they agreed to permit the Anglo 
American Corporation to undertake the initial exploratory 
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work they have refused to permit the Corporation to carry 
out more intensive prospecting activity. Thus far the act 
has not succeeded in persuading the Tati Company to engage 
in any prospecting o.r mining a9ti vi ty. The act has had 
the effect of causing Anglo to relinguish its mineral 
rights in the Tuli, Gaborone and.Lobatse Blocks. 22 
12.5 §~~~!Y 
This lengthy chapter undoubtedly constitutes the centre-
piece of the entire dissertation. One might justifiably 
argue that the description and analysis preceding Chapter 12 
has attempted, in fact, to establish the setting within 
which this chapter is presented - the generalised theore-
tical hypotheses and conclusions, and the particular 
features of the Botswana economy and the Selebi-Pikwe 
project. And the chapters that. follow merely conclude 
the analysis of the present chapter - the proportion of 
value retained in the host country and its distribution 
amongst the various interest groups is crucially determined 
by the manner in which it is generated. There are certain 
policy tools available to the host government whereby the 
proportion of value retained and its distribution may be 
influenced, but the impact of any policy variable is 
narrowly circumscribed by the nature of the value adding 
mechanism. In 8hapter 12 I have attempted to outline the 
manner in which the copper-nickel industry contributes 
to the value of Botswana's national product and, without 
wishing to ~nticipate Chapter is; it is probably desirable 
to summarise briefly the important conc·::tusions that have 
emerged thus far. 
The capital intensive techniques of production employed 
by the mining company ensure that the Selebi-Pikwe copper-
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nickel mine will make a small contribution to total em-
ployment, but that the labour force will consist of a 
relatively large proportion of high level manpower. The 
wage rate prevailing in the mines - unskilled, skilled, 
and high-level - will be higher than that of the other 
sectors of the economy and there is every possibility 
that the mining sector will act as a wage leader. The 
wage bill of the mining sector is considerable but a. 
large proportion of this wage bill will accrue to a 
small elite of highly paid, largely expatriate, employees. 
The government have attempted to counter these problems 
by according priority to localisation of the workforce 
and by the enunciation of an incomes policy. The mining 
sector's localisation position is predictably unfavourable 
and, therefore, its wage levels remain excessive. The 
government hopes to control profit levels by means of 
taxation policy. 
In section 12.3 it is argued that the investment multiplier, 
in so far as its impact is realised in Botswana, will be 
small. The corporate structure of the copper-nickel industry 
will reduce the likelihood of generating domestic backward 
and forward linkages - the major sha~eholders of BRST, 
Anglo and Amax, control substantial mining interests in 
the neighbouring territories and Anglo controls industrial 
interests in South Africa. These could be used as sources 
of supply for the Botswana copper-nickel industry. The 
company will not, of its own volition, establish a refining 
plant in Botswana. The Botswana matte is of some importance 
to the Amax refinery and there is little reason to expect 
a local refinery to be established. Furthermore, and 
probably of greater importance, the geographical polarisa-
tion of industrial development in Southern Africa strongly 
favours the developed centre. This is particularly true in 
the case of heavy mining equipment and is also true of the 
small scale, less costly inputs. The consumption linkages 
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will be smaller than might be expected largely because 
of the structure of the industry's labour force. The 
benefits stemming from the infrastructure are difficult 
to assess but it appears that, despite the construction 
of the Shashe Dam, the water constraint will remain im-
portant. If the Botswana government is able to overcome 
this constraint the power.plant, the improved communica-
tion facilities, and particularly, the existence of a 
large market might encourage the development of a small 
industrial ·area around Selebi-Pikwe. 
'l'he copper-nickel industry's most significant contribu-
tion lies in the area of government revenue. The mining 
companies, particularly BCL and BRST, have been granted 
significant concessions, although the tax rate applicable 
to BCL, BCL (Sales) and BRST is somewhat high~r than the 
rate applied to other companies. The following table 
illustrates the government sector's dependence on the 
mining sector. 
'l'ABLE 12. 10 
Source 
Source of Government Recurrent Revenue 
Plan Period (1973 - 1978) - (R million) 
Amount Per cent 
Mining and Associated Revenue 68,5 29,2 
Customs, Excise and Sales Duties 99,8 42,6 
Other Sources 66,0 28,2 
234,3 100,0 
Source: National Development Plan, 1973 - 78, Table 4.4. 
The above table aggregates the contribution made by the 
entire mining sector. The Diamond industry's share will 
be significant23 and probably half of the total will 
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be attributable to the Selebi-Pikwe project. Moreover a 
large portion of.t:he revenue accruing in the form of 
customs, excise and sales duties constitutes taxation 
levied on imports required by the Selebi-Pikwe project. 
Furthermore, the governments dependence on the mining 
sector as a source of revenue is expected to increase 
markedly. 
TABLE 12.11 
; Mining Year Projects 
(1) 
1973/74 5 981 
1974/75 9 486 
1975/76 15 617 
1976/77 18 854 
1977/78 18 540 
% growth 32,7 p. annum 
Projected Central Government Revenue from 
Domestic Sources 1973/74 to 1977/78 
(R '000) 
Customs, Excise Other Total (1) as % 
and Sales Duties Sources of (4) 
(2) (3) (4) (5) 
20 941 10 810 37 732 15,9 
22 830 1 1 891 44 207 21'5 
116 906 13 080 45 603 34,2 
1 7 345 14 388 50 587 37,3 
21 740 15 827 56 107 33,0 
0,9 10,0 10,5 
Source: National Development Plan, 1973 - 78, Table 4.3. 
The implications of this dependence will be re-examined 
in the concluding chapter. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 12 
l With the exception of the Railways which is controlled 
by Rhodesia Rail. This is an important factor account-
ing for the poor localisation record for the transport 
and communication sector. 
2 A senior BCL official informs me that despite the 
fact that BCL offer its unskilled miners a slightly 
higher wage than is available in the South African 
mining sector many Batswana actually prefer to seek 
employment on the South African mines. 
This might be ·explained by the higher non-cash wage 
available in South Africa, or by the allegedly poor 
conditions of employment prevailing in the Selebi-
Pikwe mine. 
3 The data regarding wages - skilled and unskilled -
is summarised in Table D.l of the Manpower Report. 
The average wage conceals the large differentials 
referred to above and it is not useful to reproduce 
the table here. 
4 See Ghai, D. P. and National Policy on Incomes, 
Employment, Prices and Profits. Government Paper 
No. 2 of 1972. 
5 The Manufacturing sector is dominated by the Botswana 
Meat Commission. A O,l elasticity of demand might 
be realistic in the case of the BMC but it will 
not be realistic in the case of small scale industry • 
. 6 A comment in the Government White Paper (No. 2 of 
1972) outlining the incomes policy surely justifies 
an absolute reduction of certain wages. It notes 
that" ... administrative, managerial, and profes-
sional people receive basic local salaries (exclud-
ing expatriate inducements) which are as high as, 
or, in the case of young university graduates, even 
higher than comparable rates in highly develdped 
countries" (para 10). 
7 See also Government Paper No. 2 of 1972, paras. 25 - 27. 
8 Although one cannot help suspecting that the recent 
wage increase is prompted, in part, by the impending 
national elections. 
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9 The Industrial Development Corporation of South 
Africa have lent BCL R 13,5 million in the form of 
an export credit. 
10 The Mazazuru, a sect from Rhodesia, have a large 
stake in the sale of fresh foodstuffs. They are 
well known as informal traders in most parts of 
Botswana. 
11 The Brigades are self-financing, co-operative 
organisations which attempt to provide training 
and employment to primary school leavers, whilst 
simultaneously engaging in production. They have 
been established in several rural centres in 
Botswana and are engaged in, inter alia, farming, 
construction, electrical work, textiles, etc. The 
Brigade movement was initiated by members of the 
Serowe community. See van Rensburg. 
12 Most of the information in this section is drawn 
from the agreements between the Government and 
CIDA (dd. 16/11/70), the World Bank (30/6/71) and 
US AID (30/6/71); the Reports of the Shashe 
Project Management Unit; an unpublished document 
of.the Shashe Project Management Unit entitled 
"Shashe Project Infrastructure". 
13 Note that another important factor influencing 
the choice of location is that with the power unit 
situated at the mine the waste heat steam from 
the mining operations can be used to generate a 
part of the power supply. 
14 Additional skills are, of course, only beneficial 
if they are employed in productive activity. Most 
of the workers employed in the construction of the 
mine and the infrastructure have been laid off and 
many of them have not found other employment. This 
would suggest that the pecuniary externalities are 
unable to "accommodate" thetechnological externali-
ties - see chapter 9. 
15 "The Shashe Project in North East Botswana" - paper 
of the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, 
July 1973. 
16 Of course, dividends are not determined directly by 
the size of the profits. It is an internal company 
decision and other priorities may determine the 
dividend declaration. 
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17 Matte Sales Agreement between BCL and BCL (Sales) 
Limited dd. 1st March 1972. 
18 Sales Agreement (Refined Nickel, Cop~er, Cobalt, 
and other Metals) between BCL (Sales) Limited 
and Metallgesellschaft AG dd. 22nd Noverober 1971. 
19 Metal Sales Agency Agreement between BCL (Sales) Ltd 
and RST International Incorporated dd. 1st March 1972. 
20 As noted in chapter 10, BRST's borrowings have in-
creased substantially in recent months. As at 30th 
June 1974 loans totalled R 101,5 million, an increase 
of more ::.than R 25 million since DeceJT1ber 197 3. Amax 
and Anglo are probably responsible for just under 
half of the total. 
2ll The 11 operating profit margin" is basically the 
difference between the revenue from sales and the 
costs of production. For a definition of the latter 
see the Selebi-Pikwe Tax Agreement Ratification Act, 
Part I. 
22 See Anglo American Corporation, Annual Report 1972, 
p. 37. 
23 Estimated at R 28 million. 
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CHAPTER 13 
The Value Retained 
13.1 Introduction 
Chapter 12 was concerned primarily with assessing the 
value added by the copper-nickel industry. For obvious 
reasons it has been impossible to operate with reliable 
statistical measures although extensive use has been 
made of several statistical projections. 
Thus far it has been ascertained that the average wage 
in the mining sector will be relatively high and thus, 
despite the relatively small size of the sector's labour 
force, the total waqe bill will be considerable. Further-
more, it appears that the mining sector's expenditure on 
intermediate goods will be considerable, not only in the 
initial construction period but throughout the course of 
their operations - the government estimates that in 1978 
the Selebi-Pikwe mines will spend approximately R 8 mil-
lion on intermediate goods. The previous chapter stressed 
the importance of the revenue that will accrue to the 
government as a result of the Selebi-Pikwe project, con-
stituting, as it does, a significant portion of total 
government receipts. No attempt has been made to 
estimate the size of the companies' profits - implicitly 
it has been assumed that BCL will realise substantial 
profits from the Selebi-Pikwe mine. The estimated size 
of the dividend indicates expectations of a healthy profit 
as, indeed does the expected size of government revenue 
which is crucially, although by no means entirely, 
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determined by the size of the profits. It must be acknow-
ledged that the profit expectations are extremely hapha-
zard and open to doubt - the exercise of profit projection 
has been rendered all the more dubious by the constant 
technical problems experienced at Selebi-Pikwe and the 
consequent cost escalations. 
Therefore, the primary concern thus far has been with 
value added. This chapter concentrates upon the question 
of value retained, that is, with the foreign exchange 
content of the value added. Much of what is dealt with 
in this chapter will have already been implicit in 
previous chapters and, for the most part, this chapter 
will serve to emphasise particular aspects of chapter 12. 
13.2 ~h~-~~~~~n~1-~EE2Yni§_:_~n_Qy~fe!1_E~!~E~EiiY~ 
Although this chapter is concerned primarily with examin-
ing individual components of the value added by the mining 
sector, it is useful to obtain an overview of the external 
accounts - both thecurrent and capital accounts - and to 
examine the contribution made by the mining sector within 
this framework. 
The foreign trade statistics are extremely unreliable 
but they do indicate the important part played by mining 
development in the level of exports and imports. 
Table 13.l speaks for itself. The export value of the 
mining sector's output far exceeds that· of any other 
sector and its share of total export value ts expected 
to increase during the period under review. Table 13.2 
is more difficult to interpret. The value of imports re-
quired by the mining sector fluctuates considerably. 
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TABLE 13.1 Past and Projected Exports (R million) 
Financial Livestock Minerals Others Total ( 3) as % Year Products of (5) 
(1) (2) ( 3) (4) (5) (6) 
1971/72 17,0 11,7 2,3 31,0 37,7 
1972/73 21,0 19,0 2,7 42,7 44,5 
1973/74 23,0 38,0 3,5 65,5 58,0 
1974/75 24,4 85,0 4,1 113,5 74,9 
1975/76 26,0 90,0 5,0 121,0 74,3 
1976/77 27,4 95,0 7,1 129,5 73,4 
1977/78 29,0 100,0 10,0 139,0 71,9 
Source: National Development Plan, 1973 - 78, Table 1.14 
TABLE 13.2 Past and Projected Net Imports (R million) 
Pinancial Net Mining Sector (3) as % 
Year Imports Imports of (2) 
(1) (2) ( 3) (4) 
1969/70 34,3 n.a. -
11970/71 44,8 n.a. -
1971/72 62,7 n.a. -
1972/73 85,1 n.a. -
1973/74 83,4 46,0 55,2 
1974/75 85,9 7,7 9,0 
1975/76 96,l 4,5 4,7 
1976/77 106,5 13,1 12,3 
1977/78 119,6 28,2 23,6 
Source: National Development Plan, 1973 - 78 and 
Ministry of Finance and Development Planning. 
' 
l· 
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In 1973/74 it has been estimated that mining imports 
comprised more than half of total imports, and that in 
1975/76 the mining sector will account for less than 
5 per cent of total imports. The volume of imports in 
any particular year depends on the new developments 
taking place within the mining sector. In 1.1973/74 the 
activity at Selebi-Pikwe accounted for the high level 
of imports. In 1977/78 the level of mining imports. is 
expected to be noticeably high which is probably a result 
of the expected requirements of the mine at Selebi and 
possibly the development of the Sua Pan deposits. 
The development of the mining sector not only affects 
the external accounts via its impact on the export and 
import of goods but also through its impact on the capital 
account and, of course, as a result of the remission of 
investment income to the foreign shareholders. The Balance 
of Payments estimates, reproduced below, summarise the 
impact of the mining development on the external accounts. 
Section D of the table is equivalent to the changes in 
the level of foreign reserves in a country with a Central 
Bank. 
In 1971/72 the large deficit on current account was offset 
by the inflow of capital. This capital inflow is attribut-
able almost entirely to the development of the mining 
sector - the loans to government are largely in respect 
of the Shashe Project and private investment refers 
almost entirely to the copper-nickel industry. By 1977/78 
the growth of the mining sector, particularly Selebi-Pikwe, 
will give rise to a substantial surplus on the trade account 
but the net remission to foreign investors is expected 
to offset the trade surplus. The capital account surplus 
is expected to decrease from R 47 million in 1971/72 to 
R. l million in 1977/78 - by 1977/78 the repayments on the 
loans in respect of the mining investments will have comrrenced. 
- 250 -
TABLE 13.3 Balance of Payments Estimates, 1971/72 
and 1977/78 (R million) 
1971/72 1977/78 
A. Goods and Services 
Export of goods less imports, 19 43 adjusted for duty content -
Net services and investment income - 22 .., 53 
Net goods and services balance - 41 - lC 
B. Unreguited Transfers 
Government 5 lC 
Private 3 ~ ~ 
Current Account Balance - 33 3 
c. ca;eital Account 
Loans to Government 11 15 
Private Investments and Loans 36 . - u 
Overall Balance 14 4 
D. tJ,onetar:t Sector 
Net changes in foreign assets of 8 financial institutions -
Net imports of notes and coins 2 4 
Errors and omissions 4 
' Source: National Development Plan 1973 - 78, Table 1.17 
It is difficult to arrive at any firm conclusions on 
the basis of these figures. We might extract and project 
capital inflows and compare these with loan servicing 
charges and the remission of investment income to foreign 
shareholders. Although the reliability of the statistical 
projections would be highly questionable we might arrive 
at an approximate estimate, and thus assess whether 
Botswana emerges as a net loser or earner of foreign 
exchange as a result of the project. But the relevance 
of an exercise of this nature is questionable. Chapter 12 
indicates that the inflow of capital into the mining sector 
is productive insofar as it combines with other factors of 
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production and realises a certain surplus - wages are 
paid, taxes and other statutory charges are levied, and 
profits are earned. A certain portion of this added 
value will be remitted abroad and it is with this issue 
that the remainder of this chapter is concerned. 
The value added and retained by the mining sector will 
not be affected directly by the origin of the material 
inputs consumed in the productive process. If we are to 
assess the overall impact of the growth of the .:copper-
nickel industry it will be important to determine the 
share of expenditure on material inputs that is incurred 
locally. 
The Ministry of Finapce and Development Planning estimates 
that the mining sector consumed intermediate goods to the 
value of R 5,5 million in 1971/72 and it is estimated that 
this will increase to R 12,l_million in 1977/78. The 
Selebi-Pikwe mines will account for approximately R 8 mil-
lion of the 1977/78 total. An unofficial estimate suggests 
that R 3 million to R 4 million of this expenditure will 
be incurred locally. This would appear to be highly 
optimistic particularly as the mines will have to con-
tinue importing coal from South Africa. Chapter 12 indicates 
that, for a variety of reasons, most of the expenditure 
on intermediate commodities will be incurred abroad. -
particularly heavy mining equipment and machinery, and 
also the smaller less costly mining inputs such as protec-
tive clothing. In fact, until Morupule coal is purchased, 
it would be optimistic to suggest that more than 15 per 
cent to 20 per cent of this expenditure will be incurred 
locally. Most of the local expenditure will be incurred 
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in the construction sector or in the purchase of building 
equipment, in the purchase of industrial gas from the 
plant that will open at Pikwe, and in the purchase of 
water, power and transportation. 
13.4 ~es~2-~~g_§e~eE!~2 
Wages and salaries will be remitted abroad in the form 
of savings and in the form of consumption of imported 
commodities. 
Table 13.4 is an estimate of earnings accruing to foreign 
workers. 
'£ABLE 13. 4 Estimated Earnings of Foreign Workers 
1977/78, 1983/84 - 1973/74 prices, 
R million 
Sector 1977/78 1983/84 
... -.~ 
Mining and Quarrying 3,1 8,4 
Building 1,9 5,0 
Trading, Hotels, Restaurants 0,2 0,5 
Transport and Communications 1,9 4,6 
Financial Institutions 0,5 1,2 
Centr:al Government n.a. na. 
7,6 16,7 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Development Planning 
Selebi-Pikwe will account for approximately 65 per cent 
of the mining sectors1977/78 total, that is, approximately 
R. 2 million and approximately 50 per cent of :.the 1983/84 
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total, that is,·~ 4,2 mil~ion. It is estimated th~t 50 per 
cent of the earnings of foreign workers accrue in the form 
of bonuse~ and gratuities usually paid on expiry of their 
contract. Most of this Will be remitted abroad in the form 
of savings. A small :portion of' the wages and salaries 
components mi~ht be remitted in the form of savings but 
most of .it will be spent on imported consumer goods -
locally produced fresh foodstufts will be purchased, a 
certain amount of entertainment, schooling, but most con-
sumer :r;iecessities, furniture, clothing, processed food-
stuffs and.the like wJll be impprteQ.. It is not unrealistic 
to·expect at least 50 p~r cent to 60 per cent of the wages 
arid salaries component of expatriate earning to be remitted 
abroad in the purc.Qase of imported consumer goods~ This 
coupled with the high proportion.of bonuses a11d gratuities 
paid abroad me~ns that forei~n workers will remit 
approximately 70 per cent of their total earnings abroad. 
The foreign exchange content1 of the earnings of Botswana 
nationals will not be as high - remission abroad in the 
fo~ of savings will be low~ ~ut expendituFe on import~d 
consµmer goo9s will be substantial. The high income 
. earners' import propensity will be only slightly lower 
than tpat of their expatriate counterparts, although the 
import propensity of ~he unskilled wor~ers will be insig-
, 
nif.1,cant. Both hi~h i:qcome an,d low income employees will 
remit a portion of their earnings to the rural areas -
both in the form of investment arid in order to bolster 
the cons\Urlptiop of their families living in the tribal 
villages. This will .lower the foreign exohan,ge content 
of their earnings. 
13.5 Profits and Interest 
-----------------~--
TABLE 13.5 Interest Paid and Profits Remitted 
1977/78, 1983/84 - 1973/74 price~ 
(R million) 
I 
Sector 1977/78 . 1983/84 
Mining and Quarrying 20,2 36,3 
Building· 6,1 16,2 
•rraqing, Hotel, Restaurants 1,2 2,8 
'l'ransport and Comm~nication 1,9 4,6 
Financial Institutions 1,4 3,2 
Central Government 3,0 6,0 
TOTAL 33,8 68,1 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Development Planning 
.It is not·clear wh~ther Table 13.5 refers t9 profit and 
interest remitte9- abroad or to profit and interest re.,. 
mitted to all shareholders and lenders. However, compar-
ing the p+ofi t fig.ures in the above table with the pre-tax 
profit figures of Table 11.2 it appears that Table 13.5 
refers to remissions abroad. In any event all interest 
will be paid abroad and 85 per cent of profits remitted 
by Selebj.-Pikwe mining companies will be remitted to :: 
foreign shareholders. 
It is reasonable to assume that all interest payments 
abroad are made in respect of the Selebi-Pikwe project -
this is confirmed by.Table 11.2. Selebi-Pikwe will 
account for appIFoximately one-half Qf the profit :r;e-
missions estimated in Table 13.5 - the copper-nickel 
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industry's share 9f profit remissions is likely to be 
somewhat greater in 1983/84 than in 1977/78. In any event 
it appears than the foreign excpange content of the 
~nterest payment will be 100 per cent and the foreign 
exchange coptent of profits remitted in the form of · 
dividends will be 85 per cent. It might pe argue9 that 
a certain portion of the profits will be reinvested in 
the further development of the copper-nickel industry. 
It is likely that the companies will wish to finance 
future expansion by +aising loans or ipcreasing the 
equity capital - interest repayments are a useful 
channel of profit remission arid, given that dividends 
a:i::e a taxfree form of profit remission, it is unlikely 
that the company will reinvest profits which may be 
remitted a~road so inexpensively. 
l3.6 Government Revenue 
l ---------------~--
It is impossible to estimate with any Q.19gree of accuracy 
the foreign exchange content of the revenue which accrues 
to the government from the miniztg sector. It is r~ason- . · 
able to expect that the complex task of administering a 
l~rge scale, sophisticated mining sectorwill necessitate, 
as it has done, the use of some foreig?'), personn.el and 
. equivment. 3 . 
13.7 §E!!!ill~!Y 
It is evident that there will be a significant dive~gence 
between value added ~nd value retained, and this divergence 
is attributable to the high foreign exchange content of 
the wages and salaries and profit and interest components 
of value added. 
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As noted in t~e introductor¥ chapter Botswan~ doe~ not . 
face a Balance Qf Payments or foreign exchange con~ 
straint in the usual sense. Nevertheless by continually 
. '. ' . 
operating a deficit on their external accounts they will 
pecrease the money supply at a time when they might wish 
t;.o inject additional supplies of money into._ th~ economy. 
E'urthermore, remission of foreign exchange outside the 
ste:rling area requires the permissiqn of the South African 
authorities - the South African authorities h~ve refused 
to guarantee that they.will provide foreign exchange 
.for remission of profits to the United St.atei;; i;;hare-
holders. This problem has been overcome by an agreement 
between Metallgesell$chaft and Am~x. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 13 
1 The term "foreign exchange content" effectiv~ly 
refers to that part of the value added remit~ed 
abroad. The term is used interchangeably with 
"foreign exchange requirement" - see chapter ~· 
2 Alt;.hough in so far as saving takes the form of 
increased bank balances a large port~on 9f the 
savings will be remitted abroad - se~ chapter 
14, below. 
3 It might be possible to estimate the foreign exchange 
content of government revenue in general. It is 
more diffic;::ult·to estimate the foreign exchange 
content o~ the government revenue accruing ~rom 
the mining sector. We would have to estimate. the 
additional foreign exchange required by the 
government as a result of the development of the 
:mining sector. 
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CHAPTER 14 
The Distribution of Income 
14.l ~BE~29Y£Ei2~ 
The introductory chapter broadly outlines the inequities 
of the distribution of income in Botswana. Ch,apter 11 
notes the government's growing concern with this problem 
and it is thus extremely important to examine thE? impact 
which the development of the mining sector will have on 
the distribution of income. 
Official concern is directed primarily at the income gap 
existing between the urban and rural sectors. However, 
within each of these sectors there is considerable 
disparity between:the earnings of the. highest and lowes~ 
paid workers. I will argue that the developme;mt of til:lf,: 
mining sector may affect the inter-sectoral gap (urban-
rural) and the intra-sectoral gaps (urban-urban, and 
possibly rural-rural) . Once again m~py of the arguments 
' 
which will be detailed below will have been raised in 
Chapter 12 but given the marked disparities in earnings 
and the growing official concern it appears that the. 
question of distribution is of sufficient importance 
to warrant explicit attention. 
14.4.~es~2L-~IDE12Ym~n~_eu9_Eh~_Q!2s~!£Y~!2n_2~_!n22m~ 
·chapter 12 outlined the wage and employment po~icies 
prevailing in the copper-nickel industry, and the analysi~ 
reveals a clear division within the mine's laboµr force. 
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On the one hand there are the high income skilled em~loyees. 
This group is expatriate dominated and their level of 
earnings is determined on the inter.national market. A 
distinction is drawn between the wages (or salaries) of 
this group of employees and their total earnings and 
I 
although their wage levels are expected to c<,:>J;1form to 
the relevant government scales it appears that they are 
markedly higher than those pertaining ;i.n any sec~or of 
the economy. Table 12.3 indicates that 52,9 per cent 
of the mining sector~ skilled labour force earn a wage 
in excess of R 150 per month. 
On the other hand, the mines employ a large number of 
workerswho, for the purposes of this analysis, have been. 
qefined as unskj,lle~, although many of these employees 
·will have acquired some experience and tra;i.ning on the 
·South African mines. Their average wage is somewhat higher 
than the ayerage wage of the unskilled workers emp1oye9 
in ct.her sectors. of the economy, with the .exception of 
the transport sector. 
a) Th~ high wage "elite" 
The possib~lity that the mining sector will act as a 
wage leader has been discussed in previous chapters, 
and the recent increases granted to the civil service 
bear out th~s argument. If the high wages paid in 
min~ng do set the national wage level the mining sector 
will nurture the growth of a small highly paid elite 
which, in the initial stage, will be dominated by 
expatriates although, as localisation proceeds, w~ll 
come to be dominated by Botswana nationals. As. p9inted 
out in Chapter 7 there are several arguments whicJt might 
justify the creation of a national elite and these must 
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be examined within the context of the Botswana economy. 
Firstly, Botswana, like most LDCs, is severely constrain-
ed by a shortage of domestic savings and it might be 
argued that the existence of a national elite will 
assist in overcoming this constraint. This argument 
may be supported within limits - it is likely that the 
highly paid nationals will devote a substantial portion 
of their earnings to improvement and development of their' 
rural interests and, in this sense, the creation of ~ 
national elite may raise.the level of investment. But 
· this type of investment will not be very significant 
in a national context - the sav:j.ngs of one man applied 
to his individual rural holding are not likely to stimul-
ate growth very significantly and serves to entrench 
the privileged position of the high wage earne+s. Although 
I do not know of any attempt to measure this phenomenon, 
one might expect a marked overlap between the privileged 
members of the rural and urban sectors. If the "rein-
vestment" argument is to be supported financial inter-
mediaries must be developed in order to attract the 
savings of the high wage earners and make them avai~able 
to borrowers who will invest in the development of a 
small scale, employment creating industrial sector. These 
conditions do not exist in Botswana. 
Financial intermediation is dominated by tpe commercial 
banking sector which is controlled by the Standard Bank 
and Barclays Bank International. Botswana's membership 
of the Rand currency area complicates attempts to restrict 
the oubflow of savings and the Commercial Banking sector 
appears to be engaging in progressive credit destruction 
rather than credit creation. 
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TABLE 14.1 
31st March 
31St II 
31st II 
31St II 
31st II 
31st II 
31st II 
31st II 
.1st January 
% growth per 
Deposits and Advances of the Conunercial 
Banks, 1965 - 1972 (R million) 
Deposits Advances % 
1965 5 581 5 132 92,0 
1966 8 166 6 488 79,5 
1967 9 640 5 454 56,6 
1968 12 591 7 048 56,0 
1969 13 038 6 598 50,6 
1970 20 136 10 137 50,3 
1971 15 951 13 092 82,1 
1972 22 366 13 153 58,8 
1973 34 834 15 889 45,6 
annum 26,7 15,7 
Source: National Development Plan 1973 - 78, Table 1.16. 
From an examination of the above table one is torced to 
conclude that the Conunercial Banks rechannel Botswana 
savings to South African borrowers. The g9vernment has 
attempted to reverse this flow by the formation of the 
National Development Bank which, by the 31st December 
1972, had advanced loans amounting to approxi~ately 
R 1,4 million. The National Development Bank does not 
accept deposits from individual savers. A Post Office 
savings scheme has been initiated and ·by February 1973 
the amount deposited in the Post Office totalled R 573 194. 
Several Thrift and Loan Societies have be~n established 
and in 1971 a Building Society conunenced operations in 
Botswana. Institutions of this namure are likely to 
attract the savings of the low income earners but are 
not likely to attract savings of the high wage elite. 
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The conclusion one draws from the above analysis is that 
the propensity of the highly paid wage earners to rein-
vest their earnings in Botswana is low. This does not 
necessarily stem from the individual wage earner designed-
ly investing his earnings abroad, but is rather to be 
attributed to Botswana's position in the Rand currency 
area and to the dominance exercised by foreign ownea 
banks over the Commercial Banking sector. 
Secondly, it is argued that the high wages of the national 
elite will stimulate consumption •. Thi~ argument has been 
discussed in some detail. I have argued that the consump-
tion of a high. wage elite will be directed towards imported 
consumer goods - the level of demand for domestically 
produced commodities, particularly from the manufactur-
ing sector, will not be stimulated significantly and 
the foreign exchange content of the high wage elite will 
be considerable. This is true of Botswana - the output 
of the local manufacturing sector is small and is directed 
primarily to the tourist and export markets. Certain 
cheap consumer goods are manufactured in Gaborone and 
Francistown, for example cheap textiles and furniture, 
but these are not likely to attract the money of the high 
wage earners. 
Thus, both of the arguments which might be used in support 
of the creation of a national elite do not apply in the 
Botswana situation. How will the creation of a crass of 
high wage earners affect the lower paid workers in 
the cash economy? 
b) The Urban Sector Wage Gap 
We have seen that the high wages offered by the min~ng 
sector may have the effect of raising the general level 
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of skilled wages in the economy. How will this affect 
the wage gap? 
It appears that the wage gap in the mining sector is not 
markedly more pronounced than that of the other sector$ 
of the economy largely because of the relatively high 
unskilled wage available in the mining sector. Never-
theless the wage gap is sufficiently marked to justify 
the governments concern and would become more serious if 
the skilled wage offered in the mining sector was to 
. 1 
force· up the wages offered in other sectors. Fl,lrthermore, 
it is not only the wages of the highly skilled highest 
paid workers that will rise in response to an increase 
in wages in the mines, but also those employees whose jobs 
require somewhat less education and training - the senior 
clerical workers, junior management, artisans, in general 
those earning in the R 150 to R 300 earnings bracket (13 
per cent of the mines skilled workforce) - who might use 
the wages of the highest paid workers as their reference 
point. -
TABLE 14.2 Average Cash Wages of hon-Batswana Skilled 
Employees and Batswana Unskilled Employees -
by sector - April/May 1972 (Rand) ' 
Sector non-Batswana Batswana 
skilled unskilled 
Mining and Quarrying 460 47 9,8 . 1 . 
Manufacturing 328 31 10,5 . 1 . 
Construction 345 45 7,6 . 1 . 
Commerce 270 30 9 . 1 . 
Transport 320 51 6,2 : 1 
Central Government 249 28 8,8 : l 
Average all sectors 329 39 8,4 . 1 . 
Source: see Tables 12.4 and 12.5 above. 
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This wage gap should be narrowed from the top down, thi?.t 
is, by decreasing the level of wages of the highest paid 
workers. If no positive steps are taken to narrow the 
wage gap increasing unionisation and inc~eased awareness 
of the disparity in earnings will force up the unskilled 
wage thus widening the gap between the rural and urban 
sectors. The mining sector will be able to absorb an 
increase in the unskilled wage rate, but the small scale 
manufacturing sector will be hard pressed to absorb an. 
increase in its wage bill. 
c) The Rural Sector 
Scant attention has been paid to the effect which the 
development of the copper-nickel industry will have on 
the rural sector. It appears that an important distinc-
tion must be drawn between the long run and short run 
effects - the short run impact will be felt primarily 
in the subsistence sector, whilst in the long run the 
effect on commercial agriculture must be considered. 2 
In the long run the development of the mining sector 
could provide a significant stimulus to commerci~l crop 
production. This was certainly the experience of the 
Zambian economy where the Anglo and RST mine compounds 
not only provided the agricultural sector with a large 
mark_et, but, in addition, the companies provided part 
of the financial and technological input required by 
the agricultural sector. The Selebi-Pikwe mines are 
not likely to provide as significant a stimulus to the 
Botswana agricultural sector. Firstly, there are no 
mine compounds and the mining company wilf not be a 
large purchaser of food. Secondly, the Selebi-Pikwe 
area is able to draw on the developed South African 
and, particularly, Rhodesian agricultural sectors. 
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Finally, :.the development of arable agriculture suffers 
from a severe water constraint in Botswana and presupposes 
considerable research activity anq expenditure befo~e it 
can be developed on a wide scale. The quality of the 
produce of the agricultural sector would have tq be 
improved and this would require finance, and, more par-
. ticularly the use of scarce administrative and organisa-
tional resources. The financial component, it might be 
argued, is provided by the revenue from mining, but the 
importance of the organisational component shoulO. not 
be underestimated because, it appears that, in certain 
instances, the rural sector is capable of producing a 
surplus but not of marketing it. This certainly appears 
to be the case with milk production in Mmadinari, the 
large village borde~ing on Selebi-Pikwe, where, by all 
accounts, the villagers are capable of producing a milk 
surplus but there is no organisation capable of treating 
and marketing the surplus. The Serowe Brigades 3 have 
established a market in Selebi-Pikwe which will market 
the output of the various Brigades thus providing a 
link with the rural sector. 
What of the immediate short term impact on the subsistence 
sector. Most of the mines' workforce retain strong links 
with the rural areas and generally maintain a defined 
economic interest in their tribal villages. Part of the 
earnings of these workers will be remitted to their 
tribal villages - the remittances of the low income mine~s 
will generally be used to bolster consumption but, in 
certain instances, may constitute a small source of 
investment funds. The remittances of the high income 
earners will constitute a greater source of inv~stment 
funds. This will enable the high wage earner to improve 
and supplement his rural assets, particularly his holding 
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of livestock. The high income earners in the urban sector 
will often come from economically privileged rural back-
grounds - it was this source of privilege which enabled 
them to attend school and possibly university in the 
first place and the high income earned as a result 
thereof will allow them to consolidate the ba~e of their 
privilege. Moreover, it is these people who stand to 
benefit most if the long term stimulus to commercial 
agriculture is realised. 4 In this sense then, ther';develop ... 
ment of the mining sector, the high wages it pays and 
encourages, will influence the intra-rural income gap 
by consolidating the position of those already at the 
top of the rural income scale. 
What of the short term effects on the poorer subsistence 
farmers? As noted above the wages paid to the miner will 
bolster the consumption level of .. :the rural dependents 
and could possibly be used as a source of investment 
funds. It does remove an able bodied man (and possibly 
his family) from the rural area although his remittances 
compensate, in part, for his absence and, of course, he 
will try to ensure that he returns to the +ural areas at 
harvest time. But, over and above those actually employed 
on the mine, the Selebi-Pikwe operations have attracted 
thousands of men to the town who are unable to find 
work of any nature and who remain totally dependent upon 
the rural sector. 
Finqlly, the wage level of the unskilled miners at 
Selebi-Pikwe will have to be monitored carefully by 
the authorities. If the planners attempt to narrow the 
urban sector wage gap by allowing unskilled wages to rise 
from their present level the urban-rural income gap will 
widen and probably result in an increased flow of migrants 
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to Selebi-Pikwe and to the urban areas in general. 
Furthermore, if the government attempts to establish 
small scale rural industries it cannot afford wage 
c~mpetition at the unskilled level. 
It is too early to assess accurately the distributional 
implications of the Selebi-Pikwe project. However, it 
appears that the skilled wage level prevailing in the 
mining sector will be the crucial determining variable. 
This will effectively establish the size of the inter-
urban wage gap, not only in the mining sector, but in 
the modern sector as a whole. There would appear to be 
no justification for the creation of a high wage national 
elite - the reinvestment coefficient of the high income 
earners will be low and a large portion of their con-
sumption expenditure will be directed at imported goods • 
. The government appears to favour a reduction of the 
intra-urban wage differential by ensuring that private 
enterprise and trade unions exercise restraint in calling 
for and granting wage increases. There is, however, 
likely to be pressure from the low paid workers - the 
unskilled but, more particularly, the less skilled, 
middle income employees - to take positive steps to 
narrow the wage gap. If the government attempts to narrow 
the urban wage differential by allowing the unskilled and 
lower skill level wages to drift upwards it will widen 
the urban-rural wage gap possibly accelerating the flow 
of rural-urban migration. 
I have attempted to examine the impact that the develop-
ment of the mining sector is likely to have on the agri-
cultural sector. In the long run the Selebi-Pikwe project 
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and the large cash market it establishes may stimulate 
the development of commercial crop production but there 
are factors which will reduce the strength of this effect 
and inhibit the development of a large scale commercial 
crop sector. In the short run Selebi-Pikwe might consti-
tute a market for the neighbouring rural areas although 
considerable financial and administrative resources will 
be required in order to improve and market the surplus 
output of the agricultural sector. 
The short run impact on agriculture will be influenced 
by the distribution of income within the modern sector. 
The high wage of the skilled urban employees will enable 
them to improve and supplement their agricultural assets 
thus concentratingruralwealth and urban income in the 
same hands. The urban-rural differential has encouraged 
a large migration from the rural areas to the urban 
areas - many of those migrating will be unable to find 
employment as is evidenced by the growth of a large 
squatter village at Selebi-Pikwe. 
I have not examined the possibility of interest group 
alliances and their impact on government policy. In order 
to do this one would require a far more intimate under-
standing of Botswana~ political economy than an outside 
observer could hope to achieve. But certain suggestions 
do emerge from the analysis. By maintaining a high skilled 
wage the mining company will be able to gain the support 
of a powerful sector of the economy - the educated, the 
wealthy - and this does not only refer to the employees 
of the mining company because, if it is generally acknow-
ledged that competition with the mining sector is setting 
the national wage level, the mining sector will enjoy 
the support of the skilled workers in every sector, not 
- 269 -
least of all the civil service whose salary levels are 
dependent, to a significant degree, on revenue from the 
mining sector. The government's dependence upon the 
mining sector as a source of revenue has been noted and 
will undoubtedly influence government policy - exemption 
from the withholding tax is probably just ~ blatant 
example of the direction in which the mining companies 
may attempt to pressurise the government. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 14 
l The average wage paid to non-Batswana does not 
ref1ect the average skilled wage but the average 
wage of the highest paid workers. This is, 
however, the wage at which these posts would 
be localised. -
2 In· 1971/72 the crop production of the traditional 
farming sector was valued at R 4,9 million, of 
which R 1,5 million was marketed. In the same 
year the freehold farmers sold crop and live-
stock to the value of R 10,l million. Although 
there is no official breakdown of this figure, 
the value of freehold crop production is not 
likely to have exceeded R 2 million. 
3 See Chapter 12, footnote 12. 
4 This argument is disputable. It might be argued 
that commercial crop production in Botswana will 
only be succe~sful if established on a very large 
scale under government control. 
- 271 -
CHAPTER 15 
Sununary and Conclusions 
15.1 Ye!~~-~g9~9_e~9_B~~~!~~g 
Before attempting to draw the final conclusions from 
the analysis I must stress once again that certain of 
the statistical information used is highly unreliable. 
Wherever possible I have used official reports and 
projections but, in several instances, this has been' 
impossible and I have been compelled to rely on un-
official "guestimates". Nevertheless, despite the many 
questions that justifiably may be raised concerning the 
statistics used, it is possible to estimate the contri-
bution which the Selebi-Pikwe mines will make to the 
national and domestic product. Table 15.1 uses as its 
framework the information contained in Table 11.2, 
which are projections made by the Ministry of Finance 
and Development Planning. Several of the statistics 
used by the Ministry are highly questionable - these 
doubts are registered and will modify the conclusions 
reached in Table 15.1. 
The contents of the table below are derived as follows. 
The Ministry estimates (Table 11.2) that wages and salaries 
attributable to the Selebi-Pikwe operations in 1977/78 
will total R 5,9 million. It is further estimated 
(Table 13.4) that in 1977/78 foreign workers in the 
mining sector will earn R 3,1 million. Approximately 
two-thirds of the mining sector's wage force are employed 
at Selebi-Pikwe thus the earnings attributable to Selebi-
Pikwe foreigners will total approximately R 2 million, 
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the remainder, that is R 3, 9 million, will accrme to 
Botswana citizens. !l'he foreign exchange requirement1 
of the expatriate earnings and Batswana earnings is 
estimated at 60 per cent and 25 per cent respectively 
(chapter 13, section 13.4). 
TABLE 15.1 Estimated Expenditures of Selebi-Pikwe 
Mining Companies and their Disposal -
1977/78 (R million) 
• I Expend1 tures. Mean Expenditures 
Foreign on local 
Exchange 2 goods and Requirement services 
% 
(A) (B) (C) 
a) Gross Output 50,0 
b) less Material Inputs 
i) imported 6,4 100 0 
ii) locally produced ~ 0 I , 6 
' i:) Gross Domestic Value 42,0 
I Added 
\ of which: 
~) Wages and Salaries 
' 
i) to expatriates 2,0 60 0,8 
ii) to citizens 3,9 25 2,9 
e) Government Receipts 7,5 JO 6,8 
f) Profits 22,4 85 3,4 
g) Interest 6,2 100 0 
h) Net National Value Added 24,8 
Note: 1) Errors may appear owing to rounding. 
2) "Requirement" is used interchangeably with 
"content". 
The Ministry estimates that 9overnment revenue from Selebi-
Pikwe will total R' 7,5 million in 1977/78 (Table 12.8). 
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This does not include customs duty charged on imports 
for S~lebi-~ikwe. I have not been able to estimate the 
foreign exchange content of government revenue in 
Botswana - Killick, in his survey of the Sierra Leone 
mining sector, estimates that the foreign exchange content 
of the government revenue is 17 per cent and the estimate 
I have used for Botswana is probably somewhat conservative. 
The profit estimate is drawn from Table 11.2. The estimate 
in Table 11.2 is a pre-tax total and the government 
revenue estimate of R 7,5 million has been deducted from 
the profit estimate. 'I'he above table does not include 
any estimate of depreciation. In the 1973 accounts the 
ERST auditors note that over a five year period commencing 
in November, 1973 BCL may, for tax purposes, amortise 
capital costs amounting to approximately R 110 million 
provided that the maximum relief sought in any particular 
year does not exceed more than 75 per cent of the tax 
liability in that year. If a depreciation estimate is 
included the total in Column (A) would not necessarily 
be affected - depreciation.is merely the payment accruing 
to another factor, capital - the profit figure would be 
reduced accordingly and the total would remain the same. 2 
It is reasonable to assume that the Ministry's revenue 
projections take into account the effect of the deprecia-
tion allowance and therefore the total for government 
receipts would not be altered by the inclusion of depre-
ciation. Inclusion of a depreciation estimate would hav~ 
some effect on the total of Column C because the foreign 
exchange content of depreciation will differ from that 
of profits: 3 The estimate of profit's foreign exchan~~ 
content is derived from the proportions in which BCL's 
equity is held. This estimate is open to doubt because 
a certain portion of the profits will be retained and 
reinvested and not remitted to the shareholders. Bear in 
mind that reinvested profits will also have a high foreign 
exchange requirement because additional investment 
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presupposes the purchase of capital equipment from abroad. 
The interest estimate is taken from Table 11.2. 
It is estimated in Table 11.2 that the Selebi-Pikwe mines 
will purchase material inputs to the value of R 8 million 
in 1977/78. The division as between locally produced and 
imported inputs is rationalised in Section 13.3. 
The value added is calculated by deducting the value of 
intermediate goods required in production from gross 
output. The total arived at will be identical to the 
sum of factor payments, in fact, the profit figure will 
usually be a balancing residual item. It is estimated 
that the payment to factors (items (d) - (g)) will total 
R 42,0 million and, given an estimate of R 8 million for 
material input~ the government obviously expects that 
the value of gross output will be R 50,0 million. 
Item (c) is referred to as gross domestic value added 
because it includes factor payments to non-natio.nals. 
The national value added is arrived at by deducting the 
interest payments and 85 per cent of the profit figure. 
If the argument above concerning the depreciation 
allowance is correct, then by deducting profits from 
the gross domestic value added depreciation will also 
have been deducted thereby reducing the gross figure to 
a net total. 4 
Certain of the official estimates contained in Table 15.1 
are likely to be incorrect. The nickel and, pa~ticularly, 
copper prices tend to fluctuate considerably over short 
periods and it is therefore difficult to estimate the 
value of gross output. Nevertheless, the estimate in 
Table 15.1 is probably somewhat conservative. Mining at 
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a rate of approximately 2 000 000 tons per annum, the 
value of gross output might be as high as R 70 million 
or R 80 million. This will result in an increase in 
profits and therefore government revenue. The interest 
estimate would appear to be highly conservative and will 
rise as a result of the increased borrowing by BRST from 
the major shareholders, Anglo and Amax. 
Although there is considerable room for debate as regards 
the absolute magnitudes, it appears that a close examina-
tion of Table 15.1 suggests conclusions similar to those 
arrived at in Section II of the dissertation. When the 
contribution to Gross Domestic Product is used as the 
indicator, the copper-nickel industry's impact on the 
economy is considerable - if the 1977/78 GDP does in fact 
total R 189, 7 million (Table 11. 3) the portion attribut-
able to the copper-nickel industry will amount to appro-
ximately 22 per cent. The contribution to Gross National 
Product is considerably smaller and the difference between 
the two is likely to be significantly larger than that 
suggested by the official estimates for the mining 
sector (Table 11.3). The large depreciation allowance 
means that the contribution to Net National Product will 
be smaller still. Furthermore, when one moves beyond the 
conventional national accounting definitions and takes 
into account the foreign exchange content of the wage and 
salary payments and government revenue the industry's 
impact is diminished further. Moreover, it appears that 
the Lulk of the material inputs required by the industry 
will be purchased abroad. 
\ 
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15~2 ~~~-2~9~E~X!~~-[~S~~E~-=-~-~E~~~-~~~~EX 
The conclusions outlined above are the predictable out-
come of the interplay of a set of factors which Sections 
II and III have attempted to describe and analyse. 
'l'he two important features of the copper-nickel industry 
which have been emphasised by the analysis are: 
l) The corporate structure of the copper-nickel industry. 
The industry is controlled by two large multinational 
\ 
corporations, Anglo American and Amax, both of whom 
control substantial mining interests in, inter alia, 
Southern and Central Africa. The techniques of pro-I 
\ 
duction employed in the industry are therefore predict-
ably capital intensive. Admittedly the range of 
technical choice is very limited, but, even when there 
has been a choice between utilising more or less 
capital intensive techniques of production, the 
company has opted for the more capital intensive 
technique. 
2) Botswana's peripheral status in the Southern African 
region. The special nature of the Southern African 
core-periphery structure accentuates the force of 
the agglomeration economies analysed in Section II. 
Botswana's membership of the Southern African region 
exercises an important influence over every aspect 
of her economic life and considerably modifies the 
impact which the copper-nickel industry will have 
on Botswana. 
The structure of the copper-nickel industry's labour 
force accords closely with that suggested in Section II. 
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1 The capital intensive techniques of production have ensur-
/ ed that the absolute number of workers employed is s·mall l with.a relatively large proportion of high level manpower . 
.• The highly skilled component of the workforce is dominat-
J ed by expatriates whose average wage is considerably 
1 higher than that available in any other sector of the 
f economy. There is a strong likelihood that the wages 
in the mining sector will place an upward pressure on 
the national wage level. The Botswana government have opted 
for a low wage policy. They have attempted to overcome 
the interrelated problem of expatriate dependence and 
high wages by formulating a localisation programme and 
an incomes policy. The mining sector has enjoyed little 
success in localising its skilled workforce. The incomes 
policy stipulates that the wages prevailing in the 
government sector should determine the national wage 
structure. However, salaries available in the mining 
sector exceed those offered by government at almost 
every level and, in order to ensure the success of the 
incomes policy, it will be necessary to decrease the 
skilled wage level of the mining sector. It appears, how-
ever, that Government has responded to the high level 
of wages in mining by raising civil service wages. Un-
skilled wages in the mining sector are also somewhat 
higher than those prevailing in other sectors of the 
economy - the unskilled wage rate is likely to be determin-
ed by the wages prevailing on the South African mines. 
It is difficult to predict the extent to which the develop-
ment of the copper-nickel industry will affect the level 
of skills. At the one extreme the mining sector employs 
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highly skilled workers who will require a high level of 
formal education. Most of these positions will eventually 
be localised - the mining companies are providing bursaries 
and formal training in order to advance its localisation 
programme and thus will assist in raising the skill level 
of the workforce. This does not apply to a great many 
workers and high level manpower salaries offered by the 
mines will probably ensure that the recipients of these 
additional skills will remain within the mining sector. 
The lower level skilled employees will receive a certain 
amount of training, both formal and on-the-job, and th~y 
are likely to be more mobile between sectors. Many of 
the unskilled miners will have worked on the South African 
mines arid their skill level is not likely to be raised 
significantly as a result of the added experience on the 
Botswana mines. 
It should be noted that Table 15.1 does not incorporate 
an estimate of the employment opportunities indirectly 
created by the Selebi-Pikwe mine, although the estimate 
of locally produced inputs does account for part of the 
indirect employment creation. Most of the employment in~i~ 
rectly created by the Selebi-Pikwe mines will be in the 
services sector - domestic servants, shop assistants, 
those required to operate and maintain the various 
municipal services available in the town. The National 
Development Plan estimates a one-to-one ratio between 
direct and indirect employment creation. These is no 
justification for settling on this particular figure, 
and, in any event, the wage bill of those indirectly 
employed will be smaller than those directly employed 
because of the large component of domestic servants and 
the like in the former category. 
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Furthermore, it has been argued that the wage and employ-
ment policy of the copper-nickel industry will exercise 
a strong influence on the distribution of income, parti-
cularly if the high wages offered in the mining sector 
forces up the national wage. The mining sector's wage 
policy will give rise to a small national elite. It is 
difficult to justify the creation of a high wage elite -
the reinvestment coefficient of the high wage earners is 
low, although their relatively high earnings will probab-
ly result in small scale investment in the agricultural 
sector; their consumption habits will be import oriented. 
If the government allows the urban wage gap to narrow by 
sanctioning an increase in low level skilled and unskill-
ed wages the urban-rural earnings gap will widen. Further-
more, if the high wage elite devotes a portion of its 
earnings to accumulating agricultural assets, the high 
wage policy will have the effect of concentrating rural 
and urban wealth in the same hands. 
The probable failure of the copper-nickel industry to 
generate local link industries is also attributable to 
the factors((!) and (2)) outlined above. The capital 
intensive nature of the core industry, that is, the 
copper-nickel industry, presupposes similarly capital 
intensive material inputs. Botswana is not capable of 
producing sophisticated capital equipment and, conceivably, 
might never be in a position to produce equipment of this 
nature. Moreover, as noted in Chapter 12, it is unlikely 
that the smaller less costly requirements of the mining 
sector will be produced in Botswana given the competition 
from South Africa. The Customs Union Agreement does 
permit limited protection but, particularly in the 
field of mining supplies, a Botswana manufacturer will 
have to compete with well established suppliers who have 
- 280 -
benefited from the existence of a large domestic market. 
Furthermore, Anglo and Amax' substantial interests in 
Southern and Central Africa might inhibit the develop-
ment of link industries. It is unlikely that a domestic 
refinery will be established in Botswana without speci-
fic government intervention. 
The infrastructural facilities at Selebi-Pikwe should 
facilitate industrial development in the surrounding area, 
although the Botswana planners will have to overcome the 
' 
water constraint which will persist despite the construc-
tion of the Shashe Dam. However, the additional transport 
and, particularly, power facilities undoubtedly increase 
the prospect of growth in the Selebi-Pikwe-Francistown 
area. 
The copper-nickel industry does provide a market for 
the output of the agricultural sector although finance 
and planning will be needed to link these two sectors. 
The entry of the Brigades into this sphere of activity . 
is to be welcomed. As regards the more distant futu:t.e, 
it is difficult to forsee the copper-nickel industry 
stimulating large scale cash crop production - the m.arket 
created at Selebi-Pikwe will probably be too small to 
justify the expenditure which large scale arable agri-
culture would require. 
· 
1 In general the local multiplier effects - both consumption 
and investment - of the copper-nicke·l industry a·re weak. 
A large portion of the wage bill will be expatriated or 
spent on imported consumer goods; profits will be remitted 
to foreign shareholders; backward and forward linkages 
will be realised in the developed countries - in the case 
of the copper-nickel industry the backward linkages will 
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be realised largely in South Africa, and the forward 
linkages in the United States. 
The importance of the revenue that government derives 
from the industry is accentuated by the weak multiplier 
effects. Moreover, if the government actually enforces 
a low wage policy it is important that the financial 
benefits of a low wage industry do not accrue to the 
mining companies. The mining companies' reinvestment 
coefficient will be low - because of the exemption from 
the withholding tax on dividends and interest it will be 
to the companies advantage to raise any additional finance 
that may be required either by means of a rights issue 
to the existing shareholders or by increased borrowings, 
particularly if the major shareholders or one of their 
subsidiaries act as the lenders. There is no incentive 
to reinvest prof its which may be remitted free of tax to 
foreign shareholders. 
In principle the government appears to have recognised 
this - the tax rate applied to BCL, BCL (Sales) and BRST 
is higher than that applied to other companies. In addi-
tion there is an escalator clause, and the government 
has attempted to inhibit the use of the transfer pricing 
mechanism. On the other hand, the companies.i.have been 
granted significant concessions - they have been exempted 
from the withholding tax, and they have been granted 
extreinely large depreciation allowances which will reduce 
their tax liability in the early years of the mine's life. 
The depreciation concessions invite increased capital 
intensity •. 
Nevertheless there is no attempt to deny the importance 
of mining's contribution to government revenue - Tables 
12.10 and 12.11 clearly spell out governments reliance 
' 
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on this source of revenue. If the growth of the mining 
sector and, therefore, the living standards of those 
dependent upon it, is not to outstrip that of the rest 
of the economy the government will have to inject the 
revenue from the mining sector into the agricultural 
sector and also to the nascent manufacturing sector. 
Chambers and Feldman, in their comprehensive report 
on rural development in Botswana, note that the Botswana 
Government, 
" emphasises the possible social conflict 
arising from increasing income differentials. 
Mining development is welcomed as a means of 
solving the problem of maintaining government 
revenue but it is also seen as a threat to 
social harmony. The response is a policy to 
control the wage levels in the mining and 
urban sectors. Unfortunately this negative 
response will not be effective in producting 
more generally distributive levels of income 
especially in the rural areas, unless it is 
associated with an active policy of encouraging 
the linkages between the mining and urban centres 
with the rest of the local economy" (para 12.6). 
15.3 [~E~!~-Q~y~!2E~~n~ 
In the final analysis the conclusions do not differ 
materially from those arrived at in Section II. The 
scenario is similar - large MNCs dominate the export 
'N. sector and employ capital intensive techniques of produc-
tion. The implications for :-.the Botswana economy closely 
approximate the pattern outlined in Section II - a 
small labour force 'With a relatively high average rate 
of pay, insignificant multiplier effects, and dependence 
upon the revenue derived from the activities of the MNC. 
Where will Botswana go from here? I have carefully 
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avoided discussing policy alternatives - policy of the 
Botswana Government has: ·been examined, and criticised or 
supported, but it has not been possible to outline 
detailed alternatives, and no attempt is made to embark 
on an exercise of this nature at this late stage. It ~s, 
however, important to attempt to predict future policy 
directions. 
It is unlikely that the present government will consider 
expropriation or nationalisation of the copper-nickel 
industry and there is little to suggest that it would 
be a desirable step. The operation of the mine is firmly 
controlled by the mining companies and neither production 
or marketing would be possible if the companies were to 
withdraw their services, and a management contract would 
not necessarily be more favourable than the present 
arrangment. Government will almost certair.ly demand a 
greater share of future mining activity and may negotiate 
an increase in its share of BCL although this is unlikely. 
'l'he planners will undoubtedly attempt to encourage the 
development of link industries. The governme·nt might 
compel the mining companies to reinvest a stipulated share 
of their profits, or purchase a specified portion of their 
inputs in Botswana, thereby encouraging the mining 
companies to establish the link industries. However, 
provisions of this nature are likely to contravene either 
the Master Agreement or the Customs Union Agreement. 
Government will concentrate upon increasing its revenue 
share. Theoretically its movement in this sphere is 
severely limited by the provisions of the Selebi-Pikwe 
I 
Tax Agreement Ratification Act. Clause 9 (I) provides 
\ 
that BCL.will not be subjected to "any unfavourable 
I , 
I 
I 
I 
I 
\ 
\ 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
j 
\ 
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discriminatory legislation in the field of direct or 
indirect taxation". Clause 9 (III) provides that, 
11 to the extent that any amendment or re-
enactment of the current Act together with all 
other such amendments or re-enactments has the 
effect of increasing the liability of BCL to 
income tax by more than a nominal amount over 
that to which BCL would have been liable on 
the basis of this agreement and the current act 
such amendment or re-enactment shall not apply 
to BCL 11 • 
It is unlikely that a blanket clause of this nail:ture 
would prevent the Botswana Government demanding a larger 
share of the mining companies' profits. The government's 
ability to extract a larger portion of the surplus depends 
upon its bargaining strength - the companies have comitted 
large sums of money to the project and will be loathe to 
jeopardise their interest in any way, although, as 
pointed out, even if their interests were to be expro-
priated their technical and managerial services would 
still be required. Botswana is dependent upon the exper-
tise - both technical and managerial - of the mining 
companies and would not be able to operate the mine 
unaided. Furthermore, the Shashe Infrastructure is 
entirely dependent upon aid from multilateral and national 
aid bodies some of whom would undoubtedly suspend the 
loans in the event of what they deem to be a serious 
breach of the contract. Moreover the bargaining power 
of the companies is strengthened by the widespread 
interests that one of its major shareholders, the Anglo 
American Corporation, controls in Botswana - copper-nickel, 
diamonds, coal, brine, are all subject to control by Anglo. 
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Anglo's control over most of the important activity 
in the entire mining sector undoubtedly strengthens 
the bargaining power of BRST and BCL. Finally, the 
government will probably not attempt to amend the contract 
in any significant manner until the current technical 
problems are overcome. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 15 
l It is important to emphasise that "foreign exchange 
requirement" refers to any remittance of funds to 
any country outside Botswana. Botswana does not 
possess foreign exchange reserves as such but the 
money supply is determined by movements in the 
external accounts. 
2 The profit rate appears to be exceptionally high -
profits are 44,8 per cent of gross revenue. The 
profit rate is distorted by the omission of a 
depreciation estimate. The inclusion of the large 
depreciation allowance would probably have the 
effect of distorting the profit rate in the opposite 
direction in the initial years of the project's 
life. 
3 Note that in so far as the depreciation allowance 
is used to replace capital equipment its foreign 
exchange content will be extremely high. 
4 Although, effectively, only 85 per cent of the 
depreciation allowance will have been deducted~ 
.... 
0 
t 
t 
A N G (J l A 
L~ I ,,_" ...... 
W E S T $(JUTH 
\ . 
0 
··~. 
untn S.A. ·Roaci Motor &-rviec 
_ RaHways 
- Bantu Homelc01!s 
. 
l 
\ 
' . . 
. 
-~---
.. 
·············< ..... 
Map /.J I 
L . , 
~ ::-· ~·--... - . - r-. - . -
\)' 
l t . 
. l \.--··. 
\ ·. OR APA 
\ .. \ L ... ,.. . ............. . 
f 
I 
I ) 
( )\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
. ............................ ~~ .. . 
· .. 
...... 
·-. 
258 
\ 
\ 
\ 
-
Mt!in Nt1t1d 
SKOlldary Road 
197} - 7t . ll. 2S"'~ 
v I 
~M:tT, 
34 
BOTSWANA 
LANO TENURE 
k~ Tribal areas 
g State lands 
"d , I tenure c::::J lnd1v1 ua 
MINERAL POTENTIAL OF BOTSWANA. 
: :: : :::::~::::: ::::: ::::::::: ::: : : : ........ . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ 
........................................................ 
• •• • • • 0 o o o o o o o 0 o o. 0 0 0 o 0 o o 0 0 0 0 o o o o o o o o o o 0 o o o o' o' o o o o o 0 o o o 0 o o o o 0 o Io o 
.............................. •.• ......... •.• ..................... . 
.............................................................. ,_~~~ 
................... •.• ....................................... . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Mn 
Large scale m1n1ng complea,either operational 
or 1n advanced gtoQel of deYelopment 
Mop IO·I 
r::-:::1 
~
-D 
A Mineral d!'posl1 kriown '" br econf'rn1colly eaplolloble. 
Area covered by Karroo basalts and/or Kalohori sediments. 
E1.plorat1on by conventional ":'eons Yery difficult 
Ar.ea underlain by those sedim~"tory rockr. of Karroo 
oge with high cool potentiol. 
MokQodikgodi Pons oreo, high eotent1ol for salts. 
Areo where bedrock is neor surfooce Includes most areas 
of high potential for base a metallic mineral deposits. 
210 
Asb 
Cu 
D 
Gyp 
Mn 
Salll 
Asbestos 
Copper 
Diamonds 
Gyps~m 
Soda o sh, salt, salt coke 
and potosll 
0 10 
ROAD & 
RAILWAY 
SCAl.I! 111 l11t 
40 Ml IO 100 
:' ;!·. 
'' ' 
KEY. 
rntttllQ.lionGl eoUndary -·--
Moht ROlld· ·----
.. Roilw.y.. .+++++ ......... 
. Rivet• 
N 
s 0 I.ti" c..& ~· 4/1-1 :C...T'! • It r - fl.A~ulll~(,. O/f/ WlfTEI. 
I ME 
Pow4( ' fRllNSPot r1t rl'""" I lfN~ kwN$ .. :Ci> 
F1.t,?l..:t7'1GS ,.QI& 'Tlf& SJ.ittSHll. P110;-e.<.t -
l3e.rf.wlf"'" Nor11s lfN.o '/(11Gok.cs, '4, .. ~,1112 
' (J. 2."'· 
- 292 -
B I B L I 0 G R A P H Y 
A. Books and Articles 
Areskoug, K. 
Arrighi, G. 
Arrow, K. J. 
Baldwin, R. E. 
Baran, P. A. 
Behrman, J. M. 
Bhagwati, J. 
Foreign Capital Utilisation and 
Economic Policies in Developing 
Countries - The Review of Economics 
and Statistics, Vol. LV, No. 2, 
May 1973 
International Corporations, Labour 
Aristocracies, and Economic Develop-
ment in Tropical Africa - in: 
Rhodes (ed), (see Rhodes, below) 
Economic Welfare and the Allocation 
of Resources for Invention - in: 
Lamberton, D. M. (ed) - Economics 
of Information and Knowledge -
Penguin, 1971 
Economic Development and Export 
Growth - University of California 
Press, 1966 
The Political Economy of Growth -
Monthly Review Press, 1957 
Taxation of Extractive Industries 
in Latin America and the Impact on 
Foreign Investors - iruMikesell (ed), 
see below 
Immiserising Growth: A Geometrical 
Note - Review of Economic Studies, 
Vol. XXV, No. 3, June 1958 
- 293 -
Bronfenbrenner, M. The Appeal of Confiscation in Economic 
Development - Economic Development and 
Cultural Change, Vol. 3, April 19SS 
Caves, R. E. 
Cooper, C, 
Cooper, c. and 
N. Clark 
Cooper, R. N. 
Cooper, R. N. and 
E. M •. 'l'ruman 
Church, P. E. 
Dos Santos, T. 
Dunning, J. H. 
(eel) (1971 a) 
Dunning, J. H. 
(1971 b) 
International Corporations~ The 
Industrial Economics of Foreign 
Investment - Economica, February 1971 
Science, Technology and Production 
in the Underdeveloped Countries: 
An Introduction - Journal of Develop-
ment Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1, October 
1972 
The Transfer of Technology to Latin 
America - Unpublished paper of the 
Science Policy Research Unit, Sussex 
University, 15th February 1972 
Towards an International Capital 
Market - in: Dunning (ed) (1972 a) 
An Analysis of the Role of Inter-
national Capital Markets in Providing 
Funds to Developing Countries - Yale 
University, Economic Growth Centre, 
Paper No. 170, 1971 
Labour Relations in Mineral and 
Petroleum Resource Development -
in: Mikesell (ed), see below 
... 
The Structure of Dependence - American 
Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 
May 1970 
The Multinational Enterprise -
George Allen and Unwin 
The Multinational Enterprise: The 
Background - in Dunning (ed) (1971 a) 
- 294 -
Dunning, J. H. 
(ed) ( 1972 a) 
Dunning, J. H. 
(1972 b) 
Dunning, J. H. 
(1973 a) 
Dunning, J. H. 
{1973 b) 
Dobb, M. 
Edozien, E. c. 
Faber, M. L. o. and 
J. G~, Potter 
Frank, A. G. 
Galenson, W. and 
H. Liebenstein 
Girvan, M. 
International Investment - Penguin 
Capital Movements in the Twentieth 
Century - in: Dunning (ed) (1972 a) 
Multinational Enterprises and Domestic 
Capital Formation - Manchester School, 
No. 3, September 1973 
The Determinants of International 
Production - Oxford Economic Papers, 
Vo 1. 2 5 , No • 3 
An Essay on Economic Growth and Planning, 
Monthly Review Press 1969 (originally 
published 1960) 
Linkages, Direct Foreign Investment, 
and Nigerian Economic Development -
Nigerian Journal of Economic and 
Social Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2, 
July 1968 
Towards Economic Independence - Papers 
on the Nationalisation of the Copper 
Industry in Zambia - Cambridge 
University Press, 1971 
Capitalism and Underdevelopment in 
Latin America - Pelican, 1971 
Investment Criteria, Productivity and 
Economic Development - The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, August 1955 
Multinational Corporations and 
Dependent Underdevelopment in Mineral 
Export Economies - Social and Economic 
Stuides, Vol. 19, 1970 
- 295 -
Girvan, M. and 
o. Jefferson 
Gruber, W.; Mehta, 
P.; Vernon, R. 
Hirschman, A. o. 
(1958) 
Hirschman, A. o. 
(1969) 
Horst, T. O. 
Hymer , S • ( 19 6 O ) 
Hymer, S. ( 196 7) 
Hymer, S • ( 19 7 O) 
Hymer, S. (1972) 
Hymer, S. and 
S •. ··A. Resnick 
Corporate v. Caribbean Integration -
in: Bernstein, H. (ed) - Underdevelop-
ment and Development - Penguin 1973 
The R&D Factor in International Trade 
and International Investment of 
United States Industries - Journal 
of Political Economy, Vol. LXXV, 
No. 1, February 1967 
The Strategy of Economic Development -
Yale University Press 
How to Divest in Latin American and 
Why - Princeton University, Essays 
in International Finance, No. 76 
The Theory of the Multinational Firm: 
Optimal Behaviour under Different 
Tariff and Tax Rates - Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 79, 5, Sept.-
Oct. 1971 
The International Operations of 
National Firms: A Study of Direct 
Investment - MIT Doctoral Dissertation 
Direct Foreign Investment and the 
National Economic Interest - Yale 
Economic Growth Centre, Paper No. 108 
The Efficiency Contradictions of 
Multinational Corporations - American 
Economic Review, Vol. 60, 2, May 
The Multinational Corporation and the 
Law of Uneven Development - Yale 
Economic Growth Centre, Paper No. 181 
International Trade and Uneven Develop-
ment - Yale Economic Growth Centre, 
Paper No. 178 
- 296 -
Hymer, S. and 
R. :{lowthorn 
Johnson, H. G. 
Kaldor, N. 
Kemp, M. C. 
Killick, T. 
The Multinational Corporations and 
International Oligopoly: The Non-
American Challenge - in: Kindleberger 
(ed) 
The Efficiency and Welfare Implica~ 
tions of the International Corpora-
tion - in: Kindleberger (ed) 
Essays on Economic Policy, Volume I -
Duckworth, 1964 
Foreign Investment and the National 
Advantage - Economic Record, Vol. Ja, 
March 1962 
The Benefits of Foreign Direct In-
vestment and its Alternatives: 
An Empirical Exploitation - Harvard 
University, Development Advisory 
Service, Report No. 183 
Kindleberger, C. P. American Business Abroad: Six Lectures 
on Direct Investment - Yale Univer-
sity Press, 1969 
Kindleberger, C. P. The International Corporation -
(ed) The M.I.T. Press, 1970 
La Clau, E. 
Lichtheim, G. 
Mamalakis, M. 
Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin 
America - New Left Review, No. 67, 
1971 
Imperialism - Allen Lane, 1971 
The Contribution of Copper to 
Chilean Economic Development, 1920 -
67: Profile of a Foreign Owned 
Economic Sector - in: Mikesell (ed) 
- 297 -
Merhav, M. 
Meillassoux, c. 
Mikesell, R. F. 
(ed) 
Mikesell, R. F. 
Mikesell, R. F. 
Mikesell, R. F. 
Mundell, R. A. 
Murray, R. (1971) 
Murray, R. (1972) 
l.\4egishi, T. 
Penrose, E. T. 
(1956) 
Technological Dependence, Monopoly 
and Growth - Pergamom Press, 1969 
From Reproduction to Production -
Economy and Society, Vol. 1, No. 1, 
1972 
Foreign Investment in the Petroleum 
and Mineral Industries - John Hopkins 
Press, 1971 
The Contribution of Petroleum and 
Mineral Resources to Economic Develop-
ment - in~ Mikesell (ed) 
Conflict in Foreign Inve~tor-Host ~ 
Country Relations: A Preliminary 
Analysis - in: Mikesell (ed) 
Cqnlfict and Accommodation in 
Chilean Copper - in: Mikesell (ed) 
International Trade and Factor 
Mobility - American Economic Review, 
Vo 1 • 4 7 , 19 5 7 
The Internation~lisation of Cap~tal 
and the Nation State - in: Dunning (ed) 
Underdevelopment, International Firms, 
and the International Division of 
Labour - in "Towards a New World 
Economy" - Rotterdam University l?ress, 
1972 
Foreign Investment and the Long Run 
National Advantage - Economic Record, 
Vol. 41, December 1965 
Foreign Investment and the Growth of 
the Firm - Economic Journal, Vol. LXVI, 
June 
- 298 -
Penrose, E. T. 
(1968) 
Penrose, E. T. 
(19 71) 
Penrose, E. T. 
(1973) 
Reno, P. 
Rhodes, R. I. (ed) 
Rollin, C. E. 
Sci tovsky, 'I'. 
Seers, D. (1963) 
Seers, D. (1972) 
Sen, A. K. 
Servan-Schreiber, 
J. J. 
The Large International Firm in 
Developing Countries - Allen and 
Unwin 
The State and Multinational Enterprises 
in Less Developed Countries - in: 
Dunning (ed) 
International Patenting and the Less 
Developed Countries - The Economic 
Journal, Vol. 83, No. 331, September 
Aluminium Profits and Caribbean 
People - in: Rhodes (ed} 
Imperialism and Underdevelopment: a 
reader - Monthly Review Press 1970 
Mineral Development and Export Growth -
in: Rhodes (ed} 
Two Concepts of External Economies -
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 17, 
1954 - reprinted in A.E.A. Readings 
in Welfare Economics - Allen and 
Unwin, 1969 
Big Companies and Small Countries 
Kyklos, Vol. XVI, No. 4 
What are we trying to measure? -
Journal of Development Studies, 
Vol. 8, 3, April 1972 
Choice of Techniques. An Aspect of 
the Theory of Planned Economic Develop-
ment - Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962 
The American Challenge - Pelican 
(1969} 
- 299 -
· Shulman , J . S . 
Singer, H. W. 
Stewart, F. 
Streeten, P. 
Vaitsos, C. V. 
(1970 a) 
Vaitsos, c. V. 
(1970 b) 
Vaitsos, C. V. 
(1972 a) 
Vaitsos, c. V. 
(1972 b) 
Vernon, R. (1966) 
Transfer Pricing in the Multinational 
Firm - in: Thorelli, H. B. (ed) -
International Marketing Strategy, 
Penguin, 1973 
The Distribution of Gains between 
Investing and Borrowing Countries -
American Economic Review, Vol. 40, 
May 1950 
Choice of Technique in Developing 
Countries - Journal of Developmept 
Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1, October 1972 
Costs and Benefits of Multinational 
Enterprises in Less Developed 
Countries - in: Dunning ( ed) ( 1971) 
Transfer of Resources and Preserva-
tion of Monopoly Rents - Harvard 
University, Development Advisory 
Service, Report No. 168 
Bargaining and the Distribution of 
Returns in the Purchase of Technology 
by Developing Countries - Bulletin 
of the Institute of Development 
Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 
Income Distribution, Welfare Conside-
rations and Transnational Ente~prises -
Mimeo, Lima, August 
Patents Revisited: Their Function in 
Developing Countries - Journal of 
Development Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1, 
October 1972 
International Investment an~ Inter-
national Trade in the Product Cycle -
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
Vol. LXXX, May 
- 300 -
Vernon, R. (1971) 
Wells, L. T. 
Weisskopf, T. E. 
Boocock, c. 
Cowen, D. V. 
sovereignity at Bay - Longman 
Foreign Investment in Joint Ventures: 
Some Effects of Government Policy in 
Less Developed Countries - Harvard 
University, Development Advisory 
Service 
The Impact of Foreign Capital Inflows 
on Domestic Savings in Underdeveloped 
Countries - Journal of International 
Economics, Vol. 2, No. 1, February 1972 
Review of Mineral Resources and 
Mining Activities in the Republic 
of Botswana - South African Mining 
and Engineering Journal, 1969 
Towards a Common Market in South 
Africa - Optima, Vol. 17, 1967 
Davenport, T. R. H. The Right to Land - Cape Town, 
and K. S. Hunt (ed) David Philip, 1974 
Gordon, H. S. 
11ailey, Lord 
Halpern, J. 
Report on Gold Mining in the 
Bechuanaland Protectorate -
Report of the XV International 
Geological Conference, 1929 
'I'he Republic of South Africa and the 
High Commission Territories - Oxford 
University Press, 1963 
South Africa's Hostages: Basutoland, 
Bechuanaland and Swaziland - Penguin, 
1965 
- 301 -
Henry, H. G. 
Hopkinson, B. 
The International 
Monetary E'und 
Jackson, D. 
Joubert, c. 
Khama, s. 
Khama, T. 
Landell-Mills, P. 
(1970) . 
Landell-Mills, P. 
(1971) 
Muzorewa, B. c. 
(1972) 
The Economy of Botswana - in: 
R. P. Stevens (1967) 
A Backward Glance for the Future -
unpublished paper of the Botswana 
Christian Council, Urban and 
Industrial Mission, Selebi-Pikwe, 
1973 
Customs Union between Botswana, 
Lesotho, Swaziland and the Republic 
of South Africa - African Depart-
ment, March 1971 
Income Differentials and Unbalanced 
Planning - the case of Botswana -
Journal of Modern African Studies, 
Vol. 8, No. 4, December 1970 
Notes on a Botswana Example of the 
Taxation of Mining - Botswana Notes 
and Records, Vol. 4, 1972 
Next Goal: Economic Independence -
Third World, Vol. 2, No. I, 
January 1973 
Bechuanaland and South Africa -
London, Africa Bureau, 1955 
Rural Income and Urban Wage· Rates -
Botswana Notes and Records, Vo+. 2 
The 1969 Southern African Customs 
Union Agreement - The Journal of 
Modern African Studies, Vol. 9, 
No. 2, 1971 
The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas 
and the Rand - The Rhodesian Jou~nal 
of Economics, Vol. 6, No. 2 
- 302 -
Muzorewa, B. 
(1974) 
Ostrander, F. T. 
Potholm, c. P. and 
R. Dale (ed) 
Rey, C. F. 
Robson, P. 
The Southern African Currency 
Arrangements - unpublished paper 
received in June 1974 
Botswana Nickel-Copper: A Case S~udy 
in Private Investments Contribution 
to Economic Development - unpublished 
paper at conference on Accelerated 
Development in Southern Africa -
March 1972 
Southern Africa in Perspective 
The Free Press, 1972 
Memorandum: Prospecting and Mining 
in the Bechuanaland Protectorate -
Mafeking Mail, 1934 
Economic Integration in Southern 
Africa - The Journal of Modern 
African Studies, Vol. 5, No. 4, 
1967 
Schapera, I. (1953) The Tswana - London, International 
African Institute 
Selwyn, P. 
Sillery, A. 
Smit, P. 
Spence, J. 
Core and·Periphery - A Study of 
Industrial Development in the Small 
Countries of Southern Africa -
unpublished IDS Mineo - 1973 
The Bechuanaland Protectorate -
Oxford University Press, 1952 
Botswana, Resources and Development -
Communication of the Africa Institute, 
No. 13, 1970 
British Policy Towards the High 
Commission Territories - Journal 
of Modern African Studies, Vol. 2, 
No. 2, July 1964 
- 303 -
Stevens, R. P. 
(1967) 
Stevens, R. P. 
(1972) 
'rurner, B. 
van Rensburg, P. 
White, R. J. 
Wilson, F. 
Wolpe, H. 
Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland. 
'11he Former High Con:unission Terri-
tories in Southern Africa - London, 
Pall Mall, 1967 
The History of the Anglo-South 
African Conflict over the Proposed 
Incorporation of the High Commission 
Territories - in: Potholm and 
Dale (ed) 
A Fresh Start for the South African 
Customs Union - African Affairs, 
Vol. 70, NO. 280 
Report from Swaneng Hill: Education 
and Employment in an African Country -
Almqvist and Wiksell, Uppsala, 1974 
Planning of Water, Power, Transporta-
tion and Township Facilities for 
the Shashe Project - Botswana Notes 
and Records Vol. 4, 1972 
Migrant Labour •. Report to the South 
African Council of Churches and 
Spro-Cas - 1972 
Capitalism and Cheap Labour Power 
in South Africa - From Segregation 
to Apartheid - Economy and Society, 
Vol. 1, No. l 
B. Official Publications 
Chambers, R. and 
o. Feldman 
Report on Rural Development - Ministry 
of Finance and Development Planning -
February, 1973 
- 305 -
2. Great Britain 
-------------
- ·, ·l 
-bth-
Dominions Off ice - Financial and 
Economic Position of the Bechuanaland 
Protectorate (Pim Commission) -
London H.M.S.O., 1933, Cmd. 4368 
Commonwealth Relations Office -
Economic Survey Mission to Basutoland, 
Bechuanaland and Swaziland (Morse 
Commission), London, H.M.s.o., 1960 
The Development of the Bechuanaland 
Economy: Report of the Ministry of 
Overseas Development, Economic Survey 
Mission, November 1965 
- 304 -
Ghai, D. P. 
Customs Union Agreements, 1910 
and 1969 - see: IMF in A. 2. (above) 
A Long Term Wages Policy for Botswana -
Ministry of Finance and Development 
Planning, 1971 
Geological Survey and Mines Department -
Annual REports 
Localisation and Training in the 
Botswana Civil Service - Report 
of the Presidential Commission, 1973 
Manpower and Employment in Botswana -
Ministry of Finance and Development 
Planning, May 1973 
National Accounts of Botswana - Annual 
National Development Plans - 1968 - 73, -
1970 - 75, 1973 - 78 
National Policy on Incomes, Employ-
ment, Prices and Profits - Government 
Paper No. 2, March 1972 
Statistical Abstract - Annual 
The Shashe Project in North East 
Botswana - Unpublished Paper of the 
Ministry of Finance and Development 
Planning - July, 1973 
Shashe Project Management Unit -
Quarterly Reports 
